From: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
To: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, "Boris Fiuczynski" <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com>,
brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
"Ram Pai" <linuxram@us.ibm.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Halil Pasic" <pasic@linux.ibm.com>,
"Viktor Mihajlovski" <mihajlov@linux.ibm.com>,
thuth@redhat.com, "Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
"Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>,
qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, rth@twiddle.net,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Marcelo Tosatti" <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, "David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [for-6.0 v5 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 09:34:24 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210119093424.165cfebb.cohuck@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2f358741-a9a5-a5d6-715c-c3dba85fbb17@de.ibm.com>
On Tue, 19 Jan 2021 09:28:22 +0100
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:
> On 18.01.21 18:39, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * David Gibson (david@gibson.dropbear.id.au) wrote:
> >> On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 11:25:17AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 12:42:26PM +0000, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> >>>> * Cornelia Huck (cohuck@redhat.com) wrote:
> >>>>> On Tue, 5 Jan 2021 12:41:25 -0800
> >>>>> Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> On Tue, Jan 05, 2021 at 11:56:14AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:
> >>>>>>> On Mon, 4 Jan 2021 10:40:26 -0800
> >>>>>>> Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>> The main difference between my proposal and the other proposal is...
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> In my proposal the guest makes the compatibility decision and acts
> >>>>>>>> accordingly. In the other proposal QEMU makes the compatibility
> >>>>>>>> decision and acts accordingly. I argue that QEMU cannot make a good
> >>>>>>>> compatibility decision, because it wont know in advance, if the guest
> >>>>>>>> will or will-not switch-to-secure.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> You have a point there when you say that QEMU does not know in advance,
> >>>>>>> if the guest will or will-not switch-to-secure. I made that argument
> >>>>>>> regarding VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM (iommu_platform) myself. My idea
> >>>>>>> was to flip that property on demand when the conversion occurs. David
> >>>>>>> explained to me that this is not possible for ppc, and that having the
> >>>>>>> "securable-guest-memory" property (or whatever the name will be)
> >>>>>>> specified is a strong indication, that the VM is intended to be used as
> >>>>>>> a secure VM (thus it is OK to hurt the case where the guest does not
> >>>>>>> try to transition). That argument applies here as well.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> As suggested by Cornelia Huck, what if QEMU disabled the
> >>>>>> "securable-guest-memory" property if 'must-support-migrate' is enabled?
> >>>>>> Offcourse; this has to be done with a big fat warning stating
> >>>>>> "secure-guest-memory" feature is disabled on the machine.
> >>>>>> Doing so, will continue to support guest that do not try to transition.
> >>>>>> Guest that try to transition will fail and terminate themselves.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Just to recap the s390x situation:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - We currently offer a cpu feature that indicates secure execution to
> >>>>> be available to the guest if the host supports it.
> >>>>> - When we introduce the secure object, we still need to support
> >>>>> previous configurations and continue to offer the cpu feature, even
> >>>>> if the secure object is not specified.
> >>>>> - As migration is currently not supported for secured guests, we add a
> >>>>> blocker once the guest actually transitions. That means that
> >>>>> transition fails if --only-migratable was specified on the command
> >>>>> line. (Guests not transitioning will obviously not notice anything.)
> >>>>> - With the secure object, we will already fail starting QEMU if
> >>>>> --only-migratable was specified.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> My suggestion is now that we don't even offer the cpu feature if
> >>>>> --only-migratable has been specified. For a guest that does not want to
> >>>>> transition to secure mode, nothing changes; a guest that wants to
> >>>>> transition to secure mode will notice that the feature is not available
> >>>>> and fail appropriately (or ultimately, when the ultravisor call fails).
> >>>>> We'd still fail starting QEMU for the secure object + --only-migratable
> >>>>> combination.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Does that make sense?
> >>>>
> >>>> It's a little unusual; I don't think we have any other cases where
> >>>> --only-migratable changes the behaviour; I think it normally only stops
> >>>> you doing something that would have made it unmigratable or causes
> >>>> an operation that would make it unmigratable to fail.
> >>>
> >>> I agree, --only-migratable is supposed to be a *behavioural* toggle
> >>> for QEMU. It must /not/ have any impact on the guest ABI.
> >>>
> >>> A management application needs to be able to add/remove --only-migratable
> >>> at will without changing the exposing guest ABI.
> >>
> >> At the qemu level, it sounds like the right thing to do is to fail
> >> outright if all of the below are true:
> >> 1. --only-migratable is specified
> >> 2. -cpu host is specified
> >> 3. unpack isn't explicitly disabled
> >> 4. the host CPU actually does have the unpack facility
> >>
> >> That can be changed if & when migration support is added for PV.
> >
> > That sounds right to me.
>
> as startup will fail anyway if the guest cpu model enables unpack, but the host
> cpu does not support it this can be simplified to forbid startup in qemu if
> --only-migratable is combined with unpack being active in the guest cpu model.
>
> This is actually independent from this patch set.
Yep, I think we should just go ahead and fix this.
> maybe just
> something like
>
> diff --git a/target/s390x/cpu_models.c b/target/s390x/cpu_models.c
> index 35179f9dc7ba..3b85ff4e31b2 100644
> --- a/target/s390x/cpu_models.c
> +++ b/target/s390x/cpu_models.c
> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
> #include "qapi/qmp/qdict.h"
> #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
> #include "sysemu/arch_init.h"
> +#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
> #include "hw/pci/pci.h"
> #endif
> #include "qapi/qapi-commands-machine-target.h"
> @@ -878,6 +879,11 @@ static void check_compatibility(const S390CPUModel *max_model,
> return;
> }
>
> + if (only_migratable && test_bit(S390_FEAT_UNPACK, model->features)) {
> + error_setg(errp, "The unpack facility is not compatible with "
> + "the --only-migratable option");
> + }
> +
> /* detect the missing features to properly report them */
> bitmap_andnot(missing, model->features, max_model->features, S390_FEAT_MAX);
> if (bitmap_empty(missing, S390_FEAT_MAX)) {
>
>
Want to send this as a proper patch?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-19 8:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 93+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-12-04 5:44 [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2020-12-04 12:57 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-14 21:25 ` Eduardo Habkost
2021-01-11 18:04 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 02/13] securable guest memory: Introduce new securable guest memory base class David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 03/13] securable guest memory: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-12-04 13:10 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-08 4:03 ` David Gibson
2021-01-12 3:49 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 04/13] securable guest memory: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 05/13] securable guest memory: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2021-01-11 18:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 06/13] securable guest memory: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2021-01-11 18:13 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-01-12 3:03 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 07/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2020-12-14 16:50 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 08/13] securable guest memory: Introduce sgm "ready" flag David Gibson
2020-12-14 17:00 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 5:38 ` David Gibson
2020-12-17 11:24 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 09/13] securable guest memory: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based securable guest memory David Gibson
2021-01-05 23:34 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-08 0:34 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2020-12-14 17:22 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 5:47 ` David Gibson
2020-12-17 11:38 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 14:15 ` Greg Kurz
2020-12-18 11:41 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-18 12:08 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-04 7:15 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-04 12:46 ` [EXTERNAL] " Halil Pasic
2021-01-04 18:40 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-05 10:56 ` [EXTERNAL] " Halil Pasic
2021-01-05 20:41 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-11 16:59 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-11 19:58 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-12 8:19 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-12 18:55 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-13 8:06 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-15 18:55 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-19 8:19 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-19 9:59 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 11:23 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-13 12:42 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-14 10:28 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 10:36 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-14 10:52 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 11:05 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-14 11:45 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-14 11:50 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 12:20 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 14:04 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-14 14:09 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 14:15 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 15:25 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 15:33 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-15 18:24 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-14 11:25 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 23:51 ` David Gibson
2021-01-18 17:39 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-19 8:28 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-19 8:34 ` Cornelia Huck [this message]
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 12/13] securable guest memory: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-12-04 8:10 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-04 8:17 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 8:29 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-04 14:43 ` Halil Pasic
2020-12-08 1:54 ` David Gibson
2020-12-08 8:16 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-08 10:28 ` Halil Pasic
2020-12-08 12:50 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 5:53 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 17:04 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 13/13] s390: Recognize securable-guest-memory option David Gibson
2020-12-15 11:45 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 5:54 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 8:06 ` [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-04 13:02 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 13:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-12-04 13:12 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-08 2:57 ` David Gibson
2020-12-08 12:43 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 6:21 ` David Gibson
2020-12-17 11:43 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 13:25 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-12-04 13:51 ` Halil Pasic
2020-12-08 2:54 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 9:50 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-12 3:02 ` David Gibson
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