From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>, Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Subject: [PATCH v2 2/4] ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 16:33:02 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1519335184-17808-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1519335184-17808-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in a "secure" environment, with a correctly enforced security policy, which is willing to assume the inherent risk of specific fuse filesystems that are well defined and properly implemented. As there is no way for the kernel to detect file changes, the kernel ignores the cached file integrity results and re-measures, re-appraises, and re-audits the file. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a5d225ffc388..f550f25294a3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/iversion.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -230,9 +231,17 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | IMA_ACTION_FLAGS); - if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags)) - /* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */ + /* + * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the + * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem. + * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.) + */ + if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) || + ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) && + !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER))) { iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; + iint->measured_pcrs = 0; + } /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED, -- 2.7.5
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 2/4] ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 16:33:02 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1519335184-17808-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1519335184-17808-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in a "secure" environment, with a correctly enforced security policy, which is willing to assume the inherent risk of specific fuse filesystems that are well defined and properly implemented. As there is no way for the kernel to detect file changes, the kernel ignores the cached file integrity results and re-measures, re-appraises, and re-audits the file. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a5d225ffc388..f550f25294a3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/iversion.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -230,9 +231,17 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | IMA_ACTION_FLAGS); - if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags)) - /* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */ + /* + * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the + * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem. + * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.) + */ + if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) || + ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) && + !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER))) { iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; + iint->measured_pcrs = 0; + } /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED, -- 2.7.5 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-22 21:33 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-02-22 21:33 [PATCH v2 0/4] ima: unverifiable file signatures Mimi Zohar 2018-02-22 21:33 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-22 21:33 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems Mimi Zohar 2018-02-22 21:33 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-27 1:47 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-02-27 1:47 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-02-27 15:33 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-27 15:33 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-27 15:33 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-22 21:33 ` Mimi Zohar [this message] 2018-02-22 21:33 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] ima: re-evaluate files on privileged " Mimi Zohar 2018-02-22 21:33 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] ima: fail signature verification based on policy Mimi Zohar 2018-02-22 21:33 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-27 22:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2018-02-27 22:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2018-02-28 11:38 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-28 11:38 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-28 11:38 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-28 15:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2018-02-28 15:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2018-02-28 15:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2018-03-02 21:10 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-03-02 21:10 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-03-02 21:10 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-22 21:33 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted Mimi Zohar 2018-02-22 21:33 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-23 4:00 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] ima: unverifiable file signatures James Morris 2018-02-23 4:00 ` James Morris 2018-02-27 2:08 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-02-27 2:08 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-02-27 16:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-27 16:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-02-27 16:17 ` Mimi Zohar
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