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From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: [PATCH V37 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 15:15:50 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190731221617.234725-3-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190731221617.234725-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether
kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the
runtime state of the kernel should be permitted.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/security.h  | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/security.c       |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index aebb0e032072..29c22cf40113 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1807,6 +1807,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
 	void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+	int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what);
 };
 
 struct security_hook_heads {
@@ -2046,6 +2047,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
 	struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+	struct hlist_head locked_down;
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 /*
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 66a2fcbe6ab0..c2b1204e8e26 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -77,6 +77,33 @@ enum lsm_event {
 	LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
 };
 
+/*
+ * These are reasons that can be passed to the security_locked_down()
+ * LSM hook. Lockdown reasons that protect kernel integrity (ie, the
+ * ability for userland to modify kernel code) are placed before
+ * LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX.  Lockdown reasons that protect kernel
+ * confidentiality (ie, the ability for userland to extract
+ * information from the running kernel that would otherwise be
+ * restricted) are placed before LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX.
+ *
+ * LSM authors should note that the semantics of any given lockdown
+ * reason are not guaranteed to be stable - the same reason may block
+ * one set of features in one kernel release, and a slightly different
+ * set of features in a later kernel release. LSMs that seek to expose
+ * lockdown policy at any level of granularity other than "none",
+ * "integrity" or "confidentiality" are responsible for either
+ * ensuring that they expose a consistent level of functionality to
+ * userland, or ensuring that userland is aware that this is
+ * potentially a moving target. It is easy to misuse this information
+ * in a way that could break userspace. Please be careful not to do
+ * so.
+ */
+enum lockdown_reason {
+	LOCKDOWN_NONE,
+	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
+	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
+};
+
 /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
 extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 		       int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -393,6 +420,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1205,6 +1233,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
+static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 90f1e291c800..ce6c945bf347 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2392,3 +2392,9 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
 	call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+
+int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
-- 
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-07-31 22:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-31 22:15 [PATCH V37 00/29] security: Add support for locking down the kernel Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-01 14:21   ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-01 20:42     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 10:01       ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-08 18:31         ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 22:43           ` James Morris
2019-08-09 20:59         ` [PATCH V39] " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-08-01 16:19   ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-01 20:44     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
     [not found]   ` <CGME20190813061053eucas1p1b6945259d9663b743e7cb32521d041e7@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
2019-08-13  6:10     ` Marek Szyprowski
     [not found]       ` <CGME20190813072111eucas1p2b87f3f8d16c22a0a3d024bc5ebcc8bcc@eucas1p2.samsung.com>
2019-08-13  7:21         ` Marek Szyprowski
     [not found]           ` <CGME20190814061246eucas1p128cae99a14f27bc79fa2aa72084a0413@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
2019-08-14  6:12             ` [PATCH] tracefs: Fix NULL pointer dereference when no lockdown is used Marek Szyprowski
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett

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