All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH] proc: prevent a task from writing on its own /proc/*/mem
Date: Sat, 26 May 2018 16:50:46 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1527346246-1334-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> (raw)

Prevent a task from opening, in "write" mode, any /proc/*/mem
file that operates on the task's mm.
/proc/*/mem is mainly a debugging means and, as such, it shouldn't
be used by the inspected process itself.
Current implementation always allow a task to access its own
/proc/*/mem file.
A process can use it to overwrite read-only memory, making
pointless the use of security_file_mprotect() or other ways to
enforce RO memory.

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
---
 fs/proc/base.c       | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 fs/proc/internal.h   |  3 ++-
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c   |  4 ++--
 fs/proc/task_nommu.c |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 1a76d75..01ecfec 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -762,8 +762,9 @@ static int proc_single_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	.release	= single_release,
 };
 
-
-struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
+struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode,
+				unsigned int mode,
+				fmode_t f_mode)
 {
 	struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
 	struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
@@ -773,10 +774,20 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
 		put_task_struct(task);
 
 		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
-			/* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */
-			mmgrab(mm);
-			/* but do not pin its memory */
-			mmput(mm);
+			/*
+			 * Prevent this interface from being used as a mean
+			 * to bypass memory restrictions, including those
+			 * imposed by LSMs.
+			 */
+			if (mm == current->mm &&
+			    f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+				mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+			else {
+				/* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */
+				mmgrab(mm);
+				/* but do not pin its memory */
+				mmput(mm);
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -785,7 +796,7 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
 
 static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	struct mm_struct *mm = proc_mem_open(inode, mode);
+	struct mm_struct *mm = proc_mem_open(inode, mode, file->f_mode);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(mm))
 		return PTR_ERR(mm);
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 0f1692e..8d38cc7 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -275,7 +275,8 @@ struct proc_maps_private {
 #endif
 } __randomize_layout;
 
-struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode);
+struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode,
+				fmode_t f_mode);
 
 extern const struct file_operations proc_pid_maps_operations;
 extern const struct file_operations proc_tid_maps_operations;
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index c486ad4..efb6535 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static int proc_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	priv->inode = inode;
-	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ, file->f_mode);
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(priv->mm);
 
@@ -1534,7 +1534,7 @@ static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm;
 
-	mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+	mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ, file->f_mode);
 	if (IS_ERR(mm))
 		return PTR_ERR(mm);
 	file->private_data = mm;
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
index 5b62f57..dc38516 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static int maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	priv->inode = inode;
-	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ, file->f_mode);
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(priv->mm);
 
-- 
1.9.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: s.mesoraca16@gmail.com (Salvatore Mesoraca)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] proc: prevent a task from writing on its own /proc/*/mem
Date: Sat, 26 May 2018 16:50:46 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1527346246-1334-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> (raw)

Prevent a task from opening, in "write" mode, any /proc/*/mem
file that operates on the task's mm.
/proc/*/mem is mainly a debugging means and, as such, it shouldn't
be used by the inspected process itself.
Current implementation always allow a task to access its own
/proc/*/mem file.
A process can use it to overwrite read-only memory, making
pointless the use of security_file_mprotect() or other ways to
enforce RO memory.

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
---
 fs/proc/base.c       | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 fs/proc/internal.h   |  3 ++-
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c   |  4 ++--
 fs/proc/task_nommu.c |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 1a76d75..01ecfec 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -762,8 +762,9 @@ static int proc_single_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	.release	= single_release,
 };
 
-
-struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
+struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode,
+				unsigned int mode,
+				fmode_t f_mode)
 {
 	struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
 	struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
@@ -773,10 +774,20 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
 		put_task_struct(task);
 
 		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
-			/* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */
-			mmgrab(mm);
-			/* but do not pin its memory */
-			mmput(mm);
+			/*
+			 * Prevent this interface from being used as a mean
+			 * to bypass memory restrictions, including those
+			 * imposed by LSMs.
+			 */
+			if (mm == current->mm &&
+			    f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+				mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+			else {
+				/* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */
+				mmgrab(mm);
+				/* but do not pin its memory */
+				mmput(mm);
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -785,7 +796,7 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
 
 static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	struct mm_struct *mm = proc_mem_open(inode, mode);
+	struct mm_struct *mm = proc_mem_open(inode, mode, file->f_mode);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(mm))
 		return PTR_ERR(mm);
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 0f1692e..8d38cc7 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -275,7 +275,8 @@ struct proc_maps_private {
 #endif
 } __randomize_layout;
 
-struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode);
+struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode,
+				fmode_t f_mode);
 
 extern const struct file_operations proc_pid_maps_operations;
 extern const struct file_operations proc_tid_maps_operations;
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index c486ad4..efb6535 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static int proc_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	priv->inode = inode;
-	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ, file->f_mode);
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(priv->mm);
 
@@ -1534,7 +1534,7 @@ static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm;
 
-	mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+	mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ, file->f_mode);
 	if (IS_ERR(mm))
 		return PTR_ERR(mm);
 	file->private_data = mm;
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
index 5b62f57..dc38516 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static int maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	priv->inode = inode;
-	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ, file->f_mode);
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(priv->mm);
 
-- 
1.9.1

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

             reply	other threads:[~2018-05-26 14:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-26 14:50 Salvatore Mesoraca [this message]
2018-05-26 14:50 ` [PATCH] proc: prevent a task from writing on its own /proc/*/mem Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-26 15:48 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-26 15:48   ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-26 17:30   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-26 17:30     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-26 17:53     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-26 17:53       ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-26 17:58     ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-26 17:58       ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-27  0:31 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-27  0:31   ` Kees Cook
2018-05-27  1:33   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-27  1:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-27 14:41     ` Kees Cook
2018-05-27 14:41       ` Kees Cook
2018-05-28  9:32     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-28  9:32       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-06-04 16:57       ` Steve Kemp
2018-06-04 16:57         ` Steve Kemp
2018-06-04 16:57         ` Steve Kemp
2018-06-04 18:03         ` Casey Schaufler
2018-06-04 18:03           ` Casey Schaufler
2018-06-10  7:40         ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-06-10  7:40           ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-28  9:06 ` Jann Horn
2018-05-28  9:06   ` Jann Horn
2018-05-28  9:33   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-28  9:33     ` Salvatore Mesoraca

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1527346246-1334-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com \
    --to=s.mesoraca16@gmail.com \
    --cc=adobriyan@gmail.com \
    --cc=akinobu.mita@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=dave@stgolabs.net \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.