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From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	SMACK-discuss@lists.01.org, casey.schaufler@intel.com,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com,
	kristen@linux.intel.com, arjan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH RFC 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel vulnerability
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 16:53:55 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180815235355.14908-6-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180815235355.14908-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com>

SELinux considers tasks to be side-channel safe if they
have PROCESS_SHARE access.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a8bf324130f5..7fbd7d7ac1cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4219,6 +4219,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
 	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
 }
 
+static int selinux_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+
+	return avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p),
+				    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, 0, &avd);
+}
+
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
@@ -7002,6 +7010,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, selinux_task_safe_sidechannel),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
-- 
2.17.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: casey.schaufler@intel.com (Casey Schaufler)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH RFC 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel vulnerability
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 16:53:55 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180815235355.14908-6-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180815235355.14908-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com>

SELinux considers tasks to be side-channel safe if they
have PROCESS_SHARE access.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a8bf324130f5..7fbd7d7ac1cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4219,6 +4219,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
 	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
 }
 
+static int selinux_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+
+	return avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p),
+				    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, 0, &avd);
+}
+
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
@@ -7002,6 +7010,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, selinux_task_safe_sidechannel),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-15 23:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-15 23:53 [PATCH RFC 0/5] LSM: Add and use a hook for side-channel safety checks Casey Schaufler
2018-08-15 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-08-15 23:53 ` [PATCH RFC 1/5] LSM: Introduce a hook for side-channel danger Casey Schaufler
2018-08-15 23:53   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-08-15 23:53 ` [PATCH RFC 2/5] X86: Support LSM determination of side-channel vulnerability Casey Schaufler
2018-08-15 23:53   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-08-16 14:09   ` Jann Horn
2018-08-16 14:09     ` Jann Horn
2018-08-15 23:53 ` [PATCH RFC 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers Casey Schaufler
2018-08-15 23:53   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-08-16 14:15   ` Jann Horn
2018-08-16 14:15     ` Jann Horn
2018-08-15 23:53 ` [PATCH RFC 4/5] Smack: Support determination of side-channel vulnerability Casey Schaufler
2018-08-15 23:53   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-08-15 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-08-15 23:53   ` [PATCH RFC 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux " Casey Schaufler
2018-08-16 14:12   ` Stephen Smalley
2018-08-16 14:12     ` Stephen Smalley
2018-08-16 14:22   ` Jann Horn
2018-08-16 14:22     ` Jann Horn

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