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From: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	bauerman@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
	dyoung@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image
Date: Wed, 09 Jan 2019 16:48:22 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190109164824.19708-1-kasong@redhat.com> (raw)

Hi,

This is a different approach for the previous patch:
[RFC PATCH 0/1] KEYS, integrity: Link .platform keyring to .secondary_trusted_keys
make kexec_file_load be able to verify the kernel image against keys
provided by platform or firmware.

This patch adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference
to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is
being initialized it will be updated.

Another thing on my mind is that now kexec_file_load will still relay on
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING and all its dependencies to be enabled
to be able to verify the image against firmware keys. I'm thinking about
to have something like CONFIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING and make the .platform
keyring could be enabled for a more wider usage. Not sure if it's a good
idea though.

Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the
cert to EFI's MokList variable.

Kairui Song (2):
  integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
  kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify

 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 certs/system_keyring.c            | 10 +++++++++-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h     |  5 +++++
 include/linux/verification.h      |  1 +
 security/integrity/digsig.c       |  4 ++++
 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

-- 
2.20.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	bauerman@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
	dyoung@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 00:48:22 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190109164824.19708-1-kasong@redhat.com> (raw)

Hi,

This is a different approach for the previous patch:
[RFC PATCH 0/1] KEYS, integrity: Link .platform keyring to .secondary_trusted_keys
make kexec_file_load be able to verify the kernel image against keys
provided by platform or firmware.

This patch adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference
to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is
being initialized it will be updated.

Another thing on my mind is that now kexec_file_load will still relay on
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING and all its dependencies to be enabled
to be able to verify the image against firmware keys. I'm thinking about
to have something like CONFIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING and make the .platform
keyring could be enabled for a more wider usage. Not sure if it's a good
idea though.

Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the
cert to EFI's MokList variable.

Kairui Song (2):
  integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
  kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify

 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 certs/system_keyring.c            | 10 +++++++++-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h     |  5 +++++
 include/linux/verification.h      |  1 +
 security/integrity/digsig.c       |  4 ++++
 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

-- 
2.20.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>,
	ebiggers@google.com, dyoung@redhat.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	dwmw2@infradead.org, bauerman@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 00:48:22 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190109164824.19708-1-kasong@redhat.com> (raw)

Hi,

This is a different approach for the previous patch:
[RFC PATCH 0/1] KEYS, integrity: Link .platform keyring to .secondary_trusted_keys
make kexec_file_load be able to verify the kernel image against keys
provided by platform or firmware.

This patch adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference
to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is
being initialized it will be updated.

Another thing on my mind is that now kexec_file_load will still relay on
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING and all its dependencies to be enabled
to be able to verify the image against firmware keys. I'm thinking about
to have something like CONFIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING and make the .platform
keyring could be enabled for a more wider usage. Not sure if it's a good
idea though.

Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the
cert to EFI's MokList variable.

Kairui Song (2):
  integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
  kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify

 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 certs/system_keyring.c            | 10 +++++++++-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h     |  5 +++++
 include/linux/verification.h      |  1 +
 security/integrity/digsig.c       |  4 ++++
 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

-- 
2.20.1


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

             reply	other threads:[~2019-01-09 16:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-09 16:48 Kairui Song [this message]
2019-01-09 16:48 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image Kairui Song
2019-01-09 16:48 ` Kairui Song
2019-01-09 16:48 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring Kairui Song
2019-01-09 16:48   ` Kairui Song
2019-01-09 16:48   ` Kairui Song
2019-01-09 19:21   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-09 19:21     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-09 19:21     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-09 16:48 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify Kairui Song
2019-01-09 16:48   ` Kairui Song
2019-01-09 16:48   ` Kairui Song
2019-01-11 13:43   ` Dave Young
2019-01-11 13:43     ` Dave Young
2019-01-11 13:43     ` Dave Young
2019-01-11 16:13     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-11 16:13       ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-11 16:13       ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-13  1:39       ` Dave Young
2019-01-13  1:39         ` Dave Young
2019-01-13  1:39         ` Dave Young
2019-01-14  3:28         ` Kairui Song
2019-01-14  3:28           ` Kairui Song
2019-01-14  3:28           ` Kairui Song
2019-01-14 16:10         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-14 16:10           ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-14 16:10           ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-15  2:42           ` Dave Young
2019-01-15  2:42             ` Dave Young
2019-01-15  2:42             ` Dave Young
2019-01-15  3:10             ` Kairui Song
2019-01-15  3:10               ` Kairui Song
2019-01-15  3:10               ` Kairui Song
2019-01-15 15:17             ` nayna
2019-01-15 15:17               ` nayna
2019-01-15 15:17               ` nayna

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