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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v14 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 16:22:46 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200124002306.3552-4-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200124002306.3552-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.

Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a
temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go
away when other interfaces get converted.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
 kernel/auditfilter.c                |  6 ++++--
 kernel/auditsc.c                    | 14 ++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  7 +++++--
 security/security.c                 |  8 +++++---
 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3422726268d2..1988b728eb3a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1837,7 +1837,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void **lsmrule);
 void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule);
 
 #else
@@ -1853,8 +1854,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					    void **lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+					    u32 op, void **lsmrule)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 3a44abf4fced..509eb21eff7f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
 			pid_t pid;
 			u32 sid;
+			struct lsmblob blob;
 
 			switch (f->type) {
 			case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1357,8 +1358,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_isset) {
 					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
-						   f->type, f->op,
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+					result = security_audit_rule_match(
+						   &blob, f->type, f->op,
 						   f->lsm_rules);
 				}
 				break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0c239c29a9d5..ef2f5e7eec7b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
 	u32 sid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
 	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -643,7 +644,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+								   f->type,
 								   f->op,
 								   f->lsm_rules);
 			}
@@ -658,15 +661,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (f->lsm_isset) {
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
-								name->osid,
+								&blob,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rules);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+						lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 						if (security_audit_rule_match(
-								n->osid,
+								&blob,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rules)) {
@@ -678,7 +683,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 					break;
-				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
 							      f->type, f->op,
 							      f->lsm_rules))
 					++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index df4ca482fb53..d95b0ece7434 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					     void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+					     u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 808c2515fc6a..27257af4a8cd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid;
+		struct lsmblob blob;
 
 		if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules))
 			continue;
@@ -435,7 +436,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rules);
@@ -443,7 +445,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rules);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 214404a78db1..3a2529f36269 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
 /*
  * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
  */
-static int lsm_slot __initdata;
+static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
 
 /**
  * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -2435,7 +2435,8 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
 	} 
 }
 
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void **lsmrule)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 	int rc;
@@ -2443,7 +2444,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
 		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
 			continue;
-		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+					       field, op,
 					       &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
-- 
2.24.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-01-24  0:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20200124002306.3552-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-01-24  0:22 ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:21     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24  0:22   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:29     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:36     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:42     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 16:20       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 19:28         ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 20:16           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 20:05             ` Simon McVittie
2020-02-03 20:54               ` John Johansen
2020-01-27 22:49             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-31 22:10             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-03 18:54               ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-03 19:37                 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-03 21:39                   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-04 13:37                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-04 17:14                       ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-10 11:56                 ` Simon McVittie
2020-02-10 13:25                   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-10 14:55                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-10 18:32                       ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-10 19:00                         ` John Johansen
2020-02-11 15:59                           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-11 17:58                             ` John Johansen
2020-02-11 18:35                               ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-11 19:11                                 ` John Johansen
2020-02-10 18:56                       ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 21:02             ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 21:43               ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-03 22:49                 ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 20:59           ` John Johansen
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 15:05   ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 21:04   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 21:49     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-27 16:14       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 16:56         ` KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in tun_chr_open/sock_init_data (Was: Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor) Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 17:34           ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-06 14:34           ` BUG: sock_init_data() assumes socket is embedded in socket_alloc, tun/tap does not Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 17:16         ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler

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