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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	omosnace@redhat.com, jeffv@google.com,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: [RFC PATCH] selinux: randomize layout of key structures
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2019 15:28:38 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191213202838.7323-1-sds@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)

Randomize the layout of key selinux data structures.
Initially this is applied to the selinux_state, selinux_ss,
policydb, and task_security_struct data structures.

NB To test/use this mechanism, one must install the
necessary build-time dependencies, e.g. gcc-plugin-devel on Fedora,
and enable CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT in the kernel configuration.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
I would have expected that two kernels built with the same config
with this enabled would have yielded different struct layouts in
pahole vmlinux output, but that doesn't appear to be the case. They
do have different seeds.  Am I doing something wrong?
Also, does DEBUG_INFO_BTF effectively undermine/negate the benefits of this
change if enabled?

 security/selinux/include/objsec.h   | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.h      | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index a4a86cbcfb0a..330b7b6d44e0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ struct task_security_struct {
 	u32 create_sid;		/* fscreate SID */
 	u32 keycreate_sid;	/* keycreate SID */
 	u32 sockcreate_sid;	/* fscreate SID */
-};
+} __randomize_layout;
 
 enum label_initialized {
 	LABEL_INVALID,		/* invalid or not initialized */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 49737087ad33..3ea406ad91b6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ struct selinux_state {
 	bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
 	struct selinux_avc *avc;
 	struct selinux_ss *ss;
-};
+} __randomize_layout;
 
 void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss);
 void selinux_avc_init(struct selinux_avc **avc);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index bc56b14e2216..98afe52a3d19 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ struct policydb {
 
 	u16 process_class;
 	u32 process_trans_perms;
-};
+} __randomize_layout;;
 
 extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
 extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index fc40640a9725..c5896f39e8f6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ struct selinux_ss {
 	struct selinux_map map;
 	struct page *status_page;
 	struct mutex status_lock;
-};
+} __randomize_layout;
 
 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
 				struct avtab_node *node);
-- 
2.23.0


             reply	other threads:[~2019-12-13 20:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-13 20:28 Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-12-14 18:50 ` [RFC PATCH] selinux: randomize layout of key structures Dan Aloni
2019-12-16 14:22   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 23:46     ` Paul Moore
2019-12-17 13:44       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-19  2:35         ` Paul Moore
2019-12-17 23:50 ` Kees Cook
     [not found]   ` <CAOSEQ1qFpLX5hTyNZ+QZuhunH3gr+KAB5PDgcoFjUcyNojEVMQ@mail.gmail.com>
2019-12-18  0:16     ` Kees Cook
     [not found]       ` <CAOSEQ1ow2XGQ4faoFekK9s3HfmfcvnVKZgGC6tPm0ChJ0F+-vw@mail.gmail.com>
2019-12-18  0:47         ` Kees Cook
     [not found]           ` <CAOSEQ1quzmnB4700JdOob=DNgbF5ma2rt7O-ayZwWeWBjymcjw@mail.gmail.com>
2019-12-19 18:29             ` Kees Cook

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