From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> To: james.l.morris@oracle.com Cc: bot+015afdb01dbf2abb6a6bfdd5430b72e5503fca6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, danielj@mellanox.com, dledford@redhat.com, eparis@parisplace.org, junil0814.lee@lge.com, kyeongdon.kim@lge.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mka@chromium.org, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, serge@hallyn.com Subject: Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in strcmp Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 19:44:54 +0900 [thread overview] Message-ID: <201712041944.HAI56745.HOFQFtJSOVMOFL@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> (raw) In-Reply-To: <alpine.LFD.2.20.1712041150270.1348@localhost> James Morris wrote: > On Sun, 3 Dec 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote: > > > Tetsuo Handa wrote: > > > which will allow strcmp() to trigger out of bound read when "size" is > > > larger than strlen(initial_sid_to_string[i]). > > > > Oops. "smaller" than. > > > > > > > > Thus, I guess the simplest fix is to use strncmp() instead of strcmp(). > > > > Can somebody test below patch? (My CentOS 7 environment does not support > > enabling SELinux in linux.git . Userspace tool is too old to support?) > > You mean enabling KASAN? Yep, you need gcc 4.9.2 or better. Recent > Fedora has it. I was not able to find "SELinux: Initializing." line for some reason, and it turned out that I just forgot to run "make install". ;-) I tested using debug printk() and init for built-in initramfs shown below. It is strange that KASAN does not trigger upon strcmp()ing initial_sid_to_string[1]. But anyway, my patch fixes this problem. ---------- --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5973,6 +5973,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL); else error = -EINVAL; + printk("setprocattr %s=%d size=%lu\n", name, error, size); if (error) return error; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 33cfe5d..fbf0ade 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1417,6 +1417,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, int i; for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { + printk("Comparing with %s\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]); if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) { *sid = i; return 0; ---------- ---------- #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; mount("/proc", "/proc", "proc", 0, NULL); fd = open("/proc/self/attr/current", O_WRONLY); write(fd, "n", 1); close(fd); return 0; } ---------- ---------- [ 7.894061] Write protecting the kernel read-only data: 71680k [ 7.899889] Freeing unused kernel memory: 1744K [ 7.923592] Freeing unused kernel memory: 1832K [ 7.926960] setprocattr current=0 size=1 [ 7.928253] Comparing with kernel [ 7.929350] Comparing with security [ 7.930457] Comparing with unlabeled [ 7.931581] Comparing with fs [ 7.932538] Comparing with file [ 7.933537] Comparing with file_labels [ 7.934720] Comparing with init [ 7.935719] Comparing with any_socket [ 7.936866] Comparing with port [ 7.937874] Comparing with netif [ 7.938965] ================================================================== [ 7.941183] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [ 7.942957] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801145a5441 by task init/1 [ 7.944832] [ 7.945349] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2+ #323 [ 7.947177] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/02/2015 [ 7.950331] Call Trace: [ 7.951133] dump_stack+0x12e/0x188 [ 7.952222] ? vprintk_default+0x28/0x30 [ 7.953431] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [ 7.954421] print_address_description+0x73/0x260 [ 7.955860] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [ 7.956855] kasan_report+0x22b/0x340 [ 7.957987] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 [ 7.959460] strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [ 7.960408] security_context_to_sid_core+0x312/0x450 [ 7.961945] ? string_to_context_struct+0x940/0x940 [ 7.963434] ? vprintk_func+0x5e/0xc0 [ 7.964564] ? printk+0xaa/0xca [ 7.965554] ? show_regs_print_info+0x65/0x65 [ 7.966876] ? proc_pid_attr_write+0x169/0x280 [ 7.968178] security_context_to_sid+0x32/0x40 [ 7.969480] selinux_setprocattr+0x2e1/0x8f0 [ 7.970734] ? ptrace_parent_sid+0x400/0x400 [ 7.972034] security_setprocattr+0x85/0xc0 [ 7.973326] proc_pid_attr_write+0x1d8/0x280 [ 7.974638] __vfs_write+0x10d/0x610 [ 7.975746] ? comm_write+0x230/0x230 [ 7.976903] ? kernel_read+0x120/0x120 [ 7.978064] ? __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 [ 7.979266] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 7.980722] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x70/0xb0 [ 7.982134] ? __sb_start_write+0x211/0x2d0 [ 7.983413] vfs_write+0x18d/0x510 [ 7.984477] SyS_write+0xd4/0x1a0 [ 7.985518] ? SyS_read+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 7.986622] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x442/0x5c0 [ 7.988107] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 7.989524] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 [ 7.990928] RIP: 0033:0x40f7a0 [ 7.991875] RSP: 002b:00007ffe20eb59c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 7.994144] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000040f7a0 [ 7.996262] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000492b75 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 7.998372] RBP: 00007ffe20eb59a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000004 [ 8.000498] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe20eb5af8 [ 8.002629] R13: 00007ffe20eb5b08 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 8.004774] [ 8.005283] Allocated by task 1: [ 8.006283] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 8.007312] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 8.008417] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x192/0x760 [ 8.009804] memdup_user+0x2c/0x80 [ 8.010873] proc_pid_attr_write+0x115/0x280 [ 8.012172] __vfs_write+0x10d/0x610 [ 8.013283] vfs_write+0x18d/0x510 [ 8.014336] SyS_write+0xd4/0x1a0 [ 8.015380] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 [ 8.016793] [ 8.017302] Freed by task 1: [ 8.018211] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 8.019241] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 [ 8.020389] kfree+0xca/0x250 [ 8.021317] acpi_ds_create_operand+0x45f/0x664 [ 8.022696] acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0x116/0x3b6 [ 8.024165] acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x291/0xd61 [ 8.025469] acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x1338/0x13ee [ 8.026815] acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x23a/0x7f4 [ 8.028064] acpi_ps_execute_method+0x4f2/0x55f [ 8.029451] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x6ba/0x8d3 [ 8.030708] acpi_ut_evaluate_object+0x122/0x3c5 [ 8.032108] acpi_ut_execute_STA+0x84/0x15a [ 8.033390] acpi_get_object_info+0x431/0x9bd [ 8.034676] acpi_init_device_object+0xb65/0x15f0 [ 8.036040] acpi_add_single_object+0x119/0x1630 [ 8.037384] acpi_bus_check_add+0x1c7/0x520 [ 8.038656] acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x1e0/0x346 [ 8.040029] acpi_walk_namespace+0xb5/0xef [ 8.041277] acpi_bus_scan+0xe0/0xf0 [ 8.042376] acpi_scan_init+0x258/0x5e5 [ 8.043578] acpi_init+0x650/0x6d8 [ 8.044654] do_one_initcall+0x9e/0x2c9 [ 8.045843] kernel_init_freeable+0x476/0x52a [ 8.047165] kernel_init+0x13/0x172 [ 8.048248] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 [ 8.049762] [ 8.050268] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801145a5440 [ 8.050268] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 [ 8.053780] The buggy address is located 1 bytes inside of [ 8.053780] 32-byte region [ffff8801145a5440, ffff8801145a5460) [ 8.057068] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 8.058525] page:00000000243fc1bc count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000008e54372e index:0xffff8801145a5fc1 [ 8.061337] flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab) [ 8.062619] raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffff8801145a5000 ffff8801145a5fc1 0000000100000020 [ 8.064922] raw: ffffea0004516ca0 ffff880119c01240 ffff880119c001c0 0000000000000000 [ 8.067232] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 8.068902] [ 8.069409] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 8.070849] ffff8801145a5300: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 8.073016] ffff8801145a5380: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 8.075194] >ffff8801145a5400: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 8.077367] ^ [ 8.078977] ffff8801145a5480: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 8.081133] ffff8801145a5500: 06 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 8.083293] ================================================================== [ 8.085394] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 8.086963] Comparing with netmsg [ 8.088029] Comparing with node [ 8.088992] Comparing with igmp_packet [ 8.090156] Comparing with icmp_socket [ 8.091319] Comparing with tcp_socket [ 8.092447] Comparing with sysctl_modprobe [ 8.093731] Comparing with sysctl [ 8.094805] Comparing with sysctl_fs [ 8.095905] Comparing with sysctl_kernel [ 8.097113] Comparing with sysctl_net [ 8.098188] Comparing with sysctl_net_unix [ 8.099370] Comparing with sysctl_vm [ 8.100449] Comparing with sysctl_dev [ 8.101571] Comparing with kmod [ 8.102525] Comparing with policy [ 8.103550] Comparing with scmp_packet [ 8.105942] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000000 ----------
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp (Tetsuo Handa) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in strcmp Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 19:44:54 +0900 [thread overview] Message-ID: <201712041944.HAI56745.HOFQFtJSOVMOFL@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> (raw) In-Reply-To: <alpine.LFD.2.20.1712041150270.1348@localhost> James Morris wrote: > On Sun, 3 Dec 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote: > > > Tetsuo Handa wrote: > > > which will allow strcmp() to trigger out of bound read when "size" is > > > larger than strlen(initial_sid_to_string[i]). > > > > Oops. "smaller" than. > > > > > > > > Thus, I guess the simplest fix is to use strncmp() instead of strcmp(). > > > > Can somebody test below patch? (My CentOS 7 environment does not support > > enabling SELinux in linux.git . Userspace tool is too old to support?) > > You mean enabling KASAN? Yep, you need gcc 4.9.2 or better. Recent > Fedora has it. I was not able to find "SELinux: Initializing." line for some reason, and it turned out that I just forgot to run "make install". ;-) I tested using debug printk() and init for built-in initramfs shown below. It is strange that KASAN does not trigger upon strcmp()ing initial_sid_to_string[1]. But anyway, my patch fixes this problem. ---------- --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5973,6 +5973,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL); else error = -EINVAL; + printk("setprocattr %s=%d size=%lu\n", name, error, size); if (error) return error; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 33cfe5d..fbf0ade 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1417,6 +1417,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, int i; for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { + printk("Comparing with %s\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]); if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) { *sid = i; return 0; ---------- ---------- #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; mount("/proc", "/proc", "proc", 0, NULL); fd = open("/proc/self/attr/current", O_WRONLY); write(fd, "n", 1); close(fd); return 0; } ---------- ---------- [ 7.894061] Write protecting the kernel read-only data: 71680k [ 7.899889] Freeing unused kernel memory: 1744K [ 7.923592] Freeing unused kernel memory: 1832K [ 7.926960] setprocattr current=0 size=1 [ 7.928253] Comparing with kernel [ 7.929350] Comparing with security [ 7.930457] Comparing with unlabeled [ 7.931581] Comparing with fs [ 7.932538] Comparing with file [ 7.933537] Comparing with file_labels [ 7.934720] Comparing with init [ 7.935719] Comparing with any_socket [ 7.936866] Comparing with port [ 7.937874] Comparing with netif [ 7.938965] ================================================================== [ 7.941183] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [ 7.942957] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801145a5441 by task init/1 [ 7.944832] [ 7.945349] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2+ #323 [ 7.947177] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/02/2015 [ 7.950331] Call Trace: [ 7.951133] dump_stack+0x12e/0x188 [ 7.952222] ? vprintk_default+0x28/0x30 [ 7.953431] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [ 7.954421] print_address_description+0x73/0x260 [ 7.955860] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [ 7.956855] kasan_report+0x22b/0x340 [ 7.957987] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 [ 7.959460] strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [ 7.960408] security_context_to_sid_core+0x312/0x450 [ 7.961945] ? string_to_context_struct+0x940/0x940 [ 7.963434] ? vprintk_func+0x5e/0xc0 [ 7.964564] ? printk+0xaa/0xca [ 7.965554] ? show_regs_print_info+0x65/0x65 [ 7.966876] ? proc_pid_attr_write+0x169/0x280 [ 7.968178] security_context_to_sid+0x32/0x40 [ 7.969480] selinux_setprocattr+0x2e1/0x8f0 [ 7.970734] ? ptrace_parent_sid+0x400/0x400 [ 7.972034] security_setprocattr+0x85/0xc0 [ 7.973326] proc_pid_attr_write+0x1d8/0x280 [ 7.974638] __vfs_write+0x10d/0x610 [ 7.975746] ? comm_write+0x230/0x230 [ 7.976903] ? kernel_read+0x120/0x120 [ 7.978064] ? __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 [ 7.979266] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 7.980722] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x70/0xb0 [ 7.982134] ? __sb_start_write+0x211/0x2d0 [ 7.983413] vfs_write+0x18d/0x510 [ 7.984477] SyS_write+0xd4/0x1a0 [ 7.985518] ? SyS_read+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 7.986622] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x442/0x5c0 [ 7.988107] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 7.989524] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 [ 7.990928] RIP: 0033:0x40f7a0 [ 7.991875] RSP: 002b:00007ffe20eb59c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 7.994144] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000040f7a0 [ 7.996262] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000492b75 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 7.998372] RBP: 00007ffe20eb59a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000004 [ 8.000498] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe20eb5af8 [ 8.002629] R13: 00007ffe20eb5b08 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 8.004774] [ 8.005283] Allocated by task 1: [ 8.006283] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 8.007312] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 8.008417] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x192/0x760 [ 8.009804] memdup_user+0x2c/0x80 [ 8.010873] proc_pid_attr_write+0x115/0x280 [ 8.012172] __vfs_write+0x10d/0x610 [ 8.013283] vfs_write+0x18d/0x510 [ 8.014336] SyS_write+0xd4/0x1a0 [ 8.015380] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 [ 8.016793] [ 8.017302] Freed by task 1: [ 8.018211] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 8.019241] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 [ 8.020389] kfree+0xca/0x250 [ 8.021317] acpi_ds_create_operand+0x45f/0x664 [ 8.022696] acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0x116/0x3b6 [ 8.024165] acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x291/0xd61 [ 8.025469] acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x1338/0x13ee [ 8.026815] acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x23a/0x7f4 [ 8.028064] acpi_ps_execute_method+0x4f2/0x55f [ 8.029451] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x6ba/0x8d3 [ 8.030708] acpi_ut_evaluate_object+0x122/0x3c5 [ 8.032108] acpi_ut_execute_STA+0x84/0x15a [ 8.033390] acpi_get_object_info+0x431/0x9bd [ 8.034676] acpi_init_device_object+0xb65/0x15f0 [ 8.036040] acpi_add_single_object+0x119/0x1630 [ 8.037384] acpi_bus_check_add+0x1c7/0x520 [ 8.038656] acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x1e0/0x346 [ 8.040029] acpi_walk_namespace+0xb5/0xef [ 8.041277] acpi_bus_scan+0xe0/0xf0 [ 8.042376] acpi_scan_init+0x258/0x5e5 [ 8.043578] acpi_init+0x650/0x6d8 [ 8.044654] do_one_initcall+0x9e/0x2c9 [ 8.045843] kernel_init_freeable+0x476/0x52a [ 8.047165] kernel_init+0x13/0x172 [ 8.048248] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 [ 8.049762] [ 8.050268] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801145a5440 [ 8.050268] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 [ 8.053780] The buggy address is located 1 bytes inside of [ 8.053780] 32-byte region [ffff8801145a5440, ffff8801145a5460) [ 8.057068] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 8.058525] page:00000000243fc1bc count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000008e54372e index:0xffff8801145a5fc1 [ 8.061337] flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab) [ 8.062619] raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffff8801145a5000 ffff8801145a5fc1 0000000100000020 [ 8.064922] raw: ffffea0004516ca0 ffff880119c01240 ffff880119c001c0 0000000000000000 [ 8.067232] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 8.068902] [ 8.069409] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 8.070849] ffff8801145a5300: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 8.073016] ffff8801145a5380: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 8.075194] >ffff8801145a5400: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 8.077367] ^ [ 8.078977] ffff8801145a5480: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 8.081133] ffff8801145a5500: 06 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 8.083293] ================================================================== [ 8.085394] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 8.086963] Comparing with netmsg [ 8.088029] Comparing with node [ 8.088992] Comparing with igmp_packet [ 8.090156] Comparing with icmp_socket [ 8.091319] Comparing with tcp_socket [ 8.092447] Comparing with sysctl_modprobe [ 8.093731] Comparing with sysctl [ 8.094805] Comparing with sysctl_fs [ 8.095905] Comparing with sysctl_kernel [ 8.097113] Comparing with sysctl_net [ 8.098188] Comparing with sysctl_net_unix [ 8.099370] Comparing with sysctl_vm [ 8.100449] Comparing with sysctl_dev [ 8.101571] Comparing with kmod [ 8.102525] Comparing with policy [ 8.103550] Comparing with scmp_packet [ 8.105942] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000000 ---------- -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-04 10:45 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-11-28 6:29 KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in strcmp syzbot 2017-12-01 18:52 ` syzbot 2017-12-01 18:52 ` syzbot 2017-12-03 11:33 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-12-03 11:33 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-12-03 11:33 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-12-03 13:27 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-12-03 13:27 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-12-04 0:51 ` James Morris 2017-12-04 0:51 ` James Morris 2017-12-04 10:44 ` Tetsuo Handa [this message] 2017-12-04 10:44 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-12-04 10:49 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-12-04 10:49 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-12-04 4:53 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 4:53 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 13:43 ` Stephen Smalley 2017-12-04 13:43 ` Stephen Smalley 2017-12-04 13:43 ` Stephen Smalley 2017-12-04 13:47 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 13:47 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 13:47 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 13:59 ` Paul Moore 2017-12-04 13:59 ` Paul Moore 2017-12-04 13:59 ` Paul Moore 2017-12-04 16:29 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 16:29 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 16:29 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 21:10 ` Paul Moore 2017-12-04 21:10 ` Paul Moore 2017-12-04 21:10 ` Paul Moore 2017-12-05 9:39 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-05 9:39 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-05 9:39 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-08 17:50 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-08 17:50 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-08 17:50 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 16:39 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 16:39 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 16:39 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 17:33 ` Stephen Smalley 2017-12-04 17:33 ` Stephen Smalley 2017-12-04 17:33 ` Stephen Smalley 2017-12-05 10:00 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-05 10:00 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-05 10:00 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-08 12:22 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-08 12:22 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-08 12:22 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2017-12-04 14:07 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-12-04 14:07 ` Tetsuo Handa
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