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From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	"Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 11/12] security/apparmor: Add enclave_load() implementation
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 15:24:37 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190617222438.2080-12-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190617222438.2080-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

Require execute permissions when loading an enclave from a file.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h |  2 ++
 security/apparmor/lsm.c           | 14 ++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index ee559bc2acb8..84470483e04d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ enum audit_type {
 #define OP_PROF_LOAD "profile_load"
 #define OP_PROF_RM "profile_remove"
 
+#define OP_ENCL_LOAD "enclave_load"
+
 
 struct apparmor_audit_data {
 	int error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 87500bde5a92..2ed1157e1f58 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -517,6 +517,17 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
+static int apparmor_enclave_load(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot,
+				bool measured)
+{
+	if (!(prot & PROT_EXEC))
+		return 0;
+
+	return common_file_perm(OP_ENCL_LOAD, vma->vm_file, AA_EXEC_MMAP);
+}
+#endif
+
 static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
 			     const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
@@ -1243,6 +1254,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(enclave_load, apparmor_enclave_load),
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-06-17 22:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-17 22:24 [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:32   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 23:42   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 14:11     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 16:06       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 12:56   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 13:00     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-20 20:09       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 13:24   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 14:08     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 22:07       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 15:20     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 22:17       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 19:08         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 15:23           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 16:19             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 16:06               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 17:25                 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-15 22:29                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-01 16:38                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 22:20                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 20:51                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-05 21:30                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-07 18:51                             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:46   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_EXECMEM to map enclave page WX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:56   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 21:13     ` James Morris
2019-06-20  9:28       ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-20 22:22       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-23 17:16       ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-26 20:39         ` James Morris
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 14:49   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-19 20:59     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 13:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 Stephen Smalley
2019-06-18 13:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 15:13     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-25 16:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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