[PATCH 1/3 v5] add a new ima hook and policy to measure the cmdline

[Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>]

From: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>

For secure boot attestation, it is necessary to measure the kernel
command line and the kernel version. For cold boot, the boot loader
can be enhanced to measure these parameters. However, for attestation
across soft reboot boundary, these values also need to be measured
during kexec.

For this reason, this patch adds support for measuring these
parameters during kexec. To achive this, a new ima policy and
hook id, defined KEXEC_CMDLINE and ima_kexec_cmdline respectively,
are added.

Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  1 +
 include/linux/ima.h                  |  2 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h         |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c     |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c    | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  |  9 +++
 6 files changed, 98 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 74c6702de74e..62e7cd687e9c 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ Description:
 		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
 				[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
 				[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
+				[KEXEC_CMDLINE]
 			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
 			       [[^]MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index dc12fbcf484c..2e2c77280be8 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
 extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return;
 }
 
+static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d213e835c498..226a26d8de09 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 	hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)	\
 	hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK)	\
 	hook(POLICY_CHECK)		\
+	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE)		\
 	hook(MAX_CHECK)
 #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM)	ENUM,
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c7505fb122d4..800d965232e5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
  *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
+ *	| KEXEC_CMDLINE
  *	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 357edd140c09..1d186bda25fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -576,6 +576,90 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer passed to ima log.
+ * (Instead of using the file hash use the buffer hash).
+ * @buf - The buffer that needs to be added to the log
+ * @size - size of buffer(in bytes)
+ * @eventname - event name to be used for buffer.
+ *
+ * The buffer passed is added to the ima log.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.
+ * On error cases surface errors from ima calls.
+ */
+static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+				const char *eventname, const struct cred *cred,
+				u32 secid)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, NULL, NULL,
+						NULL, 0, NULL};
+	struct {
+		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	} hash;
+	int violation = 0;
+	int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+	int action = 0;
+
+	action = ima_get_action(NULL, cred, secid, 0, KEXEC_CMDLINE, &pcr);
+	if (!(action & IMA_AUDIT) && !(action & IMA_MEASURE))
+		goto out;
+
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+
+	event_data.filename = eventname;
+
+	iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
+	iint->ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	iint->ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+
+	ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint->ima_hash);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
+		ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
+
+	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
+		ima_audit_measurement(iint, event_data.filename);
+
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_kexec_cmdline - based on policy, store kexec cmdline args
+ * @buf: pointer to buffer
+ * @size: size of buffer
+ *
+ * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
+ */
+void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
+{
+	u32 secid;
+
+	if (buf && size != 0) {
+		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+		process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
+				current_cred(), secid);
+	}
+}
+
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e0cc323f948f..413e5921b248 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -291,6 +291,13 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	int i;
 
+	/* only incase of KEXEC_CMDLINE, inode is NULL */
+	if (func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) {
+		if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
+			(rule->func == func) && (!inode))
+			return true;
+		return false;
+	}
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
 	    (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
@@ -869,6 +876,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0)
+				entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			if (!result)
-- 
2.20.1