From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>, Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>, "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>, Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Subject: [PATCH v5 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 01:26:01 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170607232607.26870-8-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20170607232607.26870-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> Ceph uses the RNG for various nonce generations, and it shouldn't accept using bad randomness. So, we wait for the RNG to be properly seeded. We do this by calling wait_for_random_bytes() in a function that is certainly called in process context, early on, so that all subsequent calls to get_random_bytes are necessarily acceptable. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Cc: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Cc: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> --- net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c index 47e94b560ba0..0368a04995b3 100644 --- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c +++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c @@ -598,7 +598,11 @@ struct ceph_client *ceph_create_client(struct ceph_options *opt, void *private) { struct ceph_client *client; struct ceph_entity_addr *myaddr = NULL; - int err = -ENOMEM; + int err; + + err = wait_for_random_bytes(); + if (err < 0) + return ERR_PTR(err); client = kzalloc(sizeof(*client), GFP_KERNEL); if (client == NULL) -- 2.13.0
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>, Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>, "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>, Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 01:26:01 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170607232607.26870-8-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20170607232607.26870-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> Ceph uses the RNG for various nonce generations, and it shouldn't accept using bad randomness. So, we wait for the RNG to be properly seeded. We do this by calling wait_for_random_bytes() in a function that is certainly called in process context, early on, so that all subsequent calls to get_random_bytes are necessarily acceptable. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Cc: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Cc: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> --- net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c index 47e94b560ba0..0368a04995b3 100644 --- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c +++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c @@ -598,7 +598,11 @@ struct ceph_client *ceph_create_client(struct ceph_options *opt, void *private) { struct ceph_client *client; struct ceph_entity_addr *myaddr = NULL; - int err = -ENOMEM; + int err; + + err = wait_for_random_bytes(); + if (err < 0) + return ERR_PTR(err); client = kzalloc(sizeof(*client), GFP_KERNEL); if (client == NULL) -- 2.13.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-07 23:26 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-06-07 23:25 [PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-14 19:28 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-14 19:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-14 22:33 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-14 22:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-16 8:31 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-16 8:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-16 12:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-16 12:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-16 14:36 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-16 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-14 22:45 ` [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-14 22:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-16 14:35 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-16 14:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-17 0:39 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-17 0:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-19 7:45 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-19 7:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-19 20:55 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-19 20:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 6:44 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-20 6:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2017-06-19 20:57 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-19 20:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 6:03 ` Theodore Ts'o 2017-06-20 6:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o 2017-06-20 6:27 ` Joel Stanley 2017-06-20 6:59 ` Michael Ellerman 2017-06-20 8:14 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 8:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 8:33 ` Jeffrey Walton 2017-06-20 8:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jeffrey Walton 2017-06-20 8:53 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 8:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 9:36 ` Theodore Ts'o 2017-06-20 9:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o 2017-06-20 9:49 ` Jeffrey Walton 2017-06-20 9:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jeffrey Walton 2017-06-20 17:50 ` Sandy Harris 2017-06-20 18:14 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-20 18:14 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-20 20:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 20:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 20:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 9:49 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 9:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 23:38 ` Theodore Ts'o 2017-06-20 23:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o 2017-06-20 23:54 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-20 23:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-21 0:03 ` [PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-21 0:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-21 0:12 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-21 0:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-21 0:12 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-21 6:06 ` Michael Ellerman 2017-06-21 6:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman 2017-06-21 6:06 ` Michael Ellerman 2017-06-21 20:38 ` Theodore Ts'o 2017-06-22 0:04 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-21 23:50 ` [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Jeffrey Walton 2017-06-21 23:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jeffrey Walton 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [PATCH v5 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message] 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld 2017-06-07 23:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20170607232607.26870-8-Jason@zx2c4.com \ --to=jason@zx2c4.com \ --cc=davem@davemloft.net \ --cc=ebiggers3@gmail.com \ --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \ --cc=idryomov@gmail.com \ --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \ --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=sage@redhat.com \ --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \ --cc=tytso@mit.edu \ --cc=zyan@redhat.com \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.