From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 04/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 16:51:22 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1501545093-56634-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1501545093-56634-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> The AppArmor bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored via bprm->called_set_creds). Here, all the comments describe how secureexec is actually calculated during bprm_set_creds, so this actually does it, drops the bprm flag that was being used internally by AppArmor, and drops the bprm_secureexec hook. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> --- security/apparmor/domain.c | 22 +--------------------- security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 1 - security/apparmor/include/file.h | 3 --- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 - 4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 878407e023e3..1a1b1ec89d9d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -485,14 +485,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec") - * - * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission - * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec */ if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n", name, new_profile->base.hname); - bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED; + bprm->secureexec = 1; } apply: /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */ @@ -521,23 +518,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } /** - * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed - * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL) - * - * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0 - */ -int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds - * and stored in bprm->unsafe. - */ - if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED) - return 1; - - return 0; -} - -/** * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h index 30544729878a..2495af293587 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct aa_domain { }; int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index 38f821bf49b6..076ac4501d97 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -66,9 +66,6 @@ struct path; #define AA_X_INHERIT 0x4000 #define AA_X_UNCONFINED 0x8000 -/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */ -#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED 0x8000 - /* need to make conditional which ones are being set */ struct path_cond { kuid_t uid; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8f3c0f7aca5a..291c7126350f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -624,7 +624,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), }; -- 2.7.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 04/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 16:51:22 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1501545093-56634-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1501545093-56634-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> The AppArmor bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored via bprm->called_set_creds). Here, all the comments describe how secureexec is actually calculated during bprm_set_creds, so this actually does it, drops the bprm flag that was being used internally by AppArmor, and drops the bprm_secureexec hook. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> --- security/apparmor/domain.c | 22 +--------------------- security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 1 - security/apparmor/include/file.h | 3 --- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 - 4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 878407e023e3..1a1b1ec89d9d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -485,14 +485,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec") - * - * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission - * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec */ if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n", name, new_profile->base.hname); - bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED; + bprm->secureexec = 1; } apply: /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */ @@ -521,23 +518,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } /** - * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed - * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL) - * - * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0 - */ -int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds - * and stored in bprm->unsafe. - */ - if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED) - return 1; - - return 0; -} - -/** * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h index 30544729878a..2495af293587 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct aa_domain { }; int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index 38f821bf49b6..076ac4501d97 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -66,9 +66,6 @@ struct path; #define AA_X_INHERIT 0x4000 #define AA_X_UNCONFINED 0x8000 -/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */ -#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED 0x8000 - /* need to make conditional which ones are being set */ struct path_cond { kuid_t uid; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8f3c0f7aca5a..291c7126350f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -624,7 +624,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), }; -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-31 23:55 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-07-31 23:51 [PATCH v4 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 01/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 02/15] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:23 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:23 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:44 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 0:44 ` James Morris 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] selinux: " Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:45 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 0:45 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 13:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-01 13:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 06/15] smack: " Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:46 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 0:46 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 15:24 ` Casey Schaufler 2017-08-01 15:24 ` Casey Schaufler 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] commoncap: " Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 13:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-01 13:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:48 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 0:48 ` James Morris 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:50 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 0:50 ` James Morris 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:50 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 0:50 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 15:24 ` Casey Schaufler 2017-08-01 15:24 ` Casey Schaufler 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 15/15] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook 2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:52 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 0:52 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 0:34 ` [PATCH v4 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:34 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 0:54 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 0:54 ` James Morris 2017-08-01 3:03 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 3:03 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 5:11 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-08-01 5:11 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-08-01 5:14 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-08-01 5:14 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-08-01 15:04 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 15:04 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 20:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-08-01 20:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-08-01 21:04 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 21:04 ` Kees Cook
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