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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: log policy capability state when a policy is loaded
Date: Thu, 18 May 2017 16:58:31 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170518205831.25514-1-sds@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)

Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded.
For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability
name and the value set in the policy.  For policy capabilities that are
set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy
capability index, since this is the only information presently available
in the policy.

Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined
that is not known to the kernel:
SELinux:  policy capability network_peer_controls=1
SELinux:  policy capability open_perms=1
SELinux:  policy capability extended_socket_class=1
SELinux:  policy capability always_check_network=0
SELinux:  policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0
SELinux:  unknown policy capability 5

Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  2 ++
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        | 13 ++-----------
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index f979c35..c4224bb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ enum {
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
 
+extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+
 extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index ce71718..ea2da91 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -41,15 +41,6 @@
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "conditional.h"
 
-/* Policy capability filenames */
-static char *policycap_names[] = {
-	"network_peer_controls",
-	"open_perms",
-	"extended_socket_class",
-	"always_check_network",
-	"cgroup_seclabel"
-};
-
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
 
 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
@@ -1750,9 +1741,9 @@ static int sel_make_policycap(void)
 	sel_remove_entries(policycap_dir);
 
 	for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) {
-		if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(policycap_names))
+		if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
 			dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir,
-					      policycap_names[iter]);
+					      selinux_policycap_names[iter]);
 		else
 			dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir, "unknown");
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 60d9b02..2dccba4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -70,6 +70,15 @@
 #include "ebitmap.h"
 #include "audit.h"
 
+/* Policy capability names */
+char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
+	"network_peer_controls",
+	"open_perms",
+	"extended_socket_class",
+	"always_check_network",
+	"cgroup_seclabel"
+};
+
 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
@@ -1986,6 +1995,9 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
 
 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
 {
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
 	selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
 	selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
@@ -1997,6 +2009,17 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
 	selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
 		ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
 				POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
+		pr_info("SELinux:  policy capability %s=%d\n",
+			selinux_policycap_names[i],
+			ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, i));
+
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&policydb.policycaps, node, i) {
+		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+			pr_info("SELinux:  unknown policy capability %u\n",
+				i);
+	}
 }
 
 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
-- 
2.9.3

             reply	other threads:[~2017-05-18 20:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-18 20:58 Stephen Smalley [this message]
2017-05-19 14:55 ` [PATCH] selinux: log policy capability state when a policy is loaded Paul Moore
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-05-12 15:58 Stephen Smalley

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