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From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Paul Moore <aul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 4/8] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer
Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2016 22:46:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1477863998-3298-5-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1477863998-3298-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net>

This prevents an attacker from determining the robust_list or
compat_robust_list userspace pointer of a process created by executing
a setuid binary. Such an attack could be performed by racing
get_robust_list() with a setuid execution. The impact of this issue is that
an attacker could theoretically bypass ASLR when attacking setuid binaries.

changed in v2:
 - only get_task_struct(p) if p!=NULL (Ben Hutchings)
 - move the -ESRCH return check

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
---
 kernel/futex.c        | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
 kernel/futex_compat.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index 2c4be467fecd..f0697e0d55b8 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -3016,31 +3016,43 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
 	if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
-
-	ret = -ESRCH;
-	if (!pid)
+	if (!pid) {
 		p = current;
-	else {
+		get_task_struct(p);
+	} else {
+		rcu_read_lock();
 		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+		/* pin the task to permit dropping the RCU read lock before
+		 * acquiring the mutex
+		 */
+		if (p)
+			get_task_struct(p);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		if (!p)
-			goto err_unlock;
+			return -ESRCH;
 	}
 
+	ret = mutex_lock_killable(&p->signal->cred_guard_light);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_put;
+
 	ret = -EPERM;
 	if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
 		goto err_unlock;
 
 	head = p->robust_list;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	mutex_unlock(&p->signal->cred_guard_light);
+	put_task_struct(p);
 
 	if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	return put_user(head, head_ptr);
 
 err_unlock:
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
+	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_light);
+err_put:
+	put_task_struct(p);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/futex_compat.c b/kernel/futex_compat.c
index 4ae3232e7a28..92c350f05ff8 100644
--- a/kernel/futex_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c
@@ -143,31 +143,43 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
 	if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
-
-	ret = -ESRCH;
-	if (!pid)
+	if (!pid) {
 		p = current;
-	else {
+		get_task_struct(p);
+	} else {
+		rcu_read_lock();
 		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+		/* pin the task to permit dropping the RCU read lock before
+		 * acquiring the mutex
+		 */
+		if (p)
+			get_task_struct(p);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		if (!p)
-			goto err_unlock;
+			return -ESRCH;
 	}
 
+	ret = mutex_lock_killable(&p->signal->cred_guard_light);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_put;
+
 	ret = -EPERM;
 	if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
 		goto err_unlock;
 
 	head = p->compat_robust_list;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	mutex_unlock(&p->signal->cred_guard_light);
+	put_task_struct(p);
 
 	if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	return put_user(ptr_to_compat(head), head_ptr);
 
 err_unlock:
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
+	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_light);
+err_put:
+	put_task_struct(p);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.1.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-10-30 21:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-30 21:46 [PATCH v3 0/8] Various fixes related to ptrace_may_access() Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] exec: introduce cred_guard_light Jann Horn
2016-11-02 18:18   ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-02 20:50     ` Jann Horn
2016-11-02 21:38       ` Ben Hutchings
2016-11-02 21:54         ` Jann Horn
2016-11-03 18:12       ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-03 21:17         ` Jann Horn
2016-11-04 13:26         ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-04 15:00           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-04 18:04             ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-04 18:45               ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-05 14:56                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-09  0:34                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-16 20:03                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-08 22:02                 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-08 22:46                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-08 22:56                     ` Benjamin LaHaise
2016-11-08 23:33                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] exec: add privunit to task_struct Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] proc: use open()-time creds for ptrace checks Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] proc: lock properly in ptrace_may_access callers Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] fs/proc: fix attr access check Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] proc: fix timerslack_ns handling Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] Documentation: add security/ptrace_checks.txt Jann Horn
2016-11-01 23:57 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] Various fixes related to ptrace_may_access() Linus Torvalds
2016-11-02 18:38   ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-02 21:40     ` Jann Horn
2016-11-03 19:09   ` Andrew Morton
2016-11-03 20:01     ` Jann Horn
2016-11-04  0:57   ` James Morris

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