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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: Add tests for non-init userns capability checks
Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2016 11:29:58 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1469719798-24503-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)

Add tests for the non-init user namespace capability checks.
The tests are conditional on the cap_userns security class being
defined by the base policy.  Technically they also depend on
Linux >= 4.7 but cap_userns class was only recently defined in
Fedora rawhide policy and Fedora rawhide is already running 4.7,
so I don't think we need an additional runtime check of the kernel
version in the test program.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
 policy/Makefile                      |   5 +-
 policy/test_cap_userns.te            |  27 ++++
 tests/Makefile                       |   5 +
 tests/cap_userns/Makefile            |   5 +
 tests/cap_userns/test                |  16 ++
 tests/cap_userns/userns_child_exec.c | 298 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 355 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 policy/test_cap_userns.te
 create mode 100644 tests/cap_userns/Makefile
 create mode 100755 tests/cap_userns/test
 create mode 100644 tests/cap_userns/userns_child_exec.c

diff --git a/policy/Makefile b/policy/Makefile
index 98fccbc..e79432b 100644
--- a/policy/Makefile
+++ b/policy/Makefile
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
-POLDEV = /usr/share/selinux/devel
+POLDEV ?= /usr/share/selinux/devel
 SEMODULE = /usr/sbin/semodule
 CHECKPOLICY = /usr/bin/checkpolicy
 
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ ifeq ($(shell [ $(POL_VERS) -ge 24 ] && echo true),true)
 TARGETS += test_bounds.te
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(shell grep -q cap_userns $(POLDEV)/include/support/all_perms.spt && echo true),true)
+TARGETS += test_cap_userns.te
+endif
 
 ifeq (x$(RHEL_VERS),$(filter x$(RHEL_VERS),x4 x5))
 	BUILD_TARGET := build_rhel
diff --git a/policy/test_cap_userns.te b/policy/test_cap_userns.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab74325
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policy/test_cap_userns.te
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#################################
+#
+# Policy for testing non-init userns capability checking.
+#
+
+attribute capusernsdomain;
+
+# Domain for process that is allowed non-init userns capabilities
+type test_cap_userns_t;
+domain_type(test_cap_userns_t)
+unconfined_runs_test(test_cap_userns_t)
+typeattribute test_cap_userns_t testdomain;
+typeattribute test_cap_userns_t capusernsdomain;
+
+# This domain is allowed sys_admin on non-init userns for mount.
+allow test_cap_userns_t self:cap_userns sys_admin;
+
+# Domain for process that is not allowed non-init userns capabilities
+type test_no_cap_userns_t;
+domain_type(test_no_cap_userns_t)
+unconfined_runs_test(test_no_cap_userns_t)
+typeattribute test_no_cap_userns_t testdomain;
+typeattribute test_no_cap_userns_t capusernsdomain;
+
+# Rules common to both domains.
+miscfiles_domain_entry_test_files(capusernsdomain)
+corecmd_exec_bin(capusernsdomain)
diff --git a/tests/Makefile b/tests/Makefile
index 7a9b39c..1627ebf 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile
+++ b/tests/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+POLDEV ?= /usr/share/selinux/devel
 
 export CFLAGS+=-g -O0 -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE
 
@@ -7,6 +8,10 @@ SUBDIRS_COMMON:=domain_trans entrypoint execshare exectrace execute_no_trans fdr
 
 SUBDIRS:= $(SUBDIRS_COMMON) dyntrans dyntrace bounds nnp mmap unix_socket inet_socket
 
+ifeq ($(shell grep -q cap_userns $(POLDEV)/include/support/all_perms.spt && echo true),true)
+SUBDIRS += cap_userns
+endif
+
 ifeq ($(DISTRO),RHEL4)
     SUBDIRS:=$(SUBDIRS_COMMON)
 endif
diff --git a/tests/cap_userns/Makefile b/tests/cap_userns/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27b4676
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cap_userns/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+TARGETS=userns_child_exec
+
+all: $(TARGETS)
+clean:
+	rm -f $(TARGETS)
diff --git a/tests/cap_userns/test b/tests/cap_userns/test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..9b5268f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cap_userns/test
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+
+use Test;
+BEGIN { plan tests => 2}
+
+$basedir = $0;  $basedir =~ s|(.*)/[^/]*|$1|;
+
+# Verify that test_cap_userns_t can mount proc within its own mount namespace.
+
+$result = system ("runcon -t test_cap_userns_t -- $basedir/userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 0 1' -G '0 0 1' -- true 2>&1");
+ok($result, 0);
+
+# Verify that test_no_cap_userns_t cannot mount proc within its own mount namespace.
+
+$result = system ("runcon -t test_no_cap_userns_t -- $basedir/userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 0 1' -G '0 0 1' -- true 2>&1");
+ok($result);
diff --git a/tests/cap_userns/userns_child_exec.c b/tests/cap_userns/userns_child_exec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26ea357
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cap_userns/userns_child_exec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+/* Taken from the user_namespaces.7 man page */
+
+/* userns_child_exec.c
+
+   Licensed under GNU General Public License v2 or later
+
+   Create a child process that executes a shell command in new
+   namespace(s); allow UID and GID mappings to be specified when
+   creating a user namespace.
+*/
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+/* A simple error-handling function: print an error message based
+   on the value in 'errno' and terminate the calling process */
+
+#define errExit(msg)    do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \
+                        } while (0)
+
+struct child_args {
+    char **argv;        /* Command to be executed by child, with args */
+    int    pipe_fd[2];  /* Pipe used to synchronize parent and child */
+};
+
+static int verbose;
+
+static void
+usage(char *pname)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] cmd [arg...]\n\n", pname);
+    fprintf(stderr, "Create a child process that executes a shell "
+            "command in a new user namespace,\n"
+            "and possibly also other new namespace(s).\n\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "Options can be:\n\n");
+#define fpe(str) fprintf(stderr, "    %s", str);
+    fpe("-i          New IPC namespace\n");
+    fpe("-m          New mount namespace\n");
+    fpe("-n          New network namespace\n");
+    fpe("-p          New PID namespace\n");
+    fpe("-u          New UTS namespace\n");
+    fpe("-U          New user namespace\n");
+    fpe("-M uid_map  Specify UID map for user namespace\n");
+    fpe("-G gid_map  Specify GID map for user namespace\n");
+    fpe("-z          Map user's UID and GID to 0 in user namespace\n");
+    fpe("            (equivalent to: -M '0 <uid> 1' -G '0 <gid> 1'\n");
+    fpe("-v          Display verbose messages\n");
+    fpe("\n");
+    fpe("If -z, -M, or -G is specified, -U is required.\n");
+    fpe("It is not permitted to specify both -z and either -M or -G.\n");
+    fpe("\n");
+    fpe("Map strings for -M and -G consist of records of the form:\n");
+    fpe("\n");
+    fpe("    ID-inside-ns   ID-outside-ns   len\n");
+    fpe("\n");
+    fpe("A map string can contain multiple records, separated"
+        " by commas;\n");
+    fpe("the commas are replaced by newlines before writing"
+        " to map files.\n");
+
+    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+/* Update the mapping file 'map_file', with the value provided in
+   'mapping', a string that defines a UID or GID mapping. A UID or
+   GID mapping consists of one or more newline-delimited records
+   of the form:
+
+       ID_inside-ns    ID-outside-ns   length
+
+   Requiring the user to supply a string that contains newlines is
+   of course inconvenient for command-line use. Thus, we permit the
+   use of commas to delimit records in this string, and replace them
+   with newlines before writing the string to the file. */
+
+static void
+update_map(char *mapping, char *map_file)
+{
+    int fd, j;
+    size_t map_len;     /* Length of 'mapping' */
+
+    /* Replace commas in mapping string with newlines */
+
+    map_len = strlen(mapping);
+    for (j = 0; j < map_len; j++)
+        if (mapping[j] == ',')
+            mapping[j] = '\n';
+
+    fd = open(map_file, O_RDWR);
+    if (fd == -1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: open %s: %s\n", map_file,
+                strerror(errno));
+        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+    }
+
+    if (write(fd, mapping, map_len) != map_len) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: write %s: %s\n", map_file,
+                strerror(errno));
+        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+    }
+
+    close(fd);
+}
+
+/* Linux 3.19 made a change in the handling of setgroups(2) and the
+   'gid_map' file to address a security issue. The issue allowed
+   *unprivileged* users to employ user namespaces in order to drop
+   The upshot of the 3.19 changes is that in order to update the
+   'gid_maps' file, use of the setgroups() system call in this
+   user namespace must first be disabled by writing "deny" to one of
+   the /proc/PID/setgroups files for this namespace.  That is the
+   purpose of the following function. */
+
+static void
+proc_setgroups_write(pid_t child_pid, char *str)
+{
+    char setgroups_path[PATH_MAX];
+    int fd;
+
+    snprintf(setgroups_path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%ld/setgroups",
+            (long) child_pid);
+
+    fd = open(setgroups_path, O_RDWR);
+    if (fd == -1) {
+
+        /* We may be on a system that doesn't support
+           /proc/PID/setgroups. In that case, the file won't exist,
+           and the system won't impose the restrictions that Linux 3.19
+           added. That's fine: we don't need to do anything in order
+           to permit 'gid_map' to be updated.
+
+           However, if the error from open() was something other than
+           the ENOENT error that is expected for that case,  let the
+           user know. */
+
+        if (errno != ENOENT)
+            fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: open %s: %s\n", setgroups_path,
+                strerror(errno));
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (write(fd, str, strlen(str)) == -1)
+        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: write %s: %s\n", setgroups_path,
+            strerror(errno));
+
+    close(fd);
+}
+
+static int              /* Start function for cloned child */
+childFunc(void *arg)
+{
+    struct child_args *args = (struct child_args *) arg;
+    char ch;
+
+    /* Wait until the parent has updated the UID and GID mappings.
+       See the comment in main(). We wait for end of file on a
+       pipe that will be closed by the parent process once it has
+       updated the mappings. */
+
+    close(args->pipe_fd[1]);    /* Close our descriptor for the write
+                                   end of the pipe so that we see EOF
+                                   when parent closes its descriptor */
+    if (read(args->pipe_fd[0], &ch, 1) != 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "Failure in child: read from pipe returned != 0\n");
+        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+    }
+
+    /* Execute a shell command */
+
+    printf("About to exec %s\n", args->argv[0]);
+    execvp(args->argv[0], args->argv);
+    errExit("execvp");
+}
+
+#define STACK_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
+
+static char child_stack[STACK_SIZE];    /* Space for child's stack */
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int flags, opt, map_zero;
+    pid_t child_pid;
+    struct child_args args;
+    char *uid_map, *gid_map;
+    const int MAP_BUF_SIZE = 100;
+    char map_buf[MAP_BUF_SIZE];
+    char map_path[PATH_MAX];
+
+    /* Parse command-line options. The initial '+' character in
+       the final getopt() argument prevents GNU-style permutation
+       of command-line options. That's useful, since sometimes
+       the 'command' to be executed by this program itself
+       has command-line options. We don't want getopt() to treat
+       those as options to this program. */
+
+    flags = 0;
+    verbose = 0;
+    gid_map = NULL;
+    uid_map = NULL;
+    map_zero = 0;
+    while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "+imnpuUM:G:zv")) != -1) {
+        switch (opt) {
+        case 'i': flags |= CLONE_NEWIPC;        break;
+        case 'm': flags |= CLONE_NEWNS;         break;
+        case 'n': flags |= CLONE_NEWNET;        break;
+        case 'p': flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;        break;
+        case 'u': flags |= CLONE_NEWUTS;        break;
+        case 'v': verbose = 1;                  break;
+        case 'z': map_zero = 1;                 break;
+        case 'M': uid_map = optarg;             break;
+        case 'G': gid_map = optarg;             break;
+        case 'U': flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;       break;
+        default:  usage(argv[0]);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* -M or -G without -U is nonsensical */
+
+    if (((uid_map != NULL || gid_map != NULL || map_zero) &&
+                !(flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)) ||
+            (map_zero && (uid_map != NULL || gid_map != NULL)))
+        usage(argv[0]);
+
+    args.argv = &argv[optind];
+
+    /* We use a pipe to synchronize the parent and child, in order to
+       ensure that the parent sets the UID and GID maps before the child
+       calls execve(). This ensures that the child maintains its
+       capabilities during the execve() in the common case where we
+       want to map the child's effective user ID to 0 in the new user
+       namespace. Without this synchronization, the child would lose
+       its capabilities if it performed an execve() with nonzero
+       user IDs (see the capabilities(7) man page for details of the
+       transformation of a process's capabilities during execve()). */
+
+    if (pipe(args.pipe_fd) == -1)
+        errExit("pipe");
+
+    /* Create the child in new namespace(s) */
+
+    child_pid = clone(childFunc, child_stack + STACK_SIZE,
+                      flags | SIGCHLD, &args);
+    if (child_pid == -1)
+        errExit("clone");
+
+    /* Parent falls through to here */
+
+    if (verbose)
+        printf("%s: PID of child created by clone() is %ld\n",
+                argv[0], (long) child_pid);
+
+    /* Update the UID and GID maps in the child */
+
+    if (uid_map != NULL || map_zero) {
+        snprintf(map_path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%ld/uid_map",
+                (long) child_pid);
+        if (map_zero) {
+            snprintf(map_buf, MAP_BUF_SIZE, "0 %ld 1", (long) getuid());
+            uid_map = map_buf;
+        }
+        update_map(uid_map, map_path);
+    }
+
+    if (gid_map != NULL || map_zero) {
+        proc_setgroups_write(child_pid, "deny");
+
+        snprintf(map_path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%ld/gid_map",
+                (long) child_pid);
+        if (map_zero) {
+            snprintf(map_buf, MAP_BUF_SIZE, "0 %ld 1", (long) getgid());
+            gid_map = map_buf;
+        }
+        update_map(gid_map, map_path);
+    }
+
+    /* Close the write end of the pipe, to signal to the child that we
+       have updated the UID and GID maps */
+
+    close(args.pipe_fd[1]);
+
+    if (waitpid(child_pid, NULL, 0) == -1)      /* Wait for child */
+        errExit("waitpid");
+
+    if (verbose)
+        printf("%s: terminating\n", argv[0]);
+
+    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
-- 
2.5.5

                 reply	other threads:[~2016-07-28 15:29 UTC|newest]

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