From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>, LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:23:25 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180920162338.21060-14-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-1-keescook@chromium.org> In preparation for lifting the "is this LSM enabled?" logic out of the individual LSMs, pass in any special enabled state tracking (as needed for SELinux, AppArmor, and LoadPin). This must be an "int" to include handling cases where "enabled" is exposed via sysctl which has no "bool" type (i.e. LoadPin's use). LoadPin's "enabled" tracking will be added later when it gets added to the "ordered LSM" stack. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 38cbefabff71..118e12f678df 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -2044,6 +2044,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, struct lsm_info { const char *name; /* Populated automatically. */ unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */ + int *enabled; /* Optional: NULL means enabled. */ int (*init)(void); }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 4c5f63e9aeba..d03133a267f2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1303,8 +1303,8 @@ bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); /* Boot time disable flag */ -static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; -module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); +static int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; +module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, int, 0444); static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) { @@ -1608,5 +1608,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, .init = apparmor_init, END_LSM; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 615cf6498c0f..3f999ed98cfd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7204,6 +7204,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void) all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .enabled = &selinux_enabled, .init = selinux_init, END_LSM; -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:23:25 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180920162338.21060-14-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-1-keescook@chromium.org> In preparation for lifting the "is this LSM enabled?" logic out of the individual LSMs, pass in any special enabled state tracking (as needed for SELinux, AppArmor, and LoadPin). This must be an "int" to include handling cases where "enabled" is exposed via sysctl which has no "bool" type (i.e. LoadPin's use). LoadPin's "enabled" tracking will be added later when it gets added to the "ordered LSM" stack. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 38cbefabff71..118e12f678df 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -2044,6 +2044,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, struct lsm_info { const char *name; /* Populated automatically. */ unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */ + int *enabled; /* Optional: NULL means enabled. */ int (*init)(void); }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 4c5f63e9aeba..d03133a267f2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1303,8 +1303,8 @@ bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); /* Boot time disable flag */ -static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; -module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); +static int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; +module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, int, 0444); static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) { @@ -1608,5 +1608,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, .init = apparmor_init, END_LSM; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 615cf6498c0f..3f999ed98cfd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7204,6 +7204,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void) all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .enabled = &selinux_enabled, .init = selinux_init, END_LSM; -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-20 16:24 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald 2018-09-20 20:14 ` Martin Steigerwald 2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
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