From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> To: jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jgg@ziepe.ca, tyhicks@canonical.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, crazyt2019+lml@gmail.com, nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com, silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Subject: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated Date: Fri, 02 Aug 2019 15:07:33 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190802150733.1972-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw) Commit c78719203fc6 ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even a TPM is not found to avoid module dependency problems. However, trusted module initialization can still fail if the TPM is inactive or deactivated. This patch ignores tpm_get_random() errors in init_digests() and returns -EFAULT in pcrlock() if the TPM didn't return random data. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> --- security/keys/trusted.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 9a94672e7adc..34f04ffcf2e5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -389,6 +389,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + /* This happens if the TPM didn't return random data */ + if (!digests) + return -EFAULT; + return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0; } @@ -1233,10 +1237,8 @@ static int __init init_digests(void) int i; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - if (ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EFAULT; + if (ret < 0 || ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) + return 0; digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> To: <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>, <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <jgg@ziepe.ca>, <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <crazyt2019+lml@gmail.com>, <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, <silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Subject: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2019 17:07:33 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190802150733.1972-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw) Commit c78719203fc6 ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even a TPM is not found to avoid module dependency problems. However, trusted module initialization can still fail if the TPM is inactive or deactivated. This patch ignores tpm_get_random() errors in init_digests() and returns -EFAULT in pcrlock() if the TPM didn't return random data. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> --- security/keys/trusted.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 9a94672e7adc..34f04ffcf2e5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -389,6 +389,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + /* This happens if the TPM didn't return random data */ + if (!digests) + return -EFAULT; + return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0; } @@ -1233,10 +1237,8 @@ static int __init init_digests(void) int i; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - if (ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EFAULT; + if (ret < 0 || ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) + return 0; digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.17.1
next reply other threads:[~2019-08-02 15:07 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-08-02 15:07 Roberto Sassu [this message] 2019-08-02 15:07 ` [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated Roberto Sassu 2019-08-02 15:30 ` Tyler Hicks 2019-08-02 15:30 ` Tyler Hicks 2019-08-02 15:34 ` Roberto Sassu 2019-08-02 15:34 ` Roberto Sassu 2019-08-02 16:11 ` Roberto Sassu 2019-08-02 16:11 ` Roberto Sassu 2019-08-02 16:15 ` Tyler Hicks 2019-08-02 16:15 ` Tyler Hicks
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