From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: add SEV hashing to fw_cfg for kernel/initrd/cmdline
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 2021 12:42:35 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210703123406-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210525065931.1628554-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 06:59:31AM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
> From: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
>
> If the VM is using memory encryption and also specifies a kernel/initrd
> or appended command line, calculate the hashes and add them to the
> encrypted data. For this to work, OVMF must support an encrypted area
> to place the data which is advertised via a special GUID in the OVMF
> reset table (if the GUID doesn't exist, the user isn't allowed to pass
> in the kernel/initrd/cmdline via the fw_cfg interface).
Sorry about asking basic questions so late in the game.
I'm a bit curious why this feature makes sense. If someone can play
with a Linux kernel command line isn't it pretty much game over security
wise? What protections does Linux have against malicious actors
manipulating the command line?
>
> The hashes of each of the files is calculated (or the string in the case
> of the cmdline with trailing '\0' included). Each entry in the hashes
> table is GUID identified and since they're passed through the memcrypt
> interface, the hash of the encrypted data will be accumulated by the
> PSP.
>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
> [dovmurik@linux.ibm.com: use machine->cgs, remove parsing of GUID
> strings, remove GCC pragma, fix checkpatch errors]
> ---
>
> OVMF support for handling the table of hashes (verifying that the
> kernel/initrd/cmdline passed via the fw_cfg interface indeed correspond
> to the measured hashes in the table) will be posted soon to edk2-devel.
>
> ---
> hw/i386/x86.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 119 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/i386/x86.c b/hw/i386/x86.c
> index ed796fe6ba..d8e77b99b4 100644
> --- a/hw/i386/x86.c
> +++ b/hw/i386/x86.c
> @@ -37,12 +37,16 @@
> #include "sysemu/replay.h"
> #include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
> #include "sysemu/cpu-timers.h"
> +#include "sysemu/sev.h"
> +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h"
> #include "trace.h"
> +#include "crypto/hash.h"
>
> #include "hw/i386/x86.h"
> #include "target/i386/cpu.h"
> #include "hw/i386/topology.h"
> #include "hw/i386/fw_cfg.h"
> +#include "hw/i386/pc.h"
> #include "hw/intc/i8259.h"
> #include "hw/rtc/mc146818rtc.h"
>
> @@ -758,6 +762,42 @@ static bool load_elfboot(const char *kernel_filename,
> return true;
> }
>
> +struct sev_hash_table_descriptor {
> + uint32_t base;
> + uint32_t size;
> +};
> +
> +/* hard code sha256 digest size */
> +#define HASH_SIZE 32
> +
> +struct sev_hash_table_entry {
> + uint8_t guid[16];
> + uint16_t len;
> + uint8_t hash[HASH_SIZE];
> +} __attribute__ ((packed));
> +
> +struct sev_hash_table {
> + uint8_t guid[16];
> + uint16_t len;
> + struct sev_hash_table_entry entries[];
> +} __attribute__((packed));
> +
> +#define SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID "7255371f-3a3b-4b04-927b-1da6efa8d454"
> +
> +static const uint8_t sev_hash_table_header_guid[] =
> + UUID_LE(0x9438d606, 0x4f22, 0x4cc9, 0xb4, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x93,
> + 0xd4, 0x11, 0xfd, 0x21);
> +
> +static const uint8_t sev_kernel_entry_guid[] =
> + UUID_LE(0x4de79437, 0xabd2, 0x427f, 0xb8, 0x35, 0xd5, 0xb1,
> + 0x72, 0xd2, 0x04, 0x5b);
> +static const uint8_t sev_initrd_entry_guid[] =
> + UUID_LE(0x44baf731, 0x3a2f, 0x4bd7, 0x9a, 0xf1, 0x41, 0xe2,
> + 0x91, 0x69, 0x78, 0x1d);
> +static const uint8_t sev_cmdline_entry_guid[] =
> + UUID_LE(0x97d02dd8, 0xbd20, 0x4c94, 0xaa, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x71,
> + 0x4d, 0x36, 0xab, 0x2a);
> +
> void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> FWCfgState *fw_cfg,
> int acpi_data_size,
> @@ -778,6 +818,11 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> const char *initrd_filename = machine->initrd_filename;
> const char *dtb_filename = machine->dtb;
> const char *kernel_cmdline = machine->kernel_cmdline;
> + uint8_t buf[HASH_SIZE];
> + uint8_t *hash = buf;
> + size_t hash_len = sizeof(buf);
> + struct sev_hash_table *sev_ht = NULL;
> + int sev_ht_index = 0;
>
> /* Align to 16 bytes as a paranoia measure */
> cmdline_size = (strlen(kernel_cmdline) + 16) & ~15;
> @@ -799,6 +844,22 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> exit(1);
> }
>
> + if (machine->cgs && machine->cgs->ready) {
> + uint8_t *data;
> + struct sev_hash_table_descriptor *area;
> +
> + if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
> + fprintf(stderr, "qemu: kernel command line specified but OVMF has "
> + "no hash table guid\n");
> + exit(1);
> + }
> + area = (struct sev_hash_table_descriptor *)data;
> +
> + sev_ht = qemu_map_ram_ptr(NULL, area->base);
> + memcpy(sev_ht->guid, sev_hash_table_header_guid, sizeof(sev_ht->guid));
> + sev_ht->len = sizeof(*sev_ht);
> + }
> +
> /* kernel protocol version */
> if (ldl_p(header + 0x202) == 0x53726448) {
> protocol = lduw_p(header + 0x206);
> @@ -925,6 +986,17 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> fw_cfg_add_i32(fw_cfg, FW_CFG_CMDLINE_SIZE, strlen(kernel_cmdline) + 1);
> fw_cfg_add_string(fw_cfg, FW_CFG_CMDLINE_DATA, kernel_cmdline);
>
> + if (sev_ht) {
> + struct sev_hash_table_entry *e = &sev_ht->entries[sev_ht_index++];
> +
> + qcrypto_hash_bytes(QCRYPTO_HASH_ALG_SHA256, (char *)kernel_cmdline,
> + strlen(kernel_cmdline) + 1,
> + &hash, &hash_len, &error_fatal);
> + memcpy(e->hash, hash, hash_len);
> + e->len = sizeof(*e);
> + memcpy(e->guid, sev_cmdline_entry_guid, sizeof(e->guid));
> + }
> +
> if (protocol >= 0x202) {
> stl_p(header + 0x228, cmdline_addr);
> } else {
> @@ -1008,6 +1080,17 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
>
> stl_p(header + 0x218, initrd_addr);
> stl_p(header + 0x21c, initrd_size);
> +
> + if (sev_ht) {
> + struct sev_hash_table_entry *e = &sev_ht->entries[sev_ht_index++];
> +
> + qcrypto_hash_bytes(QCRYPTO_HASH_ALG_SHA256, (char *)initrd_data,
> + initrd_size, &hash, &hash_len, &error_fatal);
> + memcpy(e->hash, hash, hash_len);
> + e->len = sizeof(*e);
> + memcpy(e->guid, sev_initrd_entry_guid, sizeof(e->guid));
> + }
> +
> }
>
> /* load kernel and setup */
> @@ -1063,7 +1146,17 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> load_image_size(dtb_filename, setup_data->data, dtb_size);
> }
>
> - memcpy(setup, header, MIN(sizeof(header), setup_size));
> + /*
> + * If we're doing an encrypted VM (sev_ht will be set), it will be
> + * OVMF based, which uses the efi stub for booting and doesn't
> + * require any values to be placed in the kernel header. We
> + * therefore don't update the header so the hash of the kernel on
> + * the other side of the fw_cfg interface matches the hash of the
> + * file the user passed in.
> + */
> + if (!sev_ht) {
> + memcpy(setup, header, MIN(sizeof(header), setup_size));
> + }
>
> fw_cfg_add_i32(fw_cfg, FW_CFG_KERNEL_ADDR, prot_addr);
> fw_cfg_add_i32(fw_cfg, FW_CFG_KERNEL_SIZE, kernel_size);
> @@ -1073,6 +1166,31 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> fw_cfg_add_i32(fw_cfg, FW_CFG_SETUP_SIZE, setup_size);
> fw_cfg_add_bytes(fw_cfg, FW_CFG_SETUP_DATA, setup, setup_size);
>
> + if (sev_ht) {
> + struct iovec iov[2] = {
> + {.iov_base = (char *)setup, .iov_len = setup_size },
> + {.iov_base = (char *)kernel, .iov_len = kernel_size }
> + };
> + struct sev_hash_table_entry *e = &sev_ht->entries[sev_ht_index++];
> + int len;
> +
> + qcrypto_hash_bytesv(QCRYPTO_HASH_ALG_SHA256, iov, 2,
> + &hash, &hash_len, &error_fatal);
> + memcpy(e->hash, hash, hash_len);
> + e->len = sizeof(*e);
> + memcpy(e->guid, sev_kernel_entry_guid, sizeof(e->guid));
> +
> + /* now we have all the possible entries, finalize the hash table */
> + sev_ht->len += sev_ht_index * sizeof(*e);
> + /* SEV len has to be 16 byte aligned */
> + len = ROUND_UP(sev_ht->len, 16);
> + if (len != sev_ht->len) {
> + /* zero the excess data so hash can be reliably calculated */
> + memset(&sev_ht->entries[sev_ht_index], 0, len - sev_ht->len);
> + }
> +
> + sev_encrypt_flash((uint8_t *)sev_ht, len, &error_fatal);
> + }
> option_rom[nb_option_roms].bootindex = 0;
> option_rom[nb_option_roms].name = "linuxboot.bin";
> if (linuxboot_dma_enabled && fw_cfg_dma_enabled(fw_cfg)) {
> --
> 2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-07-03 16:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-25 6:59 [PATCH] x86: add SEV hashing to fw_cfg for kernel/initrd/cmdline Dov Murik
2021-05-25 13:10 ` Dov Murik
2021-06-14 7:08 ` Dov Murik
2021-06-15 15:20 ` Eduardo Habkost
2021-06-15 19:53 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-06-17 12:48 ` Dov Murik
2021-06-17 15:48 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-06-21 8:44 ` Thomas Huth
2021-06-21 9:15 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-06-21 9:42 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-06-17 17:22 ` Eduardo Habkost
2021-06-17 19:16 ` Dov Murik
2021-06-17 20:35 ` Eduardo Habkost
2021-06-16 12:04 ` Dov Murik
2021-07-03 16:42 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2021-07-04 6:16 ` Dov Murik
2021-07-04 6:29 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
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