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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
	Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption
Date: Wed, 08 May 2019 14:44:17 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190508144422.13171-58-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>

Provide an overview of MKTME on Intel Platforms.

Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst          |  8 +++
 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1614b52dd3e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+
+====================+Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)
+====================+
+.. toctree::
+
+   mktme_overview
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..59c023965554
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+Overview
+====+Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)[1] is a technology that
+allows transparent memory encryption in upcoming Intel platforms.
+It uses a new instruction (PCONFIG) for key setup and selects a
+key for individual pages by repurposing physical address bits in
+the page tables.
+
+Support for MKTME is added to the existing kernel keyring subsystem
+and via a new mprotect_encrypt() system call that can be used by
+applications to encrypt anonymous memory with keys obtained from
+the keyring.
+
+This architecture supports encrypting both normal, volatile DRAM
+and persistent memory.  However, persistent memory support is
+not included in the Linux kernel implementation at this time.
+(We anticipate adding that support next.)
+
+Hardware Background
+=========+
+MKTME is built on top of an existing single-key technology called
+TME.  TME encrypts all system memory using a single key generated
+by the CPU on every boot of the system. TME provides mitigation
+against physical attacks, such as physically removing a DIMM or
+watching memory bus traffic.
+
+MKTME enables the use of multiple encryption keys[2], allowing
+selection of the encryption key per-page using the page tables.
+Encryption keys are programmed into each memory controller and
+the same set of keys is available to all entities on the system
+with access to that memory (all cores, DMA engines, etc...).
+
+MKTME inherits many of the mitigations against hardware attacks
+from TME.  Like TME, MKTME does not mitigate vulnerable or
+malicious operating systems or virtual machine managers.  MKTME
+offers additional mitigations when compared to TME.
+
+TME and MKTME use the AES encryption algorithm in the AES-XTS
+mode.  This mode, typically used for block-based storage devices,
+takes the physical address of the data into account when
+encrypting each block.  This ensures that the effective key is
+different for each block of memory. Moving encrypted content
+across physical address results in garbage on read, mitigating
+block-relocation attacks.  This property is the reason many of
+the discussed attacks require control of a shared physical page
+to be handed from the victim to the attacker.
+
+--
+1. https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/a5/16/Multi-Key-Total-Memory-Encryption-Spec.pdf
+2. The MKTME architecture supports up to 16 bits of KeyIDs, so a
+   maximum of 65535 keys on top of the “TME key” at KeyID-0.  The
+   first implementation is expected to support 5 bits, making 63
+   keys available to applications.  However, this is not guaranteed.
+   The number of available keys could be reduced if, for instance,
+   additional physical address space is desired over additional
+   KeyIDs.
-- 
2.20.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
	Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption
Date: Wed,  8 May 2019 17:44:17 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190508144422.13171-58-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>

Provide an overview of MKTME on Intel Platforms.

Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst          |  8 +++
 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1614b52dd3e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+
+=========================================
+Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)
+=========================================
+
+.. toctree::
+
+   mktme_overview
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..59c023965554
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+Overview
+=========
+Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)[1] is a technology that
+allows transparent memory encryption in upcoming Intel platforms.
+It uses a new instruction (PCONFIG) for key setup and selects a
+key for individual pages by repurposing physical address bits in
+the page tables.
+
+Support for MKTME is added to the existing kernel keyring subsystem
+and via a new mprotect_encrypt() system call that can be used by
+applications to encrypt anonymous memory with keys obtained from
+the keyring.
+
+This architecture supports encrypting both normal, volatile DRAM
+and persistent memory.  However, persistent memory support is
+not included in the Linux kernel implementation at this time.
+(We anticipate adding that support next.)
+
+Hardware Background
+===================
+
+MKTME is built on top of an existing single-key technology called
+TME.  TME encrypts all system memory using a single key generated
+by the CPU on every boot of the system. TME provides mitigation
+against physical attacks, such as physically removing a DIMM or
+watching memory bus traffic.
+
+MKTME enables the use of multiple encryption keys[2], allowing
+selection of the encryption key per-page using the page tables.
+Encryption keys are programmed into each memory controller and
+the same set of keys is available to all entities on the system
+with access to that memory (all cores, DMA engines, etc...).
+
+MKTME inherits many of the mitigations against hardware attacks
+from TME.  Like TME, MKTME does not mitigate vulnerable or
+malicious operating systems or virtual machine managers.  MKTME
+offers additional mitigations when compared to TME.
+
+TME and MKTME use the AES encryption algorithm in the AES-XTS
+mode.  This mode, typically used for block-based storage devices,
+takes the physical address of the data into account when
+encrypting each block.  This ensures that the effective key is
+different for each block of memory. Moving encrypted content
+across physical address results in garbage on read, mitigating
+block-relocation attacks.  This property is the reason many of
+the discussed attacks require control of a shared physical page
+to be handed from the victim to the attacker.
+
+--
+1. https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/a5/16/Multi-Key-Total-Memory-Encryption-Spec.pdf
+2. The MKTME architecture supports up to 16 bits of KeyIDs, so a
+   maximum of 65535 keys on top of the “TME key” at KeyID-0.  The
+   first implementation is expected to support 5 bits, making 63
+   keys available to applications.  However, this is not guaranteed.
+   The number of available keys could be reduced if, for instance,
+   additional physical address space is desired over additional
+   KeyIDs.
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-05-08 14:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 324+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-08 14:43 [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 01/62] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/62] mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29  7:21     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/62] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-10 18:07   ` Dave Hansen
2019-05-10 18:07     ` Dave Hansen
2019-05-13 14:27     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-13 14:27       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/62] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/62] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29  7:21     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 12:47     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29 12:47       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/62] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/62] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/62] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/62] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14  9:15   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14  9:15     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:03     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 13:03       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/62] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 13/62] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14  9:34   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14  9:34     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:04     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:04       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:28       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 13:28         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 13:43         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:43           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 22:41           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 22:41             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17  9:25             ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  9:25               ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:14     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 13:14       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 14/62] x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 15/62] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 16/62] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 17/62] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 18/62] x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14  9:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14  9:51     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 22:43     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 22:43       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17  9:27       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  9:27         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 14:43         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17 14:43           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17 14:51           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 14:51             ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 15:17             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17 15:17               ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 19/62] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:10   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:10     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 20/62] mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 22:44     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 22:44       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17  9:30       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  9:30         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 11:01         ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 11:01           ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 11:01           ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 11:13           ` Huang, Kai
2019-06-17 11:13             ` Huang, Kai
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 21/62] mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 22/62] x86/pconfig: Set a valid encryption algorithm for all MKTME commands Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 23/62] keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 24/62] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 25/62] keys/mktme: Instantiate and destroy MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 26/62] keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:35   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:35     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 17:10     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 17:10       ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 27/62] keys/mktme: Strengthen the entropy of CPU generated MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 28/62] keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 29/62] keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 30/62] keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 31/62] keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 32/62] keys/mktme: Store MKTME payloads if cmdline parameter allows Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 33/62] acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 34/62] acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 35/62] keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 36/62] acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 37/62] keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 38/62] keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 39/62] keys/mktme: Find new PCONFIG targets during memory hotplug Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 40/62] keys/mktme: Program new PCONFIG targets with MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 41/62] keys/mktme: Support memory hotplug for " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 42/62] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 43/62] syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29  7:21     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 18:12     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-29 18:12       ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 44/62] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:44   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:44     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 17:33     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 17:33       ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 18:26       ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-14 18:26         ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-14 18:46         ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 18:46           ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 19:11           ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-14 19:11             ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17  9:10             ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  9:10               ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:47   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:47     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 17:35     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 17:35       ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 11:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:51     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-15  0:32     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-15  0:32       ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-17  9:08       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  9:08         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 15:07   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 15:07     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 15:07     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 15:28     ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 15:28       ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 15:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 15:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 15:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 18:27         ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 18:27           ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 19:12           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 19:12             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 19:12             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 21:36             ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 21:36               ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18  0:48               ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  0:48                 ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  0:48                 ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:50                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  1:50                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  1:50                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  2:11                   ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  2:11                     ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  2:11                     ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  4:24                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  4:24                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  4:24                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 14:19                   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 14:19                     ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18  0:05             ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  0:05               ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  0:05               ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  0:15               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  0:15                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  0:15                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  1:35                 ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:35                   ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:35                   ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:43                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  1:43                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  1:43                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  2:23                     ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  2:23                       ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  2:23                       ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  9:12                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-18  9:12                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-18 14:09                         ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 14:09                           ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 16:15                           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-18 16:15                             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-18 16:22                             ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 16:22                               ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 16:36                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 16:36                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 16:48                                 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 16:48                                   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 14:13                 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 14:13                   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 23:59           ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 23:59             ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 23:59             ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:34             ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-06-18  1:34               ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-06-18  1:40               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  1:40                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  1:40                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  2:02                 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-06-18  2:02                   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-06-18  4:19                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  4:19                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  4:19                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 46/62] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:54   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:54     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 18:39     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 18:39       ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 47/62] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:55   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:55     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-15  0:07     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-15  0:07       ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 48/62] selftests/x86/mktme: Test the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 17:09   ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 17:09     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 49/62] mm, x86: export several MKTME variables Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:56   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:56     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  3:14     ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17  3:14       ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17  3:14       ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17  7:46       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  7:46         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  8:39         ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17  8:39           ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17  8:39           ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 11:25           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17 11:25             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 50/62] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 51/62] iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 12:04   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 12:04     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 52/62] x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 16:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-05-08 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-05-08 20:52     ` Jacob Pan
2019-05-08 20:52       ` Jacob Pan
2019-05-08 21:21       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 21:21         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 53/62] x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 54/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 55/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 56/62] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2019-05-08 14:44   ` [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29  7:21     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 18:13     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-29 18:13       ` Alison Schofield
2019-07-14 18:16   ` Randy Dunlap
2019-07-14 18:16     ` Randy Dunlap
2019-07-15  9:02     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-15  9:02       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 58/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 59/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 60/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 61/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 62/62] x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:30 ` [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29  7:30   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 18:20   ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-29 18:20     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 12:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 12:15   ` Peter Zijlstra

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