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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman"
	<ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>,
	Alexander Viro
	<viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn
	<serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>,
	Seth Forshee
	<seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>,
	dm-devel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos-sUDqSbJrdHQHWmgEVkV9KA@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-bcache-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-raid-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	fuse-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f@public.gmane.org,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn
	<ahferroin7-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-mtd-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
	selinux-+05T5uksL2qpZYMLLGbcSA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/18] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
Date: Mon,  7 Dec 2015 15:21:16 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1449523289-144238-8-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1449523289-144238-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>

Filesystem uids which don't map into a user namespace may result
in inode->i_uid being INVALID_UID. A symlink and its parent
could have different owners in the filesystem can both get
mapped to INVALID_UID, which may result in following a symlink
when this would not have otherwise been permitted when protected
symlinks are enabled.

Add a new helper function, uid_valid_eq(), and use this to
validate that the ids in may_follow_link() are both equal and
valid. Also add an equivalent helper for gids, which is
currently unused.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
---
 fs/namei.c             |  2 +-
 include/linux/uidgid.h | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 288e8a74bf88..4ccafd391697 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
-	if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
+	if (uid_valid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
diff --git a/include/linux/uidgid.h b/include/linux/uidgid.h
index 03835522dfcb..e09529fe2668 100644
--- a/include/linux/uidgid.h
+++ b/include/linux/uidgid.h
@@ -117,6 +117,16 @@ static inline bool gid_valid(kgid_t gid)
 	return __kgid_val(gid) != (gid_t) -1;
 }
 
+static inline bool uid_valid_eq(kuid_t left, kuid_t right)
+{
+	return uid_eq(left, right) && uid_valid(left);
+}
+
+static inline bool gid_valid_eq(kgid_t left, kgid_t right)
+{
+	return gid_eq(left, right) && gid_valid(left);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
 
 extern kuid_t make_kuid(struct user_namespace *from, uid_t uid);
-- 
1.9.1


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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/18] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
Date: Mon,  7 Dec 2015 15:21:16 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1449523289-144238-8-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1449523289-144238-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Filesystem uids which don't map into a user namespace may result
in inode->i_uid being INVALID_UID. A symlink and its parent
could have different owners in the filesystem can both get
mapped to INVALID_UID, which may result in following a symlink
when this would not have otherwise been permitted when protected
symlinks are enabled.

Add a new helper function, uid_valid_eq(), and use this to
validate that the ids in may_follow_link() are both equal and
valid. Also add an equivalent helper for gids, which is
currently unused.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/namei.c             |  2 +-
 include/linux/uidgid.h | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 288e8a74bf88..4ccafd391697 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
-	if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
+	if (uid_valid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
diff --git a/include/linux/uidgid.h b/include/linux/uidgid.h
index 03835522dfcb..e09529fe2668 100644
--- a/include/linux/uidgid.h
+++ b/include/linux/uidgid.h
@@ -117,6 +117,16 @@ static inline bool gid_valid(kgid_t gid)
 	return __kgid_val(gid) != (gid_t) -1;
 }
 
+static inline bool uid_valid_eq(kuid_t left, kuid_t right)
+{
+	return uid_eq(left, right) && uid_valid(left);
+}
+
+static inline bool gid_valid_eq(kgid_t left, kgid_t right)
+{
+	return gid_eq(left, right) && gid_valid(left);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
 
 extern kuid_t make_kuid(struct user_namespace *from, uid_t uid);
-- 
1.9.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-12-07 21:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-07 21:21 [PATCH v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
     [not found] ` <1449523289-144238-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 01/18] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 02/18] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 05/18] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 06/18] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-12-07 21:21     ` [PATCH v2 07/18] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 08/18] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 09/18] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 10/18] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 11/18] fs: Ensure the mounter of a filesystem is privileged towards its inodes Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 12/18] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 15/18] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 17/18] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21   ` [PATCH v2 18/18] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21     ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee

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