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From: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
To: hpa@zytor.com, kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com,
	wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com, luto@kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
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	arnd@arndb.de, hch@lst.de, m.szyprowski@samsung.com,
	robin.murphy@arm.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	isaku.yamahata@intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com,
	jane.chu@oracle.com, seanjc@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: mikelley@microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 04/13] x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently
Date: Wed,  8 Mar 2023 18:40:05 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1678329614-3482-5-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1678329614-3482-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com>

sme_postprocess_startup() decrypts the bss_decrypted section when
sme_me_mask is non-zero.

mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem() re-encrypts the unused portion based
on CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT.

In a Hyper-V guest VM using vTOM, these conditions are not equivalent
as sme_me_mask is always zero when using vTOM. Consequently,
mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem() attempts to re-encrypt memory that was
never decrypted.

So check sme_me_mask in mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem() too.

Hyper-V guests using vTOM don't need the bss_decrypted section to be
decrypted, so skipping the decryption/re-encryption doesn't cause a
problem.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 9c4d8db..e0b51c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -513,10 +513,14 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
 	npages = (vaddr_end - vaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 	/*
-	 * The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption
-	 * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it.
+	 * If the unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption
+	 * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it. Base the
+	 * re-encryption on the same condition used for the decryption in
+	 * sme_postprocess_startup(). Higher level abstractions, such as
+	 * CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT, aren't necessarily equivalent in a Hyper-V VM
+	 * using vTOM, where sme_me_mask is always zero.
 	 */
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+	if (sme_me_mask) {
 		r = set_memory_encrypted(vaddr, npages);
 		if (r) {
 			pr_warn("failed to free unused decrypted pages\n");
-- 
1.8.3.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-03-09  2:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-03-09  2:40 [PATCH v6 00/13] Add PCI pass-thru support to Hyper-V Confidential VMs Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] x86/ioremap: Add hypervisor callback for private MMIO mapping in coco VM Michael Kelley
2023-03-27 20:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] x86/hyperv: Reorder code to facilitate future work Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] Drivers: hv: Explicitly request decrypted in vmap_pfn() calls Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` Michael Kelley [this message]
2023-03-27 20:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently tip-bot2 for Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] init: Call mem_encrypt_init() after Hyper-V hypercall init is done Michael Kelley
2023-03-27 20:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms Michael Kelley
2023-03-20 11:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-20 13:30     ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-03-20 18:16       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-20 18:50         ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-03-23 13:43           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-24 15:48             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-24 17:10               ` Dexuan Cui
2023-03-24 17:28                 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-03-24 18:30                 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-24 19:36               ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-03-25  0:04                 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] swiotlb: Remove bounce buffer remapping for Hyper-V Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second mapping of VMBus monitor pages Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second way of mapping ring buffers Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] hv_netvsc: Remove second mapping of send and recv buffers Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] Drivers: hv: Don't remap addresses that are above shared_gpa_boundary Michael Kelley
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] PCI: hv: Add hypercalls to read/write MMIO space Michael Kelley
2023-03-24 14:48   ` Lorenzo Pieralisi
2023-03-24 15:13     ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-03-24 15:24       ` Lorenzo Pieralisi
2023-03-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] PCI: hv: Enable PCI pass-thru devices in Confidential VMs Michael Kelley
2023-03-20 11:27 ` [PATCH v6 00/13] Add PCI pass-thru support to Hyper-V " Borislav Petkov

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