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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 5/4] arm: fixes for usercopy
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2016 20:02:30 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160609030230.GA23922@www.outflux.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465420302-23754-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

These will be in the next version; they are the fixes I needed to boot my
ARM VM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 7bcdb56ce6fb..c4887b272527 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -515,12 +515,12 @@ __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 #ifndef CONFIG_UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY
 	unsigned int __ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();
 
-	check_object_size(to, n, false);
+	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	n = arm_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
 	uaccess_restore(__ua_flags);
 	return n;
 #else
-	check_object_size(to, n, false);
+	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	return arm_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
 #endif
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
index 7b8f2141427b..98b497c83aef 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ badframe:
 static int
 setup_sigframe(struct sigframe __user *sf, struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set)
 {
+	sigset_t setcopy = *set;
 	struct aux_sigframe __user *aux;
 	int err = 0;
 
@@ -278,7 +279,7 @@ setup_sigframe(struct sigframe __user *sf, struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set)
 	__put_user_error(current->thread.address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 	__put_user_error(set->sig[0], &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.oldmask, err);
 
-	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
+	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, &setcopy, sizeof(*set));
 
 	aux = (struct aux_sigframe __user *) sf->uc.uc_regspace;
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRUNCH
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index e2c6da096cef..99420fc1f066 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ SECTIONS
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
 	. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
 #endif
+	_etext = .;			/* End of text section */
+
 	RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
 
 	. = ALIGN(4);
@@ -155,8 +157,6 @@ SECTIONS
 
 	NOTES
 
-	_etext = .;			/* End of text and rodata section */
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 	. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
 #else

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-06-09  3:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-06-08 21:11 [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-06-08 21:11 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/4] " Kees Cook
2016-06-09  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Brad Spengler
2016-06-09  1:39     ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-09  2:58     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-12 23:04   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-08 21:11 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/4] usercopy: avoid direct copying to userspace Kees Cook
2016-06-09 23:37   ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-06-10 21:09   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-11  1:08     ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-08 21:11 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/4] usercopy: whitelist user-copyable caches Kees Cook
2016-06-08 21:11 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/4] usercopy: provide split of user-controlled slabs Kees Cook
2016-06-09  3:02 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-06-09 15:35 ` [kernel-hardening] RE: [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy Schaufler, Casey
2016-06-09 17:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 23:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately allocated pages Rik van Riel
2016-06-10 19:44   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 " Rik van Riel
2016-06-10 20:46     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-24 20:53     ` Kees Cook
2016-06-24 20:57       ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-24 20:59         ` Kees Cook
2016-06-16  1:30 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-06-16  1:38   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-16 23:36     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-06-17  1:38       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-06-18 19:30         ` Kees Cook

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