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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/23] befs: define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 16:36:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497915397-93805-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497915397-93805-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

From: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>

The befs symlink pathnames, stored in struct befs_inode_info.i_data.symlink
and therefore contained in the befs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be
copied to/from userspace.

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in
the befs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations
are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region.  Slab
caches can now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed
memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 fs/befs/linuxvfs.c | 14 +++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
index 63e7c4760bfb..893607591805 100644
--- a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
+++ b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
@@ -442,11 +442,15 @@ static struct inode *befs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
 static int __init
 befs_init_inodecache(void)
 {
-	befs_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("befs_inode_cache",
-					      sizeof (struct befs_inode_info),
-					      0, (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|
-						SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT),
-					      init_once);
+	befs_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("befs_inode_cache",
+				sizeof(struct befs_inode_info), 0,
+				(SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|
+					SLAB_ACCOUNT),
+				offsetof(struct befs_inode_info,
+					i_data.symlink),
+				sizeof_field(struct befs_inode_info,
+					i_data.symlink),
+				init_once);
 	if (befs_inode_cachep == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/23] befs: define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 16:36:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497915397-93805-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497915397-93805-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

From: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>

The befs symlink pathnames, stored in struct befs_inode_info.i_data.symlink
and therefore contained in the befs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be
copied to/from userspace.

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in
the befs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations
are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region.  Slab
caches can now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed
memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 fs/befs/linuxvfs.c | 14 +++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
index 63e7c4760bfb..893607591805 100644
--- a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
+++ b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
@@ -442,11 +442,15 @@ static struct inode *befs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
 static int __init
 befs_init_inodecache(void)
 {
-	befs_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("befs_inode_cache",
-					      sizeof (struct befs_inode_info),
-					      0, (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|
-						SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT),
-					      init_once);
+	befs_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("befs_inode_cache",
+				sizeof(struct befs_inode_info), 0,
+				(SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|
+					SLAB_ACCOUNT),
+				offsetof(struct befs_inode_info,
+					i_data.symlink),
+				sizeof_field(struct befs_inode_info,
+					i_data.symlink),
+				init_once);
 	if (befs_inode_cachep == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-- 
2.7.4

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/23] befs: define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 16:36:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497915397-93805-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497915397-93805-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

From: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>

The befs symlink pathnames, stored in struct befs_inode_info.i_data.symlink
and therefore contained in the befs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be
copied to/from userspace.

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in
the befs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations
are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region.  Slab
caches can now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed
memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 fs/befs/linuxvfs.c | 14 +++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
index 63e7c4760bfb..893607591805 100644
--- a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
+++ b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
@@ -442,11 +442,15 @@ static struct inode *befs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
 static int __init
 befs_init_inodecache(void)
 {
-	befs_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("befs_inode_cache",
-					      sizeof (struct befs_inode_info),
-					      0, (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|
-						SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT),
-					      init_once);
+	befs_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("befs_inode_cache",
+				sizeof(struct befs_inode_info), 0,
+				(SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|
+					SLAB_ACCOUNT),
+				offsetof(struct befs_inode_info,
+					i_data.symlink),
+				sizeof_field(struct befs_inode_info,
+					i_data.symlink),
+				init_once);
 	if (befs_inode_cachep == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-19 23:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 127+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-19 23:36 [PATCH 00/23] Hardened usercopy whitelisting Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 01/23] usercopy: Prepare for " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 02/23] usercopy: Enforce slab cache usercopy region boundaries Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 03/23] vfs: define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 04/23] vfs: copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/23] befs: define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 06/23] cifs: define usercopy region in cifs_request " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 07/23] exofs: define usercopy region in exofs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 08/23] ext2: define usercopy region in ext2_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 09/23] ext4: define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 10/23] vxfs: define usercopy region in vxfs_inode " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 11/23] jfs: define usercopy region in jfs_ip " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 12/23] orangefs: define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 13/23] ufs: define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 14/23] fork: define usercopy region in thread_stack, task_struct, mm_struct slab caches Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 15/23] net: define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 16/23] net: copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 17/23] dcache: define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20  4:08   ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-20  4:08     ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-28 16:44     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 16:44       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 16:44       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 16:55       ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-28 16:55         ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-28 16:55         ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 18/23] scsi: define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 19/23] xfs: define usercopy region in xfs_inode " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 20/23] usercopy: convert kmalloc caches to usercopy caches Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 21/23] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20  4:04   ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-20  4:04     ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-28 17:03     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20  4:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-20  4:24     ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-20  4:47   ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-20  4:47     ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-20 22:27     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 22:27       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 22:27       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:24   ` Laura Abbott
2017-06-20 20:24     ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-06-20 20:24     ` Laura Abbott
2017-06-20 22:22     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 22:22       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-20 22:22       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27  7:31       ` Michal Hocko
2017-06-27  7:31         ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2017-06-27  7:31         ` Michal Hocko
2017-06-27 22:07         ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:07           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:07           ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28  8:54           ` Michal Hocko
2017-06-28  8:54             ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2017-06-28  8:54             ` Michal Hocko
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 23/23] mm: Allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20  4:09   ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-06-20  4:09     ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-20 22:51     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 22:51       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 22:51       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20  4:29   ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-20  4:29     ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-20 23:09     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 23:09       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 23:09       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 19:41 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/23] Hardened usercopy whitelisting Rik van Riel
2017-10-20 22:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 22:40   ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 22:40   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 23:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 23:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 23:25     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-21  3:04     ` Kees Cook
2017-10-21  3:04       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-10-21  3:04       ` Kees Cook

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