From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>, Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, linux-rt-users@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Subject: [PATCH v2 02/19] crypto: arm64/aes-ce-ccm - move kernel mode neon en/disable into loop Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 12:26:28 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20171204122645.31535-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20171204122645.31535-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> When kernel mode NEON was first introduced on arm64, the preserve and restore of the userland NEON state was completely unoptimized, and involved saving all registers on each call to kernel_neon_begin(), and restoring them on each call to kernel_neon_end(). For this reason, the NEON crypto code that was introduced at the time keeps the NEON enabled throughout the execution of the crypto API methods, which may include calls back into the crypto API that could result in memory allocation or other actions that we should avoid when running with preemption disabled. Since then, we have optimized the kernel mode NEON handling, which now restores lazily (upon return to userland), and so the preserve action is only costly the first time it is called after entering the kernel. So let's put the kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around the actual invocations of the NEON crypto code, and run the remainder of the code with kernel mode NEON disabled (and preemption enabled) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> --- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c | 47 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c index a1254036f2b1..68b11aa690e4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c @@ -107,11 +107,13 @@ static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen) } static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[], - u32 abytes, u32 *macp, bool use_neon) + u32 abytes, u32 *macp) { - if (likely(use_neon)) { + if (may_use_simd()) { + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, in, abytes, macp, key->key_enc, num_rounds(key)); + kernel_neon_end(); } else { if (*macp > 0 && *macp < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { int added = min(abytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - *macp); @@ -143,8 +145,7 @@ static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[], } } -static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[], - bool use_neon) +static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[]) { struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead); @@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[], ltag.len = 6; } - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, &macp, use_neon); + ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, &macp); scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src); do { @@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[], n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len); } p = scatterwalk_map(&walk); - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp, use_neon); + ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp); len -= n; scatterwalk_unmap(p); @@ -242,43 +243,42 @@ static int ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u32 len = req->cryptlen; - bool use_neon = may_use_simd(); int err; err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len); if (err) return err; - if (likely(use_neon)) - kernel_neon_begin(); - if (req->assoclen) - ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac, use_neon); + ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac); /* preserve the original iv for the final round */ memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, true); - if (likely(use_neon)) { + if (may_use_simd()) { while (walk.nbytes) { u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; if (walk.nbytes == walk.total) tail = 0; + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv); + kernel_neon_end(); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail); } - if (!err) + if (!err) { + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx)); - - kernel_neon_end(); + kernel_neon_end(); + } } else { err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, true); } @@ -301,43 +301,42 @@ static int ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u32 len = req->cryptlen - authsize; - bool use_neon = may_use_simd(); int err; err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len); if (err) return err; - if (likely(use_neon)) - kernel_neon_begin(); - if (req->assoclen) - ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac, use_neon); + ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac); /* preserve the original iv for the final round */ memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, true); - if (likely(use_neon)) { + if (may_use_simd()) { while (walk.nbytes) { u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; if (walk.nbytes == walk.total) tail = 0; + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv); + kernel_neon_end(); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail); } - if (!err) + if (!err) { + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx)); - - kernel_neon_end(); + kernel_neon_end(); + } } else { err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, false); } -- 2.11.0
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org (Ard Biesheuvel) To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH v2 02/19] crypto: arm64/aes-ce-ccm - move kernel mode neon en/disable into loop Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 12:26:28 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20171204122645.31535-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20171204122645.31535-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> When kernel mode NEON was first introduced on arm64, the preserve and restore of the userland NEON state was completely unoptimized, and involved saving all registers on each call to kernel_neon_begin(), and restoring them on each call to kernel_neon_end(). For this reason, the NEON crypto code that was introduced at the time keeps the NEON enabled throughout the execution of the crypto API methods, which may include calls back into the crypto API that could result in memory allocation or other actions that we should avoid when running with preemption disabled. Since then, we have optimized the kernel mode NEON handling, which now restores lazily (upon return to userland), and so the preserve action is only costly the first time it is called after entering the kernel. So let's put the kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around the actual invocations of the NEON crypto code, and run the remainder of the code with kernel mode NEON disabled (and preemption enabled) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> --- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c | 47 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c index a1254036f2b1..68b11aa690e4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c @@ -107,11 +107,13 @@ static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen) } static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[], - u32 abytes, u32 *macp, bool use_neon) + u32 abytes, u32 *macp) { - if (likely(use_neon)) { + if (may_use_simd()) { + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, in, abytes, macp, key->key_enc, num_rounds(key)); + kernel_neon_end(); } else { if (*macp > 0 && *macp < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { int added = min(abytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - *macp); @@ -143,8 +145,7 @@ static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[], } } -static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[], - bool use_neon) +static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[]) { struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead); @@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[], ltag.len = 6; } - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, &macp, use_neon); + ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, &macp); scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src); do { @@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[], n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len); } p = scatterwalk_map(&walk); - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp, use_neon); + ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp); len -= n; scatterwalk_unmap(p); @@ -242,43 +243,42 @@ static int ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u32 len = req->cryptlen; - bool use_neon = may_use_simd(); int err; err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len); if (err) return err; - if (likely(use_neon)) - kernel_neon_begin(); - if (req->assoclen) - ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac, use_neon); + ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac); /* preserve the original iv for the final round */ memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, true); - if (likely(use_neon)) { + if (may_use_simd()) { while (walk.nbytes) { u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; if (walk.nbytes == walk.total) tail = 0; + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv); + kernel_neon_end(); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail); } - if (!err) + if (!err) { + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx)); - - kernel_neon_end(); + kernel_neon_end(); + } } else { err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, true); } @@ -301,43 +301,42 @@ static int ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u32 len = req->cryptlen - authsize; - bool use_neon = may_use_simd(); int err; err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len); if (err) return err; - if (likely(use_neon)) - kernel_neon_begin(); - if (req->assoclen) - ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac, use_neon); + ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac); /* preserve the original iv for the final round */ memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, true); - if (likely(use_neon)) { + if (may_use_simd()) { while (walk.nbytes) { u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; if (walk.nbytes == walk.total) tail = 0; + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv); + kernel_neon_end(); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail); } - if (!err) + if (!err) { + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx)); - - kernel_neon_end(); + kernel_neon_end(); + } } else { err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, false); } -- 2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-04 12:26 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-12-04 12:26 [PATCH v2 00/19] crypto: arm64 - play nice with CONFIG_PREEMPT Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] crypto: testmgr - add a new test case for CRC-T10DIF Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message] 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] crypto: arm64/aes-ce-ccm - move kernel mode neon en/disable into loop Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] crypto: arm64/aes-blk " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] crypto: arm64/aes-bs " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] crypto: arm64/chacha20 " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] crypto: arm64/ghash " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] crypto: arm64/aes-blk - remove configurable interleave Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] crypto: arm64/aes-blk - add 4 way interleave to CBC encrypt path Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] crypto: arm64/aes-blk - add 4 way interleave to CBC-MAC " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] crypto: arm64/sha256-neon - play nice with CONFIG_PREEMPT kernels Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] arm64: assembler: add macro to conditionally yield the NEON under PREEMPT Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-05 12:28 ` Dave Martin 2017-12-05 12:28 ` Dave Martin 2017-12-05 12:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-05 12:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-05 18:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-05 18:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-06 11:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-12-06 11:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-12-06 11:57 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-06 11:57 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-06 12:12 ` Dave P Martin 2017-12-06 12:12 ` Dave P Martin 2017-12-06 12:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-06 12:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-06 14:37 ` Dave Martin 2017-12-06 14:37 ` Dave Martin 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] crypto: arm64/sha1-ce - yield every 8 blocks of input Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] crypto: arm64/sha2-ce " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] crypto: arm64/aes-blk - yield after processing a fixed chunk " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] crypto: arm64/aes-bs - yield after processing each 128 bytes " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] crypto: arm64/aes-ghash - yield after processing fixed number of blocks Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] crypto: arm64/crc32-ce - yield NEON every 16 blocks of input Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] crypto: arm64/crct10dif-ce - yield NEON every 8 " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] DO NOT MERGE Ard Biesheuvel 2017-12-04 12:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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