From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, dave.martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ykaukab@suse.de, julien.thierry@arm.com, mlangsdo@redhat.com, steven.price@arm.com, stefan.wahren@i2se.com, Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Subject: [PATCH v4 07/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:06 -0600 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190125180711.1970973-8-jeremy.linton@arm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190125180711.1970973-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com> Display the mitigation status if active, otherwise assume the cpu is safe unless it doesn't have CSV3 and isn't in our whitelist. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index a9e18b9cdc1e..624dfe0b5cdd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -944,6 +944,8 @@ has_useable_cnp(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) return has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope); } +/* default value is invalid until unmap_kernel_at_el0() runs */ +static bool __meltdown_safe = true; static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, @@ -962,6 +964,16 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, { /* sentinel */ } }; char const *str = "command line option"; + bool meltdown_safe; + + meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list); + + /* Defer to CPU feature registers */ + if (has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope)) + meltdown_safe = true; + + if (!meltdown_safe) + __meltdown_safe = false; /* * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium @@ -984,12 +996,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) return kaslr_offset() > 0; - /* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */ - if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list)) - return false; - - /* Defer to CPU feature registers */ - return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope); + return !meltdown_safe; } static void @@ -2055,3 +2062,17 @@ static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(void) } core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: KPTI\n"); + + if (__meltdown_safe) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} +#endif -- 2.17.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: stefan.wahren@i2se.com, mlangsdo@redhat.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, julien.thierry@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>, steven.price@arm.com, ykaukab@suse.de, dave.martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org Subject: [PATCH v4 07/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:06 -0600 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190125180711.1970973-8-jeremy.linton@arm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190125180711.1970973-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com> Display the mitigation status if active, otherwise assume the cpu is safe unless it doesn't have CSV3 and isn't in our whitelist. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index a9e18b9cdc1e..624dfe0b5cdd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -944,6 +944,8 @@ has_useable_cnp(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) return has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope); } +/* default value is invalid until unmap_kernel_at_el0() runs */ +static bool __meltdown_safe = true; static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, @@ -962,6 +964,16 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, { /* sentinel */ } }; char const *str = "command line option"; + bool meltdown_safe; + + meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list); + + /* Defer to CPU feature registers */ + if (has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope)) + meltdown_safe = true; + + if (!meltdown_safe) + __meltdown_safe = false; /* * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium @@ -984,12 +996,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) return kaslr_offset() > 0; - /* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */ - if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list)) - return false; - - /* Defer to CPU feature registers */ - return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope); + return !meltdown_safe; } static void @@ -2055,3 +2062,17 @@ static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(void) } core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: KPTI\n"); + + if (__meltdown_safe) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} +#endif -- 2.17.2 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-25 18:07 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-01-25 18:06 [PATCH v4 00/12] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:06 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 01/12] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-30 18:02 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-30 18:02 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-06 19:24 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-02-06 19:24 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-02-06 21:06 ` André Przywara 2019-02-06 21:06 ` André Przywara 2019-01-31 17:58 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-31 17:58 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-07 0:25 ` Jonathan Corbet 2019-02-07 0:25 ` Jonathan Corbet 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 02/12] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-30 18:03 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-30 18:03 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 03/12] arm64: Remove the ability to build a kernel without ssbd Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-30 18:04 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-30 18:04 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-15 18:20 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-02-15 18:20 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-02-15 18:20 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-02-15 18:54 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-02-15 18:54 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 04/12] arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without hardened branch predictors Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-30 18:04 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-30 18:04 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-30 18:04 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 05/12] arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without kpti Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-30 18:05 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-30 18:05 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 06/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 17:52 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-31 17:52 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton [this message] 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 07/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 9:28 ` Julien Thierry 2019-01-31 9:28 ` Julien Thierry 2019-01-31 21:48 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 21:48 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 17:54 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-31 17:54 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-31 21:53 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 21:53 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 08/12] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 17:54 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-31 17:54 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 09/12] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 10/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 11/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 12/12] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton 2019-01-25 18:07 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-01-31 17:56 ` Andre Przywara 2019-01-31 17:56 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-08 20:05 ` [PATCH v4 00/12] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Stefan Wahren 2019-02-08 20:05 ` Stefan Wahren
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