All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Subject: [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2019 12:44:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190718194415.108476-24-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190718194415.108476-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
has been locked down in confidentiality mode.

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
 include/linux/security.h     |  1 +
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c     | 10 ++++++++++
 security/lockdown/lockdown.c |  1 +
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 987d8427f091..8dd1741a52cd 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
 	LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
 	LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
+	LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
 
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index ca1255d14576..492a8bfaae98 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -142,8 +142,13 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr)
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
 	ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+out:
 		memset(dst, 0, size);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -569,6 +574,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
 	/*
 	 * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire
 	 * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
@@ -580,6 +589,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
 	 */
 	ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+out:
 		memset(dst, 0, size);
 
 	return ret;
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 6b123cbf3748..1b89d3e8e54d 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
 	[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
 	[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
+	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
 	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };
 
-- 
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-07-18 19:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-18 19:43 [PATCH V36 00/29] security: Add kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 20:02   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 20:03   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-07-29 21:47   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 21:06   ` Kees Cook
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-07-18 21:06   ` [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Kees Cook
2019-07-29 21:47   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-25  2:23   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-30 18:47     ` [PATCH] " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31  1:48       ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190718194415.108476-24-matthewgarrett@google.com \
    --to=matthewgarrett@google.com \
    --cc=alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com \
    --cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=jlee@suse.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mjg59@google.com \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.