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From: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: gleb@kernel.org, mtosatti@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: MMU: fix SMAP virtualization
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 22:55:21 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1431356122-8500-1-git-send-email-guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> (raw)

KVM may turn a user page to a kernel page when kernel writes a readonly
user page if CR0.WP = 1. This shadow page entry will be reused after
SMAP is enabled so that kernel is allowed to access this user page

Fix it by setting SMAP && !CR0.WP into shadow page's role and reset mmu
once CR4.SMAP is updated

Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c              | 16 ++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h              |  2 --
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  8 +++-----
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 8b661d1..bbb8f4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
 		unsigned nxe:1;
 		unsigned cr0_wp:1;
 		unsigned smep_andnot_wp:1;
+		unsigned smap_andnot_wp:1;
 	};
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 3711095..b78e83f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -3737,8 +3737,8 @@ static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	}
 }
 
-void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-		struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
+static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
 {
 	unsigned bit, byte, pfec;
 	u8 map;
@@ -3919,6 +3919,7 @@ static void init_kvm_tdp_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	bool smep = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
+	bool smap = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
 	struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.mmu;
 
 	MMU_WARN_ON(VALID_PAGE(context->root_hpa));
@@ -3937,6 +3938,8 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	context->base_role.cr0_wp  = is_write_protection(vcpu);
 	context->base_role.smep_andnot_wp
 		= smep && !is_write_protection(vcpu);
+	context->base_role.smap_andnot_wp
+		= smap && !is_write_protection(vcpu);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_mmu);
 
@@ -4208,12 +4211,18 @@ void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
 		       const u8 *new, int bytes)
 {
 	gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-	union kvm_mmu_page_role mask = { .word = 0 };
 	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
 	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
 	u64 entry, gentry, *spte;
 	int npte;
 	bool remote_flush, local_flush, zap_page;
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role mask = (union kvm_mmu_page_role) {
+		.cr0_wp = 1,
+		.cr4_pae = 1,
+		.nxe = 1,
+		.smep_andnot_wp = 1,
+		.smap_andnot_wp = 1,
+	};
 
 	/*
 	 * If we don't have indirect shadow pages, it means no page is
@@ -4239,7 +4248,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
 	++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pte_write;
 	kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_PRE_PTE_WRITE);
 
-	mask.cr0_wp = mask.cr4_pae = mask.nxe = mask.smep_andnot_wp = 1;
 	for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(vcpu->kvm, sp, gfn) {
 		if (detect_write_misaligned(sp, gpa, bytes) ||
 		      detect_write_flooding(sp)) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 06eb2fc..0ada65e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -71,8 +71,6 @@ enum {
 int handle_mmio_page_fault_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct);
 void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly);
-void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
-		bool ept);
 
 static inline unsigned int kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index cdccbe1..cde5d61 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -702,8 +702,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_xcr);
 int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
 {
 	unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
-	unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE |
-				   X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_SMEP;
+	unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE |
+				   X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP;
+
 	if (cr4 & CR4_RESERVED_BITS)
 		return 1;
 
@@ -744,9 +745,6 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
 	    (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
 		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
 
-	if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_SMAP)
-		update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, false);
-
 	if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
 		kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
 
-- 
2.1.0


             reply	other threads:[~2015-05-11 15:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-05-11 14:55 Xiao Guangrong [this message]
2015-05-11 14:55 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: MMU: document smap_andnot_wp Xiao Guangrong
2015-05-11 15:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-05-22 20:43 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: MMU: fix SMAP virtualization Boris Ostrovsky
2015-05-22 23:54   ` Bandan Das
2015-05-23  0:42     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-05-26 14:45     ` Edward Cree
2015-05-26 14:48       ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-05-27  2:53         ` Xiao Guangrong
2015-06-09  5:14           ` Vinson Lee
2015-06-12 12:11             ` Luis Henriques
2015-06-12 12:11               ` Luis Henriques
2015-06-10 18:02           ` Davidlohr Bueso
2015-06-10 18:08             ` Andrew Morton

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