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From: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 6/6] KVM: nSVM: fix SMI injection in guest mode
Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 10:09:04 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170925080904.24850-7-lprosek@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170925080904.24850-1-lprosek@redhat.com>

Entering SMM while running in guest mode wasn't working very well because several
pieces of the vcpu state were left set up for nested operation.

Some of the issues observed:

* L1 was getting unexpected VM exits (using L1 interception controls but running
  in SMM execution environment)
* MMU was confused (walk_mmu was still set to nested_mmu)
* INTERCEPT_SMI was not emulated for L1 (KVM never injected SVM_EXIT_SMI)

Intel SDM actually prescribes the logical processor to "leave VMX operation" upon
entering SMM in 34.14.1 Default Treatment of SMI Delivery. AMD doesn't seem to
document this but they provide fields in the SMM state-save area to stash the
current state of SVM. What we need to do is basically get out of guest mode for
the duration of SMM. All this completely transparent to L1, i.e. L1 is not given
control and no L1 observable state changes.

To avoid code duplication this commit takes advantage of the existing nested
vmexit and run functionality, perhaps at the cost of efficiency. To get out of
guest mode, nested_svm_vmexit is called, unchanged. Re-entering is performed using
enter_svm_guest_mode.

This commit fixes running Windows Server 2016 with Hyper-V enabled in a VM with
OVMF firmware (OVMF_CODE-need-smm.fd).

Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  3 ---
 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 2445b2ba26f9..e582b8c9579b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1430,4 +1430,7 @@ static inline int kvm_cpu_get_apicid(int mps_cpu)
 #endif
 }
 
+#define put_smstate(type, buf, offset, val)                      \
+	*(type *)((buf) + (offset) - 0x7e00) = val
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index b9f19d715fc3..416ec56d6715 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -5401,18 +5401,70 @@ static void svm_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static int svm_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/* Per APM Vol.2 15.22.2 "Response to SMI" */
+	if (!gif_set(svm))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu) &&
+	    svm->nested.intercept & (1ULL << INTERCEPT_SMI)) {
+		/* TODO: Might need to set exit_info_1 and exit_info_2 here */
+		svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_SMI;
+		svm->nested.exit_required = true;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	return 1;
 }
 
 static int svm_prep_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
 {
-	/* TODO: Implement */
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int ret;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		/* FED8h - SVM Guest */
+		put_smstate(u64, smstate, 0x7ed8, 1);
+		/* FEE0h - SVM Guest VMCB Physical Address */
+		put_smstate(u64, smstate, 0x7ee0, svm->nested.vmcb);
+
+		svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
+		svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
+		svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
+
+		ret = nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static int svm_post_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 smbase)
 {
-	/* TODO: Implement */
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb *nested_vmcb;
+	struct page *page;
+	struct {
+		u64 guest;
+		u64 vmcb;
+	} svm_state_save;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Temporarily set the SMM flag to access the SMM state-save area */
+	vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
+	r = kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, smbase + 0xfed8, &svm_state_save,
+				sizeof(svm_state_save));
+	vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_MASK;
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (svm_state_save.guest) {
+		nested_vmcb = nested_svm_map(svm, svm_state_save.vmcb, &page);
+		if (!nested_vmcb)
+			return 1;
+		enter_svm_guest_mode(svm, svm_state_save.vmcb, nested_vmcb, page);
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 5c4c49e8e660..41aa1da599bc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -6481,9 +6481,6 @@ static void process_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
 }
 
-#define put_smstate(type, buf, offset, val)			  \
-	*(type *)((buf) + (offset) - 0x7e00) = val
-
 static u32 enter_smm_get_segment_flags(struct kvm_segment *seg)
 {
 	u32 flags = 0;
-- 
2.13.5

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-09-25  8:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-09-25  8:08 [PATCH v3 0/6] KVM: nested virt SMM fixes Ladi Prosek
2017-09-25  8:08 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] KVM: x86: introduce ISA specific SMM entry/exit callbacks Ladi Prosek
2017-09-25  8:09 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] KVM: x86: introduce ISA specific smi_allowed callback Ladi Prosek
2017-09-25  8:09 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] KVM: nVMX: fix SMI injection in guest mode Ladi Prosek
2017-09-25  8:09 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] KVM: nVMX: treat CR4.VMXE as reserved in SMM Ladi Prosek
2017-09-25  8:09 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] KVM: nSVM: refactor nested_svm_vmrun Ladi Prosek
2017-09-25  8:09 ` Ladi Prosek [this message]
2017-10-03 19:53   ` [PATCH v3 6/6] KVM: nSVM: fix SMI injection in guest mode Radim Krčmář
2017-10-04 10:10     ` Ladi Prosek
2017-10-04 14:42       ` Radim Krčmář
2017-10-10  8:03         ` Ladi Prosek

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