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From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Ashish Kalra" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	"Connor Kuehl" <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
	"Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>,
	"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	"Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum" <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Jim Cadden" <jcadden@ibm.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/cmdline
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2021 02:55:30 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210709025512-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210624102040.2015280-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

On Thu, Jun 24, 2021 at 10:20:38AM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
> Currently booting with -kernel/-initrd/-append is not supported in SEV
> confidential guests, because the content of these blobs is not measured
> and therefore not trusted by the SEV guest.
> 
> However, in some cases the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are not secret
> but should not be modified by the host.  In such a case, we want to
> verify inside the trusted VM that the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are
> indeed the ones expected by the Guest Owner, and only if that is the
> case go on and boot them up (removing the need for grub inside OVMF in
> that mode).
> 
> To support that, OVMF adds a special area for hashes of
> kernel/initrd/cmdline; that area is expected to be filled by QEMU and
> encrypted as part of the initial SEV guest launch.  This in turn makes
> the hashes part of the PSP measured content, and OVMF can trust these
> inputs if they match the hashes.
> 
> This series adds an SEV function to generate the table of hashes for
> OVMF and encrypt it (patch 1/2), and calls this function if SEV is
> enabled when the kernel/initrd/cmdline are prepared (patch 2/2).
> 
> Corresponding OVMF support was submitted to edk2-devel [1] (patch series
> "Measured SEV boot with kernel/initrd/cmdline"); it's still under
> review.
> 
> [1] https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/topic/patch_v1_0_8_measured_sev/83074450


Now that I figured the measurement angle

Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

> ---
> 
> v3 changes:
>  - initrd hash is now mandatory; if no -initrd is passed, calculate the
>    hash of the empty buffer.  This is now aligned with the OVMF
>    behaviour which verifies the empty initrd (correctly).
>  - make SevHashTable entries fixed: 3 entries for cmdline, initrd, and kernel.
>  - in sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes: first calculate all the hashes, only then
>    fill-in the hashes table in the guest's memory.
>  - Use g_assert_not_reached in sev-stub.c.
>  - Use QEMU_PACKED attribute for structs.
>  - Use QemuUUID type for guids.
>  - in sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes: use ARRAY_SIZE(iov) instead of literal 2.
> 
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210621190553.1763020-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v2 changes:
>  - Extract main functionality to sev.c (with empty stub in sev-stub.c)
>  - Use sev_enabled() instead of machine->cgs->ready to detect SEV guest
>  - Coding style changes
> 
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210525065931.1628554-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> 
> Dov Murik (2):
>   sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes for measured linux
>     boot
>   x86/sev: generate SEV kernel loader hashes in x86_load_linux
> 
>  target/i386/sev_i386.h |  12 ++++
>  hw/i386/x86.c          |  25 +++++++-
>  target/i386/sev-stub.c |   5 ++
>  target/i386/sev.c      | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> 
> base-commit: b22726abdfa54592d6ad88f65b0297c0e8b363e2
> -- 
> 2.25.1



      parent reply	other threads:[~2021-07-09  6:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-24 10:20 Dov Murik
2021-06-24 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes for measured linux boot Dov Murik
2021-07-01 17:23   ` Connor Kuehl
2021-07-02 12:29     ` Dov Murik
2021-06-24 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] x86/sev: generate SEV kernel loader hashes in x86_load_linux Dov Murik
2021-07-08 16:41 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/cmdline Connor Kuehl
2021-07-08 17:03   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-07-08 17:16     ` Connor Kuehl
2021-07-29 19:31       ` Dov Murik
2021-07-30 14:47         ` Connor Kuehl
2021-07-30 18:02           ` Dov Murik
2021-07-30 18:14             ` Connor Kuehl
2021-07-09  6:55 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]

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