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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/2] create HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR for centralized use
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2013 18:19:55 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1387390796-5860-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1387390796-5860-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and Makefile logic
in each architecture, switch to using HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep
everything in one place. This retains the x86-specific bug verification
scripts.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 Makefile           |   14 +++++++++++---
 arch/Kconfig       |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/Kconfig   |   13 +------------
 arch/arm/Makefile  |    4 ----
 arch/mips/Kconfig  |   14 +-------------
 arch/mips/Makefile |    4 ----
 arch/sh/Kconfig    |   15 +--------------
 arch/sh/Makefile   |    4 ----
 arch/x86/Kconfig   |   17 +----------------
 arch/x86/Makefile  |    8 +++-----
 10 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 858a147fd836..27ed3ff7cf4c 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -595,10 +595,18 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN),0)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN})
 endif
 
-# Force gcc to behave correct even for buggy distributions
-ifndef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+# Handle stack protector mode.
+ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+  stackp-flag := $(call cc-option, -fstack-protector)
+  ifeq ($(stackp-flag),)
+   $(error Cannot use CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR: \
+	   -fstack-protector not supported by compiler))
+  endif
+else
+  # Force off for distro compilers that enable stack protector by default.
+  stackp-flag := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
 endif
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag)
 
 # This warning generated too much noise in a regular build.
 # Use make W=1 to enable this warning (see scripts/Makefile.build)
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index f1cf895c040f..24e026d83072 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -336,6 +336,28 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER
 
 	  See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
 
+config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if:
+	  - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option
+	  - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)
+
+config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection"
+	depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	help
+	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
+	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
+	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
+	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
+	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
+	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
+	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
+
+	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
+	  gcc with the feature backported.
+
 config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
 	bool
 	help
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index c1f1a7eee953..9c909fc29272 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ config ARM
 	select HAVE_BPF_JIT
 	select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
 	select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
 	select HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG
 	select HAVE_DMA_ATTRS
@@ -1856,18 +1857,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
 	  defined by each seccomp mode.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	help
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
-
 config SWIOTLB
 	def_bool y
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile
index c99b1086d83d..55b4255ad6ed 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/Makefile
@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER),y)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+=-fno-omit-frame-pointer -mapcs -mno-sched-prolog
 endif
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
-KBUILD_CFLAGS	+=-fstack-protector
-endif
-
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN),y)
 KBUILD_CPPFLAGS	+= -mbig-endian
 AS		+= -EB
diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig
index 650de3976e7a..c93d92beb3d6 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config MIPS
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA if MODULES && 64BIT
 	select CLONE_BACKWARDS
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 
 menu "Machine selection"
 
@@ -2322,19 +2323,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	help
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
-
 config USE_OF
 	bool
 	select OF
diff --git a/arch/mips/Makefile b/arch/mips/Makefile
index de300b993607..efe50787cd89 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Makefile
+++ b/arch/mips/Makefile
@@ -232,10 +232,6 @@ bootvars-y	= VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-y) \
 
 LDFLAGS			+= -m $(ld-emul)
 
-ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-  KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector
-endif
-
 ifdef CONFIG_MIPS
 CHECKFLAGS += $(shell $(CC) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -dM -E -x c /dev/null | \
 	egrep -vw '__GNUC_(|MINOR_|PATCHLEVEL_)_' | \
diff --git a/arch/sh/Kconfig b/arch/sh/Kconfig
index 9b0979f4df7a..ce298317a73e 100644
--- a/arch/sh/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ config SUPERH32
 	select PERF_EVENTS
 	select ARCH_HIBERNATION_POSSIBLE if MMU
 	select SPARSE_IRQ
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 
 config SUPERH64
 	def_bool ARCH = "sh64"
@@ -695,20 +696,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	depends on SUPERH32
-	help
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
-
 config SMP
 	bool "Symmetric multi-processing support"
 	depends on SYS_SUPPORTS_SMP
diff --git a/arch/sh/Makefile b/arch/sh/Makefile
index aed701c7b11b..d4d16e4be07c 100644
--- a/arch/sh/Makefile
+++ b/arch/sh/Makefile
@@ -199,10 +199,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_DWARF_UNWINDER),y)
   KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
 endif
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
-  KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector
-endif
-
 libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH32)		:= arch/sh/lib/	$(libs-y)
 libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH64)		:= arch/sh/lib64/ $(libs-y)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index e903c71f7e69..4a814e6c526b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ config X86
 	select RTC_LIB
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
 	select HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK if X86_64
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 
 config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	def_bool y
@@ -1616,22 +1617,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection"
-	---help---
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
-	  gcc with the feature backported. Older versions are automatically
-	  detected and for those versions, this configuration option is
-	  ignored. (and a warning is printed during bootup)
-
 source kernel/Kconfig.hz
 
 config KEXEC
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 57d021507120..66d126ab9942 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -89,13 +89,11 @@ else
         KBUILD_CFLAGS += -maccumulate-outgoing-args
 endif
 
+# Make sure compiler does not have buggy stackprotector support.
 ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	cc_has_sp := $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_$(BITS)-has-stack-protector.sh
-        ifeq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)
-                stackp-y := -fstack-protector
-                KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-y)
-        else
-                $(warning stack protector enabled but no compiler support)
+        ifneq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)
+                $(error stack protector enabled but compiler support is broken)
         endif
 endif
 
-- 
1.7.9.5


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>,
	Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
	Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
	Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
	Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
	Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/2] create HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR for centralized use
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2013 10:19:55 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1387390796-5860-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1387390796-5860-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and Makefile logic
in each architecture, switch to using HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep
everything in one place. This retains the x86-specific bug verification
scripts.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 Makefile           |   14 +++++++++++---
 arch/Kconfig       |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/Kconfig   |   13 +------------
 arch/arm/Makefile  |    4 ----
 arch/mips/Kconfig  |   14 +-------------
 arch/mips/Makefile |    4 ----
 arch/sh/Kconfig    |   15 +--------------
 arch/sh/Makefile   |    4 ----
 arch/x86/Kconfig   |   17 +----------------
 arch/x86/Makefile  |    8 +++-----
 10 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 858a147fd836..27ed3ff7cf4c 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -595,10 +595,18 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN),0)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN})
 endif
 
-# Force gcc to behave correct even for buggy distributions
-ifndef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+# Handle stack protector mode.
+ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+  stackp-flag := $(call cc-option, -fstack-protector)
+  ifeq ($(stackp-flag),)
+   $(error Cannot use CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR: \
+	   -fstack-protector not supported by compiler))
+  endif
+else
+  # Force off for distro compilers that enable stack protector by default.
+  stackp-flag := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
 endif
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag)
 
 # This warning generated too much noise in a regular build.
 # Use make W=1 to enable this warning (see scripts/Makefile.build)
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index f1cf895c040f..24e026d83072 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -336,6 +336,28 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER
 
 	  See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
 
+config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if:
+	  - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option
+	  - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)
+
+config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection"
+	depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	help
+	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
+	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
+	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
+	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
+	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
+	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
+	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
+
+	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
+	  gcc with the feature backported.
+
 config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
 	bool
 	help
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index c1f1a7eee953..9c909fc29272 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ config ARM
 	select HAVE_BPF_JIT
 	select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
 	select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
 	select HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG
 	select HAVE_DMA_ATTRS
@@ -1856,18 +1857,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
 	  defined by each seccomp mode.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	help
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
-
 config SWIOTLB
 	def_bool y
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile
index c99b1086d83d..55b4255ad6ed 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/Makefile
@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER),y)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+=-fno-omit-frame-pointer -mapcs -mno-sched-prolog
 endif
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
-KBUILD_CFLAGS	+=-fstack-protector
-endif
-
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN),y)
 KBUILD_CPPFLAGS	+= -mbig-endian
 AS		+= -EB
diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig
index 650de3976e7a..c93d92beb3d6 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config MIPS
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA if MODULES && 64BIT
 	select CLONE_BACKWARDS
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 
 menu "Machine selection"
 
@@ -2322,19 +2323,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	help
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
-
 config USE_OF
 	bool
 	select OF
diff --git a/arch/mips/Makefile b/arch/mips/Makefile
index de300b993607..efe50787cd89 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Makefile
+++ b/arch/mips/Makefile
@@ -232,10 +232,6 @@ bootvars-y	= VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-y) \
 
 LDFLAGS			+= -m $(ld-emul)
 
-ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-  KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector
-endif
-
 ifdef CONFIG_MIPS
 CHECKFLAGS += $(shell $(CC) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -dM -E -x c /dev/null | \
 	egrep -vw '__GNUC_(|MINOR_|PATCHLEVEL_)_' | \
diff --git a/arch/sh/Kconfig b/arch/sh/Kconfig
index 9b0979f4df7a..ce298317a73e 100644
--- a/arch/sh/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ config SUPERH32
 	select PERF_EVENTS
 	select ARCH_HIBERNATION_POSSIBLE if MMU
 	select SPARSE_IRQ
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 
 config SUPERH64
 	def_bool ARCH = "sh64"
@@ -695,20 +696,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	depends on SUPERH32
-	help
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
-
 config SMP
 	bool "Symmetric multi-processing support"
 	depends on SYS_SUPPORTS_SMP
diff --git a/arch/sh/Makefile b/arch/sh/Makefile
index aed701c7b11b..d4d16e4be07c 100644
--- a/arch/sh/Makefile
+++ b/arch/sh/Makefile
@@ -199,10 +199,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_DWARF_UNWINDER),y)
   KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
 endif
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
-  KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector
-endif
-
 libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH32)		:= arch/sh/lib/	$(libs-y)
 libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH64)		:= arch/sh/lib64/ $(libs-y)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index e903c71f7e69..4a814e6c526b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ config X86
 	select RTC_LIB
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
 	select HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK if X86_64
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 
 config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	def_bool y
@@ -1616,22 +1617,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection"
-	---help---
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
-	  gcc with the feature backported. Older versions are automatically
-	  detected and for those versions, this configuration option is
-	  ignored. (and a warning is printed during bootup)
-
 source kernel/Kconfig.hz
 
 config KEXEC
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 57d021507120..66d126ab9942 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -89,13 +89,11 @@ else
         KBUILD_CFLAGS += -maccumulate-outgoing-args
 endif
 
+# Make sure compiler does not have buggy stackprotector support.
 ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	cc_has_sp := $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_$(BITS)-has-stack-protector.sh
-        ifeq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)
-                stackp-y := -fstack-protector
-                KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-y)
-        else
-                $(warning stack protector enabled but no compiler support)
+        ifneq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)
+                $(error stack protector enabled but compiler support is broken)
         endif
 endif
 
-- 
1.7.9.5


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/2] create HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR for centralized use
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2013 10:19:55 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1387390796-5860-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1387390796-5860-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and Makefile logic
in each architecture, switch to using HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep
everything in one place. This retains the x86-specific bug verification
scripts.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 Makefile           |   14 +++++++++++---
 arch/Kconfig       |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/Kconfig   |   13 +------------
 arch/arm/Makefile  |    4 ----
 arch/mips/Kconfig  |   14 +-------------
 arch/mips/Makefile |    4 ----
 arch/sh/Kconfig    |   15 +--------------
 arch/sh/Makefile   |    4 ----
 arch/x86/Kconfig   |   17 +----------------
 arch/x86/Makefile  |    8 +++-----
 10 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 858a147fd836..27ed3ff7cf4c 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -595,10 +595,18 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN),0)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN})
 endif
 
-# Force gcc to behave correct even for buggy distributions
-ifndef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+# Handle stack protector mode.
+ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+  stackp-flag := $(call cc-option, -fstack-protector)
+  ifeq ($(stackp-flag),)
+   $(error Cannot use CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR: \
+	   -fstack-protector not supported by compiler))
+  endif
+else
+  # Force off for distro compilers that enable stack protector by default.
+  stackp-flag := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
 endif
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag)
 
 # This warning generated too much noise in a regular build.
 # Use make W=1 to enable this warning (see scripts/Makefile.build)
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index f1cf895c040f..24e026d83072 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -336,6 +336,28 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER
 
 	  See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
 
+config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if:
+	  - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option
+	  - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)
+
+config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection"
+	depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	help
+	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
+	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
+	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
+	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
+	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
+	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
+	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
+
+	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
+	  gcc with the feature backported.
+
 config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
 	bool
 	help
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index c1f1a7eee953..9c909fc29272 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ config ARM
 	select HAVE_BPF_JIT
 	select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
 	select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
 	select HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG
 	select HAVE_DMA_ATTRS
@@ -1856,18 +1857,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
 	  defined by each seccomp mode.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	help
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
-
 config SWIOTLB
 	def_bool y
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile
index c99b1086d83d..55b4255ad6ed 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/Makefile
@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER),y)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+=-fno-omit-frame-pointer -mapcs -mno-sched-prolog
 endif
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
-KBUILD_CFLAGS	+=-fstack-protector
-endif
-
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN),y)
 KBUILD_CPPFLAGS	+= -mbig-endian
 AS		+= -EB
diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig
index 650de3976e7a..c93d92beb3d6 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config MIPS
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA if MODULES && 64BIT
 	select CLONE_BACKWARDS
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 
 menu "Machine selection"
 
@@ -2322,19 +2323,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	help
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
-
 config USE_OF
 	bool
 	select OF
diff --git a/arch/mips/Makefile b/arch/mips/Makefile
index de300b993607..efe50787cd89 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Makefile
+++ b/arch/mips/Makefile
@@ -232,10 +232,6 @@ bootvars-y	= VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-y) \
 
 LDFLAGS			+= -m $(ld-emul)
 
-ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-  KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector
-endif
-
 ifdef CONFIG_MIPS
 CHECKFLAGS += $(shell $(CC) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -dM -E -x c /dev/null | \
 	egrep -vw '__GNUC_(|MINOR_|PATCHLEVEL_)_' | \
diff --git a/arch/sh/Kconfig b/arch/sh/Kconfig
index 9b0979f4df7a..ce298317a73e 100644
--- a/arch/sh/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ config SUPERH32
 	select PERF_EVENTS
 	select ARCH_HIBERNATION_POSSIBLE if MMU
 	select SPARSE_IRQ
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 
 config SUPERH64
 	def_bool ARCH = "sh64"
@@ -695,20 +696,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	depends on SUPERH32
-	help
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
-
 config SMP
 	bool "Symmetric multi-processing support"
 	depends on SYS_SUPPORTS_SMP
diff --git a/arch/sh/Makefile b/arch/sh/Makefile
index aed701c7b11b..d4d16e4be07c 100644
--- a/arch/sh/Makefile
+++ b/arch/sh/Makefile
@@ -199,10 +199,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_DWARF_UNWINDER),y)
   KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
 endif
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
-  KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector
-endif
-
 libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH32)		:= arch/sh/lib/	$(libs-y)
 libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH64)		:= arch/sh/lib64/ $(libs-y)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index e903c71f7e69..4a814e6c526b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ config X86
 	select RTC_LIB
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
 	select HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK if X86_64
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 
 config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	def_bool y
@@ -1616,22 +1617,6 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection"
-	---help---
-	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
-	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
-	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
-	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
-	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
-	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
-
-	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
-	  gcc with the feature backported. Older versions are automatically
-	  detected and for those versions, this configuration option is
-	  ignored. (and a warning is printed during bootup)
-
 source kernel/Kconfig.hz
 
 config KEXEC
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 57d021507120..66d126ab9942 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -89,13 +89,11 @@ else
         KBUILD_CFLAGS += -maccumulate-outgoing-args
 endif
 
+# Make sure compiler does not have buggy stackprotector support.
 ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	cc_has_sp := $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_$(BITS)-has-stack-protector.sh
-        ifeq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)
-                stackp-y := -fstack-protector
-                KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-y)
-        else
-                $(warning stack protector enabled but no compiler support)
+        ifneq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)
+                $(error stack protector enabled but compiler support is broken)
         endif
 endif
 
-- 
1.7.9.5

  reply	other threads:[~2013-12-18 18:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-12-18 18:19 [PATCH v4] provide -fstack-protector-strong build option Kees Cook
2013-12-18 18:19 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-18 18:19 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-18 18:19 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2013-12-18 18:19   ` [PATCH v4 1/2] create HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR for centralized use Kees Cook
2013-12-18 18:19   ` Kees Cook
2013-12-18 18:19 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] provide -fstack-protector-strong build option Kees Cook
2013-12-18 18:19   ` Kees Cook
2013-12-18 18:19   ` Kees Cook
2013-12-19 12:29   ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-19 12:29     ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-19 12:29     ` Ingo Molnar

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