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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>,
	Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@kernel.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 02/38] usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy()
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 18:02:34 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515636190-24061-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515636190-24061-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 mm/slab.h             |  6 ++++++
 mm/usercopy.c         | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 tools/objtool/check.c |  1 +
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index ad657ffa44e5..7d29e69ac310 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -526,4 +526,10 @@ static inline int cache_random_seq_create(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 static inline void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+			       bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+			       unsigned long len);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* MM_SLAB_H */
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 5df1e68d4585..8006baa4caac 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -58,11 +58,25 @@ static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
 	return GOOD_STACK;
 }
 
-static void report_usercopy(unsigned long len, bool to_user, const char *type)
+/*
+ * If this function is reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found an
+ * unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
+ * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
+ * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
+ * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
+ * For cache objects, copies must be within the object size.
+ */
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+			       bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+			       unsigned long len)
 {
-	pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s '%s' (%lu bytes)\n",
-		to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
-		to_user ? "from" : "to", type ? : "unknown", len);
+	pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
+		 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
+		 to_user ? "from" : "to",
+		 name ? : "unknown?!",
+		 detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
+		 offset, len);
+
 	/*
 	 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
 	 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
@@ -260,6 +274,6 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
 		return;
 
 report:
-	report_usercopy(n, to_user, err);
+	usercopy_abort(err, NULL, to_user, 0, n);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 9b341584eb1b..ae39444896d4 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 		"__reiserfs_panic",
 		"lbug_with_loc",
 		"fortify_panic",
+		"usercopy_abort",
 	};
 
 	if (func->bind == STB_WEAK)
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>,
	Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@kernel.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel
Subject: [PATCH 02/38] usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy()
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 18:02:34 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515636190-24061-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515636190-24061-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 mm/slab.h             |  6 ++++++
 mm/usercopy.c         | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 tools/objtool/check.c |  1 +
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index ad657ffa44e5..7d29e69ac310 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -526,4 +526,10 @@ static inline int cache_random_seq_create(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 static inline void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+			       bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+			       unsigned long len);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* MM_SLAB_H */
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 5df1e68d4585..8006baa4caac 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -58,11 +58,25 @@ static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
 	return GOOD_STACK;
 }
 
-static void report_usercopy(unsigned long len, bool to_user, const char *type)
+/*
+ * If this function is reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found an
+ * unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
+ * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
+ * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
+ * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
+ * For cache objects, copies must be within the object size.
+ */
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+			       bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+			       unsigned long len)
 {
-	pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s '%s' (%lu bytes)\n",
-		to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
-		to_user ? "from" : "to", type ? : "unknown", len);
+	pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
+		 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
+		 to_user ? "from" : "to",
+		 name ? : "unknown?!",
+		 detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
+		 offset, len);
+
 	/*
 	 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
 	 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
@@ -260,6 +274,6 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
 		return;
 
 report:
-	report_usercopy(n, to_user, err);
+	usercopy_abort(err, NULL, to_user, 0, n);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 9b341584eb1b..ae39444896d4 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 		"__reiserfs_panic",
 		"lbug_with_loc",
 		"fortify_panic",
+		"usercopy_abort",
 	};
 
 	if (func->bind == STB_WEAK)
-- 
2.7.4

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>,
	Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@kernel.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 02/38] usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy()
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 18:02:34 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515636190-24061-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515636190-24061-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 mm/slab.h             |  6 ++++++
 mm/usercopy.c         | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 tools/objtool/check.c |  1 +
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index ad657ffa44e5..7d29e69ac310 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -526,4 +526,10 @@ static inline int cache_random_seq_create(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 static inline void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+			       bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+			       unsigned long len);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* MM_SLAB_H */
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 5df1e68d4585..8006baa4caac 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -58,11 +58,25 @@ static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
 	return GOOD_STACK;
 }
 
-static void report_usercopy(unsigned long len, bool to_user, const char *type)
+/*
+ * If this function is reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found an
+ * unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
+ * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
+ * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
+ * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
+ * For cache objects, copies must be within the object size.
+ */
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+			       bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+			       unsigned long len)
 {
-	pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s '%s' (%lu bytes)\n",
-		to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
-		to_user ? "from" : "to", type ? : "unknown", len);
+	pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
+		 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
+		 to_user ? "from" : "to",
+		 name ? : "unknown?!",
+		 detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
+		 offset, len);
+
 	/*
 	 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
 	 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
@@ -260,6 +274,6 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
 		return;
 
 report:
-	report_usercopy(n, to_user, err);
+	usercopy_abort(err, NULL, to_user, 0, n);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 9b341584eb1b..ae39444896d4 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 		"__reiserfs_panic",
 		"lbug_with_loc",
 		"fortify_panic",
+		"usercopy_abort",
 	};
 
 	if (func->bind == STB_WEAK)
-- 
2.7.4

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>,
	Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@kernel.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/38] usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy()
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 18:02:34 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515636190-24061-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515636190-24061-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 mm/slab.h             |  6 ++++++
 mm/usercopy.c         | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 tools/objtool/check.c |  1 +
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index ad657ffa44e5..7d29e69ac310 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -526,4 +526,10 @@ static inline int cache_random_seq_create(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 static inline void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+			       bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+			       unsigned long len);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* MM_SLAB_H */
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 5df1e68d4585..8006baa4caac 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -58,11 +58,25 @@ static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
 	return GOOD_STACK;
 }
 
-static void report_usercopy(unsigned long len, bool to_user, const char *type)
+/*
+ * If this function is reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found an
+ * unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
+ * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
+ * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
+ * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
+ * For cache objects, copies must be within the object size.
+ */
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+			       bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+			       unsigned long len)
 {
-	pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s '%s' (%lu bytes)\n",
-		to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
-		to_user ? "from" : "to", type ? : "unknown", len);
+	pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
+		 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
+		 to_user ? "from" : "to",
+		 name ? : "unknown?!",
+		 detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
+		 offset, len);
+
 	/*
 	 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
 	 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
@@ -260,6 +274,6 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
 		return;
 
 report:
-	report_usercopy(n, to_user, err);
+	usercopy_abort(err, NULL, to_user, 0, n);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 9b341584eb1b..ae39444896d4 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 		"__reiserfs_panic",
 		"lbug_with_loc",
 		"fortify_panic",
+		"usercopy_abort",
 	};
 
 	if (func->bind == STB_WEAK)
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-11  2:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 320+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-11  2:02 [PATCH v5 00/38] Hardened usercopy whitelisting Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 01/38] usercopy: Remove pointer from overflow report Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/38] usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy() Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 17:06   ` Christopher Lameter
2018-01-11 17:06     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christopher Lameter
2018-01-11 17:06     ` Christopher Lameter
2018-01-11 17:06     ` Christopher Lameter
2018-01-11 17:06     ` Christopher Lameter
2018-01-14 20:57     ` Kees Cook
2018-01-14 20:57       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-14 20:57       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-14 20:57       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-14 20:57       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 03/38] usercopy: Include offset in hardened usercopy report Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 04/38] lkdtm/usercopy: Adjust test to include an offset to check reporting Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 05/38] stddef.h: Introduce sizeof_field() Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 06/38] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 07/38] usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 08/38] usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 09/38] usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2019-11-12  7:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Slaby
2019-11-12  7:17     ` Jiri Slaby
2019-11-12 21:21     ` Kees Cook
2019-11-12 21:21       ` Kees Cook
2019-11-14 21:27       ` Kees Cook
2019-11-14 21:27         ` Kees Cook
2020-01-23  8:14         ` Jiri Slaby
2020-01-23  8:14           ` Jiri Slaby
2020-01-27 23:19           ` Kees Cook
2020-01-27 23:19             ` Kees Cook
2020-01-28  7:58             ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-28  7:58               ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-28 23:01               ` Kees Cook
2020-01-28 23:01                 ` Kees Cook
2020-01-29  9:26                 ` Ursula Braun
2020-01-29  9:26                   ` Ursula Braun
2020-01-29 16:43                 ` Christopher Lameter
2020-01-29 16:43                   ` Christopher Lameter
2020-01-29 16:43                   ` Christopher Lameter
2020-01-29 17:07                   ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-29 17:07                     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-29 17:09                     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-29 17:09                       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-29 17:19                       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-29 17:19                         ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-30 19:23                         ` Kees Cook
2020-01-30 19:23                           ` Kees Cook
2020-01-31 12:03                           ` Jann Horn
2020-01-31 12:03                             ` Jann Horn
2020-01-31 12:03                             ` Jann Horn
2020-02-01 17:56                             ` Kees Cook
2020-02-01 17:56                               ` Kees Cook
2020-02-01 19:27                               ` Jann Horn
2020-02-01 19:27                                 ` Jann Horn
2020-02-01 19:27                                 ` Jann Horn
2020-02-03  7:46                                 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-02-03  7:46                                   ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-02-03 17:41                                   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-03 17:41                                     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-03 17:20                               ` Christopher Lameter
2020-02-03 17:20                                 ` Christopher Lameter
2020-02-03 17:20                                 ` Christopher Lameter
2020-04-07  8:00                             ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-04-07  8:00                               ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-04-07 11:05                               ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-04-07 11:05                                 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-04-20  7:53                               ` Jiri Slaby
2020-04-20  7:53                                 ` Jiri Slaby
2020-04-20 17:43                                 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-20 17:43                                   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-03 17:38                           ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-03 17:38                             ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-03 17:36                         ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-03 17:36                           ` Christoph Hellwig
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 10/38] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 11/38] vfs: Define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 12/38] vfs: Copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 13/38] ext4: Define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 17:01   ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-11 17:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-11 17:01     ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-11 17:01     ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-11 17:01     ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-11 23:05     ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:05     ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:05       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:05       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:05       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-14 22:34       ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-01-14 22:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " Matthew Wilcox
2018-01-14 22:34         ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-01-14 22:34         ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-01-14 22:34         ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-01-11 23:05     ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:05     ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 14/38] ext2: Define usercopy region in ext2_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 15/38] jfs: Define usercopy region in jfs_ip " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 16/38] befs: Define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 17/38] exofs: Define usercopy region in exofs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 18/38] orangefs: Define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 19/38] ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 20/38] vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 21/38] cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 22/38] scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 23/38] net: Define usercopy region in struct proto " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 24/38] ip: Define usercopy region in IP " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 25/38] caif: Define usercopy region in caif " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 26/38] sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02 ` [PATCH 27/38] sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:02   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-18 21:31   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2018-01-18 21:31     ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-18 21:31     ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-18 21:31     ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-18 21:31     ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-18 21:31     ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-18 21:36     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-18 21:36       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-18 21:36       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-18 21:36       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-18 21:36       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-18 21:36       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 28/38] net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0 Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 29/38] fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 30/38] fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 31/38] fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 32/38] x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 33/38] arm64: " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-15 12:24   ` Dave P Martin
2018-01-15 12:24     ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave P Martin
2018-01-15 12:24     ` Dave P Martin
2018-01-15 12:24     ` Dave P Martin
2018-01-15 12:24     ` Dave P Martin
2018-01-15 12:24     ` Dave P Martin
2018-01-15 12:24     ` Dave P Martin
2018-01-15 20:06     ` Kees Cook
2018-01-15 20:06       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-15 20:06       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-15 20:06       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-15 20:06       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-15 20:06       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-15 20:06       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-16 12:33       ` Dave Martin
2018-01-16 12:33         ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Martin
2018-01-16 12:33         ` Dave Martin
2018-01-16 12:33         ` Dave Martin
2018-01-16 12:33         ` Dave Martin
2018-01-16 12:33         ` Dave Martin
2018-03-26 16:22       ` Dave Martin
2018-03-26 16:22         ` Dave Martin
2018-03-26 17:41         ` Kees Cook
2018-03-26 17:41           ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 12:32           ` Dave Martin
2018-03-27 12:32             ` Dave Martin
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 34/38] arm: " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 10:24   ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-11 10:24     ` [kernel-hardening] " Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-11 10:24     ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-11 10:24     ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-11 10:24     ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-11 10:24     ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-11 23:21     ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:21       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:21       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:21       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:21       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11 23:21       ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 35/38] kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 36/38] kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 37/38] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03 ` [PATCH 38/38] lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-11  2:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-19 16:55 ` [PATCH] signals: Move put_compat_sigset to compat.h to silence hardened usercopy Matt Redfearn
2018-02-19 16:55   ` Matt Redfearn
2018-02-19 23:55   ` Kees Cook
2018-03-02 21:40     ` James Hogan

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