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From: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-secuirty-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, vgoyal@redhat.com,
	nayna@linux.ibm.com, Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 4/4] added LSM hook to call ima_buffer_check
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 14:47:43 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190429214743.4625-5-prsriva02@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190429214743.4625-1-prsriva02@gmail.com>

From: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>

added LSM hook to call ima_buffer_check

Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
 include/linux/security.h  | 3 +++
 kernel/kexec_internal.h   | 4 +++-
 security/security.c       | 6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a240a3fc5fc4..f18562c1eb24 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1672,6 +1672,8 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 	int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
 
+	int (*buffer_check)(const void *buff, int size, const char *eventname);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 					struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1945,6 +1947,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx;
 	struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx;
 	struct hlist_head inode_getsecctx;
+	struct hlist_head buffer_check;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	struct hlist_head unix_stream_connect;
 	struct hlist_head unix_may_send;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 49f2685324b0..8dece6da0dda 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname);
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1188,6 +1189,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
+static inline void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname)
+{ }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_internal.h b/kernel/kexec_internal.h
index 48aaf2ac0d0d..9f967fbb5aa0 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_internal.h
+++ b/kernel/kexec_internal.h
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image, struct kexec_segment *segment);
 void kimage_terminate(struct kimage *image);
 int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kimage *image,
 				unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
-
+int kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name(char **outbuf, int kernel_fd,
+				const char *cmdline_ptr,
+				unsigned long cmdline_len);
 extern struct mutex kexec_mutex;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23cbb1a295a3..2b575a40470e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -754,6 +754,12 @@ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
 }
 
+void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname)
+{
+	call_void_hook(buffer_check, buff, size, eventname);
+	return ima_buffer_check(buff, size, eventname);
+}
+
 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
-- 
2.19.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-04-29 21:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-29 21:47 [PATCH v3 0/4] Add a new ima_hook buffer_check to measure buffers critical for attestation Prakhar Srivastava
2019-04-29 21:47 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] added a new ima policy func buffer_check, and ima hook to measure the buffer hash into ima Prakhar Srivastava
2019-05-02 16:52   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-04-29 21:47 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] add the buffer to the xattr Prakhar Srivastava
2019-05-02 16:52   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-04-29 21:47 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] add kexec_cmdline used to ima Prakhar Srivastava
2019-05-02 16:52   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-02 16:58     ` Al Viro
2019-04-29 21:47 ` Prakhar Srivastava [this message]
2019-05-02 16:52   ` [PATCH v3 4/4] added LSM hook to call ima_buffer_check Mimi Zohar

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