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[79.176.118.93]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e15sm8898wro.13.2020.10.19.08.00.47 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 19 Oct 2020 08:00:49 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2020 11:00:45 -0400 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" To: Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [PATCH] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver Message-ID: <20201019105118-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> References: <20201017053712.GA14105@1wt.eu> <20201017064442.GA14117@1wt.eu> <20201018114625-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20201018115524-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=mst@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Received-SPF: pass client-ip=63.128.21.124; envelope-from=mst@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: First seen = 2020/10/19 02:32:01 X-ACL-Warn: Detected OS = Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] [fuzzy] X-Spam_score_int: -20 X-Spam_score: -2.1 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.1 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H5=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , KVM list , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , ghammer@redhat.com, "Weiss, Radu" , Qemu Developers , "open list:VIRTIO GPU DRIVER" , Pavel Machek , Colm MacCarthaigh , Jonathan Corbet , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Eric Biggers , "Singh, Balbir" , bonzini@gnu.org, "Graf \(AWS\), Alexander" , Jann Horn , oridgar@gmail.com, "Catangiu, Adrian Costin" , Michal Hocko , "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , kernel list , Linux API , Willy Tarreau , "Woodhouse, David" Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" On Sun, Oct 18, 2020 at 09:14:00AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Sun, Oct 18, 2020 at 8:59 AM Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > On Sun, Oct 18, 2020 at 08:54:36AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > On Sun, Oct 18, 2020 at 8:52 AM Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > > > > > On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 03:24:08PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > > > > > 4c. The guest kernel maintains an array of physical addresses that are > > > > > MADV_WIPEONFORK. The hypervisor knows about this array and its > > > > > location through whatever protocol, and before resuming a > > > > > moved/snapshotted/duplicated VM, it takes the responsibility for > > > > > memzeroing this memory. The huge pro here would be that this > > > > > eliminates all races, and reduces complexity quite a bit, because the > > > > > hypervisor can perfectly synchronize its bringup (and SMP bringup) > > > > > with this, and it can even optimize things like on-disk memory > > > > > snapshots to simply not write out those pages to disk. > > > > > > > > > > A 4c-like approach seems like it'd be a lot of bang for the buck -- we > > > > > reuse the existing mechanism (MADV_WIPEONFORK), so there's no new > > > > > userspace API to deal with, and it'd be race free, and eliminate a lot > > > > > of kernel complexity. > > > > > > > > Clearly this has a chance to break applications, right? > > > > If there's an app that uses this as a non-system-calls way > > > > to find out whether there was a fork, it will break > > > > when wipe triggers without a fork ... > > > > For example, imagine: > > > > > > > > MADV_WIPEONFORK > > > > copy secret data to MADV_DONTFORK > > > > fork > > > > > > > > > > > > used to work, with this change it gets 0s instead of the secret data. > > > > > > > > > > > > I am also not sure it's wise to expose each guest process > > > > to the hypervisor like this. E.g. each process needs a > > > > guest physical address of its own then. This is a finite resource. > > > > > > > > > > > > The mmap interface proposed here is somewhat baroque, but it is > > > > certainly simple to implement ... > > > > > > Wipe of fork/vmgenid/whatever could end up being much more problematic > > > than it naively appears -- it could be wiped in the middle of a read. > > > Either the API needs to handle this cleanly, or we need something more > > > aggressive like signal-on-fork. > > > > > > --Andy > > > > > > Right, it's not on fork, it's actually when process is snapshotted. > > > > If we assume it's CRIU we care about, then I > > wonder what's wrong with something like > > MADV_CHANGEONPTRACE_SEIZE > > and basically say it's X bytes which change the value... > > I feel like we may be approaching this from the wrong end. Rather > than saying "what data structure can the kernel expose that might > plausibly be useful", how about we try identifying some specific > userspace needs and see what a good solution could look like. I can > identify two major cryptographic use cases: Well, I'm aware of a non-cryptographic use-case: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1118834 this seems to just ask for the guest to have a way to detect that a VM cloning triggered. -- MST