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From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
	pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, mst@redhat.com,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
	borntraeger@de.ibm.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, thuth@redhat.com,
	Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com,
	berrange@redhat.com, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 17:30:45 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210129063045.GM6951@yekko.fritz.box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210118194730.GH9899@work-vm>

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On Mon, Jan 18, 2021 at 07:47:30PM +0000, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * David Gibson (david@gibson.dropbear.id.au) wrote:
> > The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
> > confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
> > initialization.  Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
> > initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
> > initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.
> > 
> > However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
> > properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
> > common place, relatively late in boot, where we verify that cgs has
> > been initialized if it was requested.
> > 
> > This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
> > base type to accomplish this, which we verify just before the machine
> > specific initialization function.
> 
> You may find you need to define 'ready' and the answer might be a bit
> variable;

Ugh, yeah.  I'm not sure it will be possible to precisely define
this.  Basically this is a helper for an internal sanity check, rather
than anything more fundamental.  The idea is that depending on the
details of the CGS mechanism, it might need initialization of various
components, which might naturally be distributed across different
parts of the init code.

> for example, on SEV there's a setup bit and then you may end
> up doing an attestation and receiving some data before you actaully let
> the guest execute code.   Is it ready before it's received the
> attestation response or only when it can run code?

I don't really know enough about how SEV works to answer that.
Certainly it should be "ready" before any guest instructions are
executed.

> Is a Power or 390 machine 'ready' before it's executed the magic
> instruction to enter the confidential mode?

Definitely.  Ready must be set before we enter the guest (and so
assert that it *is* set is before that).

> 
> Dave
> 
> > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > ---
> >  hw/core/machine.c                         | 8 ++++++++
> >  include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 2 ++
> >  target/i386/sev.c                         | 2 ++
> >  3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > index 94194ab82d..5a7433332b 100644
> > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > @@ -1190,6 +1190,14 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> >      }
> >  
> >      if (machine->cgs) {
> > +        /*
> > +         * Where confidential guest support is initialized depends on
> > +         * the specific mechanism in use.  But, we need to make sure
> > +         * it's ready by now.  If it isn't, that's a bug in the
> > +         * implementation of that cgs mechanism.
> > +         */
> > +        assert(machine->cgs->ready);
> > +
> >          /*
> >           * With confidential guests, the host can't see the real
> >           * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge
> > diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
> > index 5f131023ba..bcaf6c9f49 100644
> > --- a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
> > +++ b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
> > @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport, CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
> >  
> >  struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
> >      Object parent;
> > +
> > +    bool ready;
> >  };
> >  
> >  typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
> > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> > index e2b41ef342..3d94635397 100644
> > --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> > @@ -737,6 +737,8 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
> >      qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify);
> >      qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, sev);
> >  
> > +    cgs->ready = true;
> > +
> >      return 0;
> >  err:
> >      sev_guest = NULL;

-- 
David Gibson			| I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au	| minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
				| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-29  9:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-13 23:57 [PATCH v7 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:57 ` [PATCH v7 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson
2021-01-14  9:34   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 10:42     ` David Gibson
2021-01-18 18:51   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-21  1:06     ` David Gibson
2021-01-21  9:08       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-29  2:32         ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson
2021-01-15 12:54   ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-18  2:59     ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2021-01-15 12:56   ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2021-01-15 13:06   ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson
2021-01-14  8:55   ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-15 13:12   ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-18 19:47   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-19  8:16     ` Cornelia Huck
2021-02-02  1:41       ` David Gibson
2021-01-29  6:30     ` David Gibson [this message]
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2021-01-15 13:24   ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-18  3:03     ` David Gibson
2021-01-18  8:03       ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-29  3:12         ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson
2021-01-14 10:07   ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-15 15:36   ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-29  2:36     ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson
2021-01-14 10:39   ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-29  6:23     ` David Gibson
2021-01-15 15:41   ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-29  2:43     ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson
2021-01-14  9:10   ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14  9:19     ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14  9:24       ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-15  0:13         ` David Gibson
2021-01-14 11:45     ` David Gibson
2021-01-15 16:36   ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-18 17:06     ` Christian Borntraeger

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