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From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] tomoyo: common: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 13:54:57 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190731185457.GA21407@embeddedor> (raw)

profile is controlled by user-space via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

security/tomoyo/common.c:498 tomoyo_assign_profile() warn: potential spectre issue 'ns->profile_ptr' [r] (local cap)
security/tomoyo/common.c:499 tomoyo_assign_profile() warn: possible spectre second half.  'ptr'
security/tomoyo/common.c:505 tomoyo_assign_profile() warn: possible spectre second half.  'ptr'
security/tomoyo/common.c:523 tomoyo_assign_profile() warn: possible spectre second half.  'ptr'

Fix this by sanitizing profile before using it to index ns->profile_ptr

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
 security/tomoyo/common.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index dd3d5942e669..45858dbcfdb9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include "common.h"
 
 /* String table for operation mode. */
@@ -488,13 +489,15 @@ static void tomoyo_print_number_union(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
  * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile" on success, NULL otherwise.
  */
 static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_assign_profile
-(struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns, const unsigned int profile)
+(struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns, unsigned int profile)
 {
 	struct tomoyo_profile *ptr;
 	struct tomoyo_profile *entry;
 
 	if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES)
 		return NULL;
+	profile = array_index_nospec(profile, TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES);
+
 	ptr = ns->profile_ptr[profile];
 	if (ptr)
 		return ptr;
-- 
2.22.0


             reply	other threads:[~2019-07-31 19:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-31 18:54 Gustavo A. R. Silva [this message]
2019-08-01 11:02 ` [PATCH] tomoyo: common: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability Tetsuo Handa

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