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From: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, devel@driverdev.osuosl.org,
	Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>,
	Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>,
	Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] staging: rtl8723bs: Fix potential security hole
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 12:02:31 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200210180235.21691-3-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200210180235.21691-1-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>

In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").

Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
index db6528a01229..3128766dd50e 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -4207,7 +4207,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_point *p)
 
 
 	/* if (p->length < sizeof(struct ieee_param) || !p->pointer) { */
-	if (!p->pointer) {
+	if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(*param)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-- 
2.25.0


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>,
	Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] staging: rtl8723bs: Fix potential security hole
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 12:02:31 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200210180235.21691-3-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200210180235.21691-1-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>

In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").

Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
index db6528a01229..3128766dd50e 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -4207,7 +4207,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_point *p)
 
 
 	/* if (p->length < sizeof(struct ieee_param) || !p->pointer) { */
-	if (!p->pointer) {
+	if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(*param)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-- 
2.25.0

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-02-10 18:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-10 18:02 [PATCH 0/6] staging: rtl8188eu and rtl8723bs - some fixes and cleanups Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02 ` Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02 ` [PATCH 1/6] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02   ` Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02 ` Larry Finger [this message]
2020-02-10 18:02   ` [PATCH 2/6] staging: rtl8723bs: " Larry Finger
2020-02-11 14:17   ` Sasha Levin
2020-02-10 18:02 ` [PATCH 3/6] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential overuse of kernel memory Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02   ` Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02 ` [PATCH 4/6] staging: rtl8723bs: " Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02   ` Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:27   ` Greg KH
2020-02-10 18:27     ` Greg KH
2020-02-10 18:02 ` [PATCH 5/6] staging: rtl8188eu: Remove some unneeded goto statements Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02   ` Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02 ` [PATCH 6/6] staging: rtl8723bs: Remove " Larry Finger
2020-02-10 18:02   ` Larry Finger

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