From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 17:25:38 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <152346393827.4030.9682809430473131782.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <152346387861.4030.4408662483445703127.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org --- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 9 ++++++++- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 366d93af051d..1e149ec006a4 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -903,6 +903,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (off > dev->cfg_size) return 0; if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { @@ -1165,6 +1168,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type; struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar]; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1240,6 +1246,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c index 1ee8927a0635..469445a9019b 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int size = dev->cfg_size; int cnt; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (pos >= size) return 0; if (nbytes >= size) @@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + switch (cmd) { case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); @@ -237,7 +243,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) { diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c index d96626c614f5..b8a08d3166a1 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, u32 dword; int err = 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn);
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 17:25:38 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <152346393827.4030.9682809430473131782.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <152346387861.4030.4408662483445703127.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> cc: linux-pci at vger.kernel.org --- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 9 ++++++++- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 366d93af051d..1e149ec006a4 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -903,6 +903,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (off > dev->cfg_size) return 0; if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { @@ -1165,6 +1168,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type; struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar]; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1240,6 +1246,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c index 1ee8927a0635..469445a9019b 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int size = dev->cfg_size; int cnt; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (pos >= size) return 0; if (nbytes >= size) @@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + switch (cmd) { case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); @@ -237,7 +243,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) { diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c index d96626c614f5..b8a08d3166a1 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, u32 dword; int err = 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn); -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-11 16:25 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-04-11 16:24 [PATCH 00/24] security: Add kernel lockdown David Howells 2018-04-11 16:24 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells 2018-04-11 16:24 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:44 ` Jann Horn 2018-04-11 16:44 ` Jann Horn 2018-04-11 17:37 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-04-11 17:37 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-04-11 18:50 ` Miguel Ojeda 2018-04-11 18:50 ` Miguel Ojeda 2018-04-11 19:56 ` Greg KH 2018-04-11 19:56 ` Greg KH 2018-04-11 17:49 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 17:49 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 18:09 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-04-11 18:09 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-04-11 18:35 ` Justin Forbes 2018-04-11 18:35 ` Justin Forbes 2018-04-11 21:05 ` Jordan Glover 2018-04-11 21:05 ` Jordan Glover 2018-04-11 22:38 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-04-11 22:38 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-04-12 13:09 ` Justin Forbes 2018-04-12 13:09 ` Justin Forbes 2018-04-12 16:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-04-12 16:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-04-12 2:57 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-04-12 2:57 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells 2018-04-11 16:24 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 17:05 ` Jann Horn 2018-04-11 17:05 ` Jann Horn 2018-04-13 20:22 ` Pavel Machek 2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 03/24] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode David Howells 2018-04-11 16:24 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 19:00 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-04-11 19:00 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-04-11 20:09 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-04-11 20:09 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-04-12 11:38 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-04-12 11:38 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-04-11 20:05 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 20:05 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 20:05 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` David Howells 2018-04-13 20:22 ` Pavel Machek 2018-04-19 14:38 ` David Howells 2018-04-19 14:38 ` David Howells 2018-04-22 14:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-04-22 14:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-04-26 7:26 ` Pavel Machek 2018-04-26 7:34 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2018-04-26 7:34 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2018-04-26 8:20 ` Jiri Kosina 2018-04-26 8:20 ` Jiri Kosina 2018-05-23 8:46 ` joeyli 2018-05-23 8:46 ` joeyli 2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 08/24] uswsusp: " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` David Howells [this message] 2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 10/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 11/24] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 12/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:25 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 13/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 14/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 15/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 16/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 17/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 18/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 17:22 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-04-11 17:22 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 19/24] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 20/24] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 21/24] Lock down kprobes David Howells 2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 22/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2018-04-11 16:27 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down perf David Howells 2018-04-11 16:27 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2018-04-11 16:27 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 17:26 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-04-11 17:26 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-04-11 18:50 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-04-11 18:50 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-04-11 19:54 ` Greg KH 2018-04-11 19:54 ` Greg KH 2018-04-11 20:08 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 20:08 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 20:08 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 20:09 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 20:09 ` David Howells 2018-04-11 20:33 ` Greg KH 2018-04-11 20:33 ` Greg KH 2018-04-12 2:54 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-04-12 2:54 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-04-12 8:23 ` Greg KH 2018-04-12 8:23 ` Greg KH 2018-04-12 14:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-04-12 14:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-04-13 20:22 ` Pavel Machek 2018-04-19 14:35 ` David Howells 2018-04-19 14:35 ` David Howells 2018-05-10 11:01 ` Pavel Machek
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