From: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com> To: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 1/2] drm/radeon: forbid mapping of userptr bo through radeon device file Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2016 09:07:50 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1461071271-16072-1-git-send-email-jglisse@redhat.com> (raw) Allowing userptr bo which are basicly a list of page from some vma (so either anonymous page or file backed page) would lead to serious corruption of kernel structures and counters (because we overwrite the page->mapping field when mapping buffer). This will already block if the buffer was populated before anyone does try to mmap it because then TTM_PAGE_FLAG_SG would be set in in the ttm_tt flags. But that flag is check before ttm_tt_populate in the ttm vm fault handler. So to be safe just add a check to verify_access() callback. Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c index 7dddfdc..90f7394 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c @@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ static int radeon_verify_access(struct ttm_buffer_object *bo, struct file *filp) { struct radeon_bo *rbo = container_of(bo, struct radeon_bo, tbo); + if (radeon_ttm_tt_has_userptr(bo->ttm)) + return -EPERM; return drm_vma_node_verify_access(&rbo->gem_base.vma_node, filp); } -- 2.1.0
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com> To: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 1/2] drm/radeon: forbid mapping of userptr bo through radeon device file Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2016 09:07:50 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1461071271-16072-1-git-send-email-jglisse@redhat.com> (raw) Allowing userptr bo which are basicly a list of page from some vma (so either anonymous page or file backed page) would lead to serious corruption of kernel structures and counters (because we overwrite the page->mapping field when mapping buffer). This will already block if the buffer was populated before anyone does try to mmap it because then TTM_PAGE_FLAG_SG would be set in in the ttm_tt flags. But that flag is check before ttm_tt_populate in the ttm vm fault handler. So to be safe just add a check to verify_access() callback. Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c index 7dddfdc..90f7394 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c @@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ static int radeon_verify_access(struct ttm_buffer_object *bo, struct file *filp) { struct radeon_bo *rbo = container_of(bo, struct radeon_bo, tbo); + if (radeon_ttm_tt_has_userptr(bo->ttm)) + return -EPERM; return drm_vma_node_verify_access(&rbo->gem_base.vma_node, filp); } -- 2.1.0 _______________________________________________ dri-devel mailing list dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
next reply other threads:[~2016-04-19 13:23 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-04-19 13:07 Jérôme Glisse [this message] 2016-04-19 13:07 ` [PATCH 1/2] drm/radeon: forbid mapping of userptr bo through radeon device file Jérôme Glisse 2016-04-19 13:07 ` [PATCH 2/2] drm/amdgpu: " Jérôme Glisse 2016-04-19 13:07 ` Jérôme Glisse 2016-04-20 13:26 ` [PATCH 1/2] drm/radeon: " Christian König 2016-04-20 13:26 ` Christian König 2016-04-20 15:06 ` Alex Deucher 2016-04-20 15:06 ` Alex Deucher
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=1461071271-16072-1-git-send-email-jglisse@redhat.com \ --to=jglisse@redhat.com \ --cc=dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org \ --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.