[PATCH v4 01/12] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control

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From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
	marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	dave.martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ykaukab@suse.de,
	julien.thierry@arm.com, mlangsdo@redhat.com,
	steven.price@arm.com, stefan.wahren@i2se.com,
	Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 01/12] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:00 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190125180711.1970973-2-jeremy.linton@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190125180711.1970973-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com>

For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling
or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the
documentation reflects that.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index b799bcf67d7b..9475f02c79da 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1982,6 +1982,12 @@
 			Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
 			the default is off.
 
+	kpti=		[ARM64] Control page table isolation of user
+			and kernel address spaces.
+			Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
+			0: force disabled
+			1: force enabled
+
 	kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs.
 			Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
 
-- 
2.17.2

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)

From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: stefan.wahren@i2se.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	mlangsdo@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, julien.thierry@arm.com,
	will.deacon@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	steven.price@arm.com, ykaukab@suse.de, dave.martin@arm.com,
	shankerd@codeaurora.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 01/12] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:00 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190125180711.1970973-2-jeremy.linton@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190125180711.1970973-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com>

For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling
or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the
documentation reflects that.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index b799bcf67d7b..9475f02c79da 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1982,6 +1982,12 @@
 			Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
 			the default is off.
 
+	kpti=		[ARM64] Control page table isolation of user
+			and kernel address spaces.
+			Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
+			0: force disabled
+			1: force enabled
+
 	kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs.
 			Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
 
-- 
2.17.2


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next prev parent reply	other threads:[~2019-01-25 18:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-25 18:06 [PATCH v4 00/12] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:06 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton [this message]
2019-01-25 18:07   ` [PATCH v4 01/12] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:02   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-30 18:02     ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-06 19:24     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-02-06 19:24       ` Jeremy Linton
2019-02-06 21:06       ` André Przywara
2019-02-06 21:06         ` André Przywara
2019-01-31 17:58   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 17:58     ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-07  0:25   ` Jonathan Corbet
2019-02-07  0:25     ` Jonathan Corbet
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 02/12] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:03   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-30 18:03     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 03/12] arm64: Remove the ability to build a kernel without ssbd Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:04   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-30 18:04     ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-15 18:20     ` Catalin Marinas
2019-02-15 18:20       ` Catalin Marinas
2019-02-15 18:20       ` Catalin Marinas
2019-02-15 18:54       ` Jeremy Linton
2019-02-15 18:54         ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 04/12] arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without hardened branch predictors Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:04   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-30 18:04     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-30 18:04     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 05/12] arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without kpti Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:05   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-30 18:05     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 06/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:52   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 17:52     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 07/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31  9:28   ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-31  9:28     ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-31 21:48     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 21:48       ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:54   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 17:54     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 21:53     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 21:53       ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 08/12] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:54   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 17:54     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 09/12] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:55   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 17:55     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 10/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:55   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 17:55     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 11/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:55   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 17:55     ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 12/12] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:56   ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 17:56     ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-08 20:05 ` [PATCH v4 00/12] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Stefan Wahren
2019-02-08 20:05   ` Stefan Wahren

find likely ancestor, descendant, or conflicting patches for this message:
dfblob:b799bcf67d7 dfblob:b799bcf67d7 dfblob:9475f02c79d
dfblob:9475f02c79d
	(help)

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