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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: arnd@arndb.de, catalin.marinas@arm.com, cdall@linaro.org,
	kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	marc.zyngier@arm.com, mark.rutland@arm.com,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, yao.qi@arm.com,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, awallis@codeaurora.org
Subject: [PATCHv2 11/12] arm64: enable pointer authentication
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 16:38:05 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171127163806.31435-12-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171127163806.31435-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>

Now that all the necessary bits are in place for userspace / KVM guest
pointer authentication, add the necessary Kconfig logic to allow this to
be enabled.

Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index a93339f5178f..f7cb4ca8a6fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1013,6 +1013,29 @@ config ARM64_PMEM
 
 endmenu
 
+menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
+
+config ARM64_POINTER_AUTHENTICATION
+	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides
+	  instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
+	  keys, which can be used to mitigate Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
+	  and other attacks.
+
+	  This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace).
+
+	  Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys
+	  for each process at exec() time, with these keys being
+	  context-switched along with the process.
+
+	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
+	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
+	  enabled.
+
+endmenu
+
 config ARM64_SVE
 	bool "ARM Scalable Vector Extension support"
 	default y
-- 
2.11.0

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, cdall@linaro.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	marc.zyngier@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, yao.qi@arm.com,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, awallis@codeaurora.org,
	kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Subject: [PATCHv2 11/12] arm64: enable pointer authentication
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 16:38:05 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171127163806.31435-12-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171127163806.31435-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>

Now that all the necessary bits are in place for userspace / KVM guest
pointer authentication, add the necessary Kconfig logic to allow this to
be enabled.

Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index a93339f5178f..f7cb4ca8a6fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1013,6 +1013,29 @@ config ARM64_PMEM
 
 endmenu
 
+menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
+
+config ARM64_POINTER_AUTHENTICATION
+	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides
+	  instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
+	  keys, which can be used to mitigate Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
+	  and other attacks.
+
+	  This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace).
+
+	  Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys
+	  for each process at exec() time, with these keys being
+	  context-switched along with the process.
+
+	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
+	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
+	  enabled.
+
+endmenu
+
 config ARM64_SVE
 	bool "ARM Scalable Vector Extension support"
 	default y
-- 
2.11.0

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCHv2 11/12] arm64: enable pointer authentication
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 16:38:05 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171127163806.31435-12-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171127163806.31435-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>

Now that all the necessary bits are in place for userspace / KVM guest
pointer authentication, add the necessary Kconfig logic to allow this to
be enabled.

Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index a93339f5178f..f7cb4ca8a6fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1013,6 +1013,29 @@ config ARM64_PMEM
 
 endmenu
 
+menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
+
+config ARM64_POINTER_AUTHENTICATION
+	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides
+	  instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
+	  keys, which can be used to mitigate Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
+	  and other attacks.
+
+	  This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace).
+
+	  Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys
+	  for each process at exec() time, with these keys being
+	  context-switched along with the process.
+
+	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
+	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
+	  enabled.
+
+endmenu
+
 config ARM64_SVE
 	bool "ARM Scalable Vector Extension support"
 	default y
-- 
2.11.0

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: arnd@arndb.de, catalin.marinas@arm.com, cdall@linaro.org,
	kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	marc.zyngier@arm.com, mark.rutland@arm.com,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, yao.qi@arm.com,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, awallis@codeaurora.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 11/12] arm64: enable pointer authentication
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 16:38:05 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171127163806.31435-12-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171127163806.31435-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>

Now that all the necessary bits are in place for userspace / KVM guest
pointer authentication, add the necessary Kconfig logic to allow this to
be enabled.

Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index a93339f5178f..f7cb4ca8a6fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1013,6 +1013,29 @@ config ARM64_PMEM
 
 endmenu
 
+menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
+
+config ARM64_POINTER_AUTHENTICATION
+	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides
+	  instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
+	  keys, which can be used to mitigate Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
+	  and other attacks.
+
+	  This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace).
+
+	  Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys
+	  for each process at exec() time, with these keys being
+	  context-switched along with the process.
+
+	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
+	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
+	  enabled.
+
+endmenu
+
 config ARM64_SVE
 	bool "ARM Scalable Vector Extension support"
 	default y
-- 
2.11.0

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-11-27 16:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-11-27 16:37 [PATCHv2 00/12] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37 ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37 ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37 ` [PATCHv2 01/12] asm-generic: mm_hooks: allow hooks to be overridden individually Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37 ` [PATCHv2 02/12] arm64: add pointer authentication register bits Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37 ` [PATCHv2 03/12] arm64/cpufeature: add ARMv8.3 id_aa64isar1 bits Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37 ` [PATCHv2 04/12] arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37 ` [PATCHv2 05/12] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2 Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-06 12:39   ` Christoffer Dall
2018-02-06 12:39     ` Christoffer Dall
2018-02-12 16:00     ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-12 16:00       ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38 ` [PATCHv2 06/12] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 19:06   ` Adam Wallis
2018-05-22 19:06     ` Adam Wallis
2017-11-27 16:38 ` [PATCHv2 07/12] arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38 ` [PATCHv2 08/12] arm64: perf: strip PAC when unwinding userspace Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38 ` [PATCHv2 09/12] arm64/kvm: preserve host HCR_EL2 value Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-06 12:39   ` Christoffer Dall
2018-02-06 12:39     ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-09 14:57     ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-09 14:57       ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-09 19:03       ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-09 19:03         ` Christoffer Dall
2017-11-27 16:38 ` [PATCHv2 10/12] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-06 12:38   ` Christoffer Dall
2018-02-06 12:38     ` Christoffer Dall
2018-03-09 14:28     ` Mark Rutland
2018-03-09 14:28       ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-09 12:58       ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-09 12:58         ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-09 14:37         ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-09 14:37           ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2017-11-27 16:38   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 11/12] arm64: enable pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38 ` [PATCHv2 12/12] arm64: docs: document " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-11-27 16:38   ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-28 15:07   ` Andrew Jones
2017-11-28 15:07     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Jones
2017-11-28 15:07     ` Andrew Jones
2017-12-04 12:39     ` Mark Rutland
2017-12-04 12:39       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-12-04 12:39       ` Mark Rutland
2017-12-04 12:49       ` Andrew Jones
2017-12-04 12:49         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Jones
2017-12-04 12:49         ` Andrew Jones

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