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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>,
	kernel-team@android.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Subject: [PATCH v5 4/6] ubifs: don't trigger assertion on invalid no-key filename
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:31:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200120223201.241390-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200120223201.241390-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

If userspace provides an invalid fscrypt no-key filename which encodes a
hash value with any of the UBIFS node type bits set (i.e. the high 3
bits), gracefully report ENOENT rather than triggering ubifs_assert().

Test case with kvm-xfstests shell:

    . fs/ubifs/config
    . ~/xfstests/common/encrypt
    dev=$(__blkdev_to_ubi_volume /dev/vdc)
    ubiupdatevol $dev -t
    mount $dev /mnt -t ubifs
    mkdir /mnt/edir
    xfs_io -c set_encpolicy /mnt/edir
    rm /mnt/edir/_,,,,,DAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

With the bug, the following assertion fails on the 'rm' command:

    [   19.066048] UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 379): ubifs_assert_failed: UBIFS assert failed: !(hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK), in fs/ubifs/key.h:170

Fixes: f4f61d2cc6d8 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 fs/ubifs/dir.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
index 636c3222c2308..5f937226976a6 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
@@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ static struct dentry *ubifs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (nm.hash) {
 		ubifs_assert(c, fname_len(&nm) == 0);
 		ubifs_assert(c, fname_name(&nm) == NULL);
+		if (nm.hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK)
+			goto done; /* ENOENT */
 		dent_key_init_hash(c, &key, dir->i_ino, nm.hash);
 		err = ubifs_tnc_lookup_dh(c, &key, dent, nm.minor_hash);
 	} else {
-- 
2.25.0


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>,
	Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@android.com
Subject: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v5 4/6] ubifs: don't trigger assertion on invalid no-key filename
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:31:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200120223201.241390-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200120223201.241390-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

If userspace provides an invalid fscrypt no-key filename which encodes a
hash value with any of the UBIFS node type bits set (i.e. the high 3
bits), gracefully report ENOENT rather than triggering ubifs_assert().

Test case with kvm-xfstests shell:

    . fs/ubifs/config
    . ~/xfstests/common/encrypt
    dev=$(__blkdev_to_ubi_volume /dev/vdc)
    ubiupdatevol $dev -t
    mount $dev /mnt -t ubifs
    mkdir /mnt/edir
    xfs_io -c set_encpolicy /mnt/edir
    rm /mnt/edir/_,,,,,DAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

With the bug, the following assertion fails on the 'rm' command:

    [   19.066048] UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 379): ubifs_assert_failed: UBIFS assert failed: !(hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK), in fs/ubifs/key.h:170

Fixes: f4f61d2cc6d8 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 fs/ubifs/dir.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
index 636c3222c2308..5f937226976a6 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
@@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ static struct dentry *ubifs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (nm.hash) {
 		ubifs_assert(c, fname_len(&nm) == 0);
 		ubifs_assert(c, fname_name(&nm) == NULL);
+		if (nm.hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK)
+			goto done; /* ENOENT */
 		dent_key_init_hash(c, &key, dir->i_ino, nm.hash);
 		err = ubifs_tnc_lookup_dh(c, &key, dent, nm.minor_hash);
 	} else {
-- 
2.25.0



_______________________________________________
Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list
Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>,
	Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@android.com
Subject: [PATCH v5 4/6] ubifs: don't trigger assertion on invalid no-key filename
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:31:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200120223201.241390-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200120223201.241390-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

If userspace provides an invalid fscrypt no-key filename which encodes a
hash value with any of the UBIFS node type bits set (i.e. the high 3
bits), gracefully report ENOENT rather than triggering ubifs_assert().

Test case with kvm-xfstests shell:

    . fs/ubifs/config
    . ~/xfstests/common/encrypt
    dev=$(__blkdev_to_ubi_volume /dev/vdc)
    ubiupdatevol $dev -t
    mount $dev /mnt -t ubifs
    mkdir /mnt/edir
    xfs_io -c set_encpolicy /mnt/edir
    rm /mnt/edir/_,,,,,DAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

With the bug, the following assertion fails on the 'rm' command:

    [   19.066048] UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 379): ubifs_assert_failed: UBIFS assert failed: !(hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK), in fs/ubifs/key.h:170

Fixes: f4f61d2cc6d8 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 fs/ubifs/dir.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
index 636c3222c2308..5f937226976a6 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
@@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ static struct dentry *ubifs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (nm.hash) {
 		ubifs_assert(c, fname_len(&nm) == 0);
 		ubifs_assert(c, fname_name(&nm) == NULL);
+		if (nm.hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK)
+			goto done; /* ENOENT */
 		dent_key_init_hash(c, &key, dir->i_ino, nm.hash);
 		err = ubifs_tnc_lookup_dh(c, &key, dent, nm.minor_hash);
 	} else {
-- 
2.25.0


______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-01-20 22:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-20 22:31 [PATCH v5 0/6] fscrypt preparations for encryption+casefolding Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31 ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] fscrypt: don't allow v1 policies with casefolding Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] fscrypt: clarify what is meant by a per-file key Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-22  1:16   ` Daniel Rosenberg
2020-01-22  1:16     ` Daniel Rosenberg
2020-01-22  1:16     ` [f2fs-dev] " Daniel Rosenberg via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-01-20 22:31 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2020-01-20 22:31   ` [PATCH v5 4/6] ubifs: don't trigger assertion on invalid no-key filename Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:31   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-22  0:30   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-22  0:30     ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-22  0:30     ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-24 20:14     ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-24 20:14       ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-24 20:14       ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:32 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] ubifs: allow both hash and disk name to be provided in no-key names Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:32   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:32 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] fscrypt: improve format of " Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-20 22:32   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-22 23:06 ` [PATCH v5 0/6] fscrypt preparations for encryption+casefolding Eric Biggers
2020-01-22 23:06   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-22 23:06   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-01-23 21:35   ` Daniel Rosenberg
2020-01-23 21:35     ` Daniel Rosenberg
2020-01-23 21:35     ` [f2fs-dev] " Daniel Rosenberg via Linux-f2fs-devel

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