From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, stable@vger.kernel.org, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>, Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>, Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Subject: [PATCH 4.14 60/64] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 10:23:19 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180205182141.047844255@linuxfoundation.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180205182138.571333346@linuxfoundation.org> 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de commit 28c1c9fabf48d6ad596273a11c46e0d0da3e14cd Intel processors use MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to indicate RDCL_NO (bit 0) and IBRS_ALL (bit 1). This is a read-only MSR. By default the contents will come directly from the hardware, but user-space can still override it. [dwmw2: The bit in kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features can be unconditional] Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-4-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features = - F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS); + F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES); /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ get_cpu(); --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -583,6 +583,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base; #endif + u64 arch_capabilities; + u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow; u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow; u32 secondary_exec_control; @@ -3257,6 +3259,12 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_IA32_TSC: msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu); break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->arch_capabilities; + break; case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS); break; @@ -3392,6 +3400,11 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W); break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated) + return 1; + vmx->arch_capabilities = data; + break; case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT: if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) { if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data)) @@ -5652,6 +5665,8 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vm ++vmx->nmsrs; } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities); vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl); --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = { #endif MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX, + MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES }; static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, stable@vger.kernel.org, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>, Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.inte Subject: [PATCH 4.14 60/64] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 10:23:19 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180205182141.047844255@linuxfoundation.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180205182138.571333346@linuxfoundation.org> 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de commit 28c1c9fabf48d6ad596273a11c46e0d0da3e14cd Intel processors use MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to indicate RDCL_NO (bit 0) and IBRS_ALL (bit 1). This is a read-only MSR. By default the contents will come directly from the hardware, but user-space can still override it. [dwmw2: The bit in kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features can be unconditional] Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-4-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features = - F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS); + F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES); /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ get_cpu(); --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -583,6 +583,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base; #endif + u64 arch_capabilities; + u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow; u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow; u32 secondary_exec_control; @@ -3257,6 +3259,12 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_IA32_TSC: msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu); break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->arch_capabilities; + break; case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS); break; @@ -3392,6 +3400,11 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W); break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated) + return 1; + vmx->arch_capabilities = data; + break; case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT: if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) { if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data)) @@ -5652,6 +5665,8 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vm ++vmx->nmsrs; } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities); vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl); --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = { #endif MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX, + MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES }; static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-05 18:23 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-02-05 18:22 [PATCH 4.14 00/64] 4.14.18-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/64] scripts/faddr2line: fix CROSS_COMPILE unset error Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/64] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_meltdown() Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/64] powerpc/64s: Allow control of RFI flush via debugfs Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/64] x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/64] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/64] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call " Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/64] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/64] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/64] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/64] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/64] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/64] x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/64] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/64] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/64] x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/64] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/64] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/64] x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/64] auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/64] iio: adc/accel: Fix up module licenses Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/64] pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/64] ASoC: pcm512x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/64] KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/64] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/64] objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/64] objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/64] objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/64] x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/64] x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/64] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/64] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/64] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/64] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/64] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/64] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/64] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/64] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/64] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/64] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/64] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/64] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/64] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/64] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/64] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 48/64] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 49/64] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 50/64] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 51/64] x86/paravirt: Remove noreplace-paravirt cmdline option Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 52/64] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 53/64] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 54/64] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 55/64] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 56/64] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 57/64] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 58/64] KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 59/64] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message] 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 60/64] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 61/64] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 62/64] KVM/SVM: " Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 63/64] serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 64/64] fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-02-05 22:13 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/64] 4.14.18-stable review Shuah Khan 2018-02-05 23:55 ` Dan Rue 2018-02-06 0:36 ` kernelci.org bot 2018-02-06 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
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