From: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "Matt Helsley \(VMware\)" <matt.helsley@gmail.com>, Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com>, Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com>, matt.helsley@gmail.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, amakhalov@vmware.com, ganb@vmware.com, srivatsa@csail.mit.edu, srivatsab@vmware.com Subject: [PATCH 4.4.y 036/101] x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2018 02:31:13 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <153156067363.10043.5785487284032049496.stgit@srivatsa-ubuntu> (raw) In-Reply-To: <153156030832.10043.13438231886571087086.stgit@srivatsa-ubuntu> From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> commit d37fc6d360a404b208547ba112e7dabb6533c7fc upstream. Arjan points out that the Intel document only clears the 0xc2 microcode on *some* parts with CPUID 506E3 (INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP stepping 3). For the Skylake H/S platform it's OK but for Skylake E3 which has the same CPUID it isn't (yet) cleared. So removing it from the blacklist was premature. Put it back for now. Also, Arjan assures me that the 0x84 microcode for Kaby Lake which was featured in one of the early revisions of the Intel document was never released to the public, and won't be until/unless it is also validated as safe. So those can change to 0x80 which is what all *other* versions of the doc have identified. Once the retrospective testing of existing public microcodes is done, we should be back into a mode where new microcodes are only released in batches and we shouldn't even need to update the blacklist for those anyway, so this tweaking of the list isn't expected to be a thing which keeps happening. Requested-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518449255-2182-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index 71492d2..b69d258 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -40,13 +40,14 @@ struct sku_microcode { u32 microcode; }; static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = { - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 }, - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 }, - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 }, - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 }, - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x80 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x80 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x80 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x80 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x80 }, { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e }, { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 }, { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 }, { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b }, { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 },
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "Matt Helsley \(VMware\)" <matt.helsley@gmail.com>, Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com>, Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com>, matt.helsley@gmail.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, amakhalov@vmware.com, ganb@vmware.com, Subject: [PATCH 4.4.y 036/101] x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2018 02:31:13 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <153156067363.10043.5785487284032049496.stgit@srivatsa-ubuntu> (raw) In-Reply-To: <153156030832.10043.13438231886571087086.stgit@srivatsa-ubuntu> From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> commit d37fc6d360a404b208547ba112e7dabb6533c7fc upstream. Arjan points out that the Intel document only clears the 0xc2 microcode on *some* parts with CPUID 506E3 (INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP stepping 3). For the Skylake H/S platform it's OK but for Skylake E3 which has the same CPUID it isn't (yet) cleared. So removing it from the blacklist was premature. Put it back for now. Also, Arjan assures me that the 0x84 microcode for Kaby Lake which was featured in one of the early revisions of the Intel document was never released to the public, and won't be until/unless it is also validated as safe. So those can change to 0x80 which is what all *other* versions of the doc have identified. Once the retrospective testing of existing public microcodes is done, we should be back into a mode where new microcodes are only released in batches and we shouldn't even need to update the blacklist for those anyway, so this tweaking of the list isn't expected to be a thing which keeps happening. Requested-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518449255-2182-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index 71492d2..b69d258 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -40,13 +40,14 @@ struct sku_microcode { u32 microcode; }; static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = { - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 }, - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 }, - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 }, - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 }, - { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x80 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x80 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x80 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x80 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x80 }, { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e }, { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 }, { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 }, { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b }, { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 },
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-14 9:49 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 144+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-07-14 9:25 [RESEND] Spectre-v2 (IBPB/IBRS) and SSBD fixes for 4.4.y Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:26 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 001/101] x86/cpufeature: Move some of the scattered feature bits to x86_capability Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:26 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 002/101] x86/cpufeature: Cleanup get_cpu_cap() Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:26 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 003/101] x86/cpu: Provide a config option to disable static_cpu_has Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:26 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 004/101] x86/fpu: Add an XSTATE_OP() macro Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:26 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 005/101] x86/fpu: Get rid of xstate_fault() Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:26 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 006/101] x86/headers: Don't include asm/processor.h in asm/atomic.h Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:26 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 007/101] x86/cpufeature: Carve out X86_FEATURE_* Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:27 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 008/101] x86/cpufeature: Replace the old static_cpu_has() with safe variant Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:27 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 009/101] x86/cpufeature: Get rid of the non-asm goto variant Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:27 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 010/101] x86/alternatives: Add an auxilary section Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:27 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 011/101] x86/alternatives: Discard dynamic check after init Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:27 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 012/101] x86/vdso: Use static_cpu_has() Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:27 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 013/101] x86/boot: Simplify kernel load address alignment check Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:27 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 014/101] x86/cpufeature: Speed up cpu_feature_enabled() Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:28 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 015/101] x86/cpufeature, x86/mm/pkeys: Add protection keys related CPUID definitions Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:28 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-15 11:04 ` Patch "[PATCH 4.4.y 015/101] x86/cpufeature, x86/mm/pkeys: Add protection keys related CPUID definitions" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh 2018-07-14 9:28 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 016/101] x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:28 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 018/101] x86/cpufeature, x86/mm/pkeys: Fix broken compile-time disabling of pkeys Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:28 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 019/101] x86/cpufeature: Update cpufeaure macros Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:28 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 020/101] x86/cpufeature: Make sure DISABLED/REQUIRED macros are updated Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:28 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 021/101] x86/cpufeature: Add helper macro for mask check macros Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:29 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 022/101] x86/cpu: Probe CPUID leaf 6 even when cpuid_level == 6 Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:29 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 023/101] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:29 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 024/101] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:29 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 025/101] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:29 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 026/101] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:29 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 027/101] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:30 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 028/101] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:30 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 029/101] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:30 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 030/101] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:30 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 031/101] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:30 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 032/101] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:30 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 033/101] x86/asm/entry/32: Simplify pushes of zeroed pt_regs->REGs Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:30 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 034/101] x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:31 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 035/101] x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:31 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:31 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat [this message] 2018-07-14 9:31 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 036/101] x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:31 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 037/101] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:31 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 038/101] x86/speculation: Fix up array_index_nospec_mask() asm constraint Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:31 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 039/101] x86/speculation: Add <asm/msr-index.h> dependency Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:31 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 040/101] x86/xen: Zero MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL before suspend Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:31 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-23 9:22 ` Patch "x86/xen: Zero MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL before suspend" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh 2018-07-14 9:31 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 041/101] x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:31 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-23 9:22 ` Patch "x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh 2018-07-14 9:32 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 042/101] x86/mm: Give each mm TLB flush generation a unique ID Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:32 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-23 9:22 ` Patch "x86/mm: Give each mm TLB flush generation a unique ID" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh 2018-07-14 9:32 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 043/101] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:32 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 044/101] x86/spectre_v2: Don't check microcode versions when running under hypervisors Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:32 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 045/101] x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:32 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 046/101] x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:32 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 047/101] x86/speculation: Remove Skylake C2 from Speculation Control microcode blacklist Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:33 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 048/101] selftest/seccomp: Fix the flag name SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:33 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 049/101] selftest/seccomp: Fix the seccomp(2) signature Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:33 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 050/101] xen: set cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel() Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:33 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 051/101] x86/amd: don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 14:15 ` Juergen Gross 2018-07-16 19:59 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:33 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 052/101] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write() Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:33 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 053/101] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:33 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 054/101] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting " Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:33 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 055/101] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:34 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 056/101] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:34 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 057/101] x86/cpu: Rename Merrifield2 to Moorefield Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:34 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 058/101] x86/cpu/intel: Add Knights Mill to Intel family Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:34 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 059/101] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:34 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 060/101] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:34 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 061/101] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:34 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 062/101] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:35 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 063/101] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:35 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 064/101] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15, 16, 17]h if requested Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:35 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 065/101] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:35 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 066/101] prctl: Add speculation control prctls Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:35 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 067/101] x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra() Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:35 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 068/101] x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:35 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 069/101] x86/process: Optimize TIF_NOTSC switch Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:36 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 070/101] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:36 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 071/101] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:36 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 072/101] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:36 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 073/101] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:36 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 074/101] seccomp: Enable " Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:36 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 075/101] prctl: Add force disable speculation Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:36 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 076/101] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:36 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 077/101] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:37 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 078/101] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:37 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 079/101] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:37 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 081/101] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status' Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:37 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 082/101] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:37 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 083/101] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:37 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 084/101] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:38 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 085/101] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:38 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 086/101] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:38 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 087/101] x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:38 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 088/101] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:38 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 089/101] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:38 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 090/101] x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit) Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:38 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 091/101] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:38 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 092/101] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:39 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 093/101] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:39 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 094/101] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:39 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 095/101] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:39 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 096/101] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest, restore_host} Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:39 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 097/101] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:39 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 098/101] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:39 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 099/101] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:40 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 100/101] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:40 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 101/101] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-15 11:26 ` [RESEND] Spectre-v2 (IBPB/IBRS) and SSBD fixes for 4.4.y Greg KH 2018-07-15 11:26 ` Greg KH 2018-07-16 8:02 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-16 8:02 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-23 11:26 ` Greg KH 2018-07-23 11:26 ` Greg KH 2018-07-23 17:27 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-23 17:27 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-23 22:06 ` Jiri Kosina 2018-07-24 20:13 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-24 20:13 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-24 22:02 ` Jiri Kosina 2018-07-24 22:02 ` Jiri Kosina 2018-07-26 23:09 ` Kees Cook 2018-07-26 23:09 ` Kees Cook 2018-08-02 19:22 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-08-02 19:22 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-08-02 22:22 ` Kees Cook 2018-08-02 22:22 ` Kees Cook 2018-08-03 23:20 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-08-03 23:20 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-08-07 13:49 ` Greg KH 2018-08-07 13:49 ` Greg KH 2018-08-07 19:08 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-08-07 19:08 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-08-07 19:15 ` Greg KH 2018-08-07 19:15 ` Greg KH 2018-08-07 19:19 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-08-07 19:19 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2018-07-14 9:28 [4.4.y,017/101] x86/cpu: Add detection of AMD RAS Capabilities Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-14 9:28 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 017/101] " Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-13 21:49 Spectre-v2 (IBPB/IBRS) and SSBD fixes for 4.4.y Srivatsa S. Bhat 2018-07-13 21:53 ` [PATCH 4.4.y 036/101] x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again Srivatsa S. Bhat
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