From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> To: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #7] Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 15:13:29 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <148587560927.4026.13631713806987809459.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <148587558696.4026.16034622623568539004.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> efi_call_runtime() is provided for x86 to be able abstract mixed mode support. Provide this for ARM also so that common code work in mixed mode also. Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> --- arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h index 0b06f5341b45..e4e6a9d6a825 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void efi_virtmap_unload(void); #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__) +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define efi_is_64bit() (false) #define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h index 0b6b1633017f..e7445281e534 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md); #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__) +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define efi_is_64bit() (true) #define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells) To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #7] Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 15:13:29 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <148587560927.4026.13631713806987809459.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <148587558696.4026.16034622623568539004.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> efi_call_runtime() is provided for x86 to be able abstract mixed mode support. Provide this for ARM also so that common code work in mixed mode also. Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> --- arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h index 0b06f5341b45..e4e6a9d6a825 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void efi_virtmap_unload(void); #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__) +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define efi_is_64bit() (false) #define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h index 0b6b1633017f..e7445281e534 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md); #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__) +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define efi_is_64bit() (true) #define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-31 15:13 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-01-31 15:13 [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7] David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` David Howells [this message] 2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: " David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 17:37 ` kbuild test robot 2017-01-31 17:37 ` kbuild test robot 2017-01-31 17:37 ` kbuild test robot 2017-01-31 18:04 ` kbuild test robot 2017-01-31 18:04 ` kbuild test robot 2017-01-31 18:04 ` kbuild test robot [not found] ` <201702010101.EljWXBuB%fengguang.wu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> 2017-01-31 18:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel [not found] ` <CAKv+Gu92yTWcEguxGzMOQAvoUexCLtsVVBa2Xzz3cPPWQD9nSQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> 2017-01-31 18:52 ` David Howells [not found] ` <10308.1485888776-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org> 2017-01-31 20:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel [not found] ` <CAKv+Gu_oUcbQ9CYLTentjoHWreVX7Y2-SN5BBcxZ_g4-pNG1yw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> 2017-02-01 21:48 ` Matt Fleming [not found] ` <20170201214806.GO31613-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org> 2017-02-03 2:48 ` Ye Xiaolong 2017-02-02 21:34 ` Matt Fleming 2017-02-02 21:34 ` Matt Fleming 2017-02-02 21:34 ` Matt Fleming 2017-01-31 15:13 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 15:13 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 " David Howells 2017-01-31 15:14 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 18:19 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-01-31 18:19 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-01-31 18:19 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-01-31 18:59 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 18:59 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 18:59 ` David Howells 2017-02-01 10:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-01 10:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-01 10:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-01 12:33 ` David Howells 2017-02-01 12:33 ` David Howells 2017-02-01 12:33 ` David Howells 2017-02-01 14:44 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-01 14:44 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-01 14:44 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-01 15:00 ` David Howells 2017-02-01 15:00 ` David Howells 2017-02-01 15:00 ` David Howells 2017-02-01 15:02 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-01 15:02 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-01 15:02 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-02 21:36 ` Matt Fleming 2017-02-02 21:36 ` Matt Fleming 2017-02-02 21:36 ` Matt Fleming 2017-02-02 21:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-02 21:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-02 21:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-01 10:02 ` David Howells 2017-02-01 10:02 ` David Howells 2017-02-01 10:02 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 15:14 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() " David Howells 2017-01-31 15:14 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 16:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 16:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 16:21 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:21 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:21 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:23 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 16:23 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 16:23 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 16:27 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:27 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:27 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:29 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:29 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:29 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 16:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 16:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 16:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 17:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 17:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 17:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-02-03 17:19 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 17:19 ` David Howells 2017-02-03 17:19 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 16:45 ` [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-01-31 16:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-01-31 16:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-01-31 17:04 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 17:04 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 17:04 ` David Howells 2017-01-31 18:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-01-31 18:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-01-31 18:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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