From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] x86/sgx: Fix whitespace damage in sgx_encl_page_alloc()
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 14:52:36 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190823215236.8081-4-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190823215236.8081-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Fix a variety of recently introduced whitespace damage. No functional
change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 23 +++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index ead9fb2d9b69..3ce7849f067b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
u64 secinfo_flags)
{
struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
- unsigned long prot;
+ unsigned long prot;
encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!encl_page)
@@ -145,18 +145,17 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
if (secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_TCS;
+ prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
- prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
- _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
- _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
-
- /*
- * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
- * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
- * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
- */
- if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
- prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+ /*
+ * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
+ * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
+ * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
+ */
+ if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+ prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
/* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
--
2.22.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-23 21:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-23 21:52 [PATCH 0/3] x86/sgx: Misc code cleanups Sean Christopherson
2019-08-23 21:52 ` [PATCH 1/3] x86/sgx: Tweak Kconfig help section according to checkpatch Sean Christopherson
2019-08-23 21:52 ` [PATCH 2/3] x86/sgx: Add missing SPDX license to encls.c Sean Christopherson
2019-08-23 21:52 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-08-26 5:38 ` [PATCH 0/3] x86/sgx: Misc code cleanups Jarkko Sakkinen
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