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From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
	audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v15 05/21] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs()
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 20:35:35 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1710560151-28904-6-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1710560151-28904-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.

Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.

This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.

Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

---
v1-v11:
  + Not present

v12:
  + Introduced

v13:
  + Rename the hook name to initramfs_populated()

v14:
  + No changes

v15:
  + No changes
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/security.h      |  8 ++++++++
 init/initramfs.c              |  3 +++
 security/security.c           | 10 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 334e00efbde4..7db99ae75651 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -450,3 +450,5 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, initramfs_populated, void)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 41a8f667bdfa..14fff542f2e3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2255,4 +2255,12 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+extern void security_initramfs_populated(void);
+#else
+static inline void security_initramfs_populated(void)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c
index da79760b8be3..cc9115117896 100644
--- a/init/initramfs.c
+++ b/init/initramfs.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/umh.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "do_mounts.h"
 
@@ -719,6 +720,8 @@ static void __init do_populate_rootfs(void *unused, async_cookie_t cookie)
 #endif
 	}
 
+	security_initramfs_populated();
+
 done:
 	/*
 	 * If the initrd region is overlapped with crashkernel reserved region,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 287bfac6b471..b10230c51c0b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5675,3 +5675,13 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+/**
+ * security_initramfs_populated() - Notify LSMs that initramfs has been loaded
+ *
+ * Tells the LSMs the initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
+ */
+void security_initramfs_populated(void)
+{
+	call_void_hook(initramfs_populated);
+}
-- 
2.44.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-03-16  3:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-16  3:35 [RFC PATCH v15 00/21] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 01/21] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 02/21] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 03/21] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 04/21] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2024-03-18  0:29   ` [RFC PATCH v15 05/21] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Casey Schaufler
2024-03-18  1:58     ` Paul Moore
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 06/21] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 07/21] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 08/21] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 09/21] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 10/21] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 11/21] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 12/21] security: add security_bdev_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-03-16  9:30   ` kernel test robot
2024-03-16 10:34   ` kernel test robot
2024-03-16 11:07   ` kernel test robot
2024-03-19 23:00   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2024-03-20  8:28     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-20  8:31       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-20 20:31         ` Fan Wu
2024-03-21 17:25           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 13/21] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 14/21] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-03-19 23:00   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2024-03-20  2:19     ` Mike Snitzer
2024-03-20 17:23       ` Paul Moore
2024-03-20 18:49         ` Mike Snitzer
2024-03-20 17:56     ` Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 15/21] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 16/21] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-03-19 23:00   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 17/21] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-03-17  4:56   ` kernel test robot
2024-03-17 10:09   ` kernel test robot
2024-03-18  5:29   ` Eric Biggers
2024-03-19 23:00     ` Paul Moore
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 18/21] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-18  5:17   ` Eric Biggers
2024-03-18  8:08     ` Roberto Sassu
2024-03-18 20:58       ` Fan Wu
2024-03-18 20:40     ` Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 19/21] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 20/21] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-03-16  3:35 ` [RFC PATCH v15 21/21] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu

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