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From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Security Module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
	"Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 4/9] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 18:23:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200327172331.418878-5-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200327172331.418878-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>

If "hidepid=4" mount option is set then do not instantiate pids that
we can not ptrace. "hidepid=4" means that procfs should only contain
pids that the caller can ptrace.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
---
 fs/proc/base.c          | 15 +++++++++++++++
 fs/proc/root.c          | 13 ++++++++++---
 include/linux/proc_fs.h |  1 +
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 43a28907baf9..1ebe9eba48ea 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -701,6 +701,14 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
 				 struct task_struct *task,
 				 int hide_pid_min)
 {
+	/*
+	 * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check,
+	 * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall
+	 * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS
+	 */
+	if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE)
+		return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
+
 	if (fs_info->hide_pid < hide_pid_min)
 		return true;
 	if (in_group_p(fs_info->pid_gid))
@@ -3319,7 +3327,14 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
 	if (!task)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* Limit procfs to only ptraceable tasks */
+	if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) {
+		if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS))
+			goto out_put_task;
+	}
+
 	result = proc_pid_instantiate(dentry, task, NULL);
+out_put_task:
 	put_task_struct(task);
 out:
 	return result;
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 616e8976185c..62eae22403d2 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -47,6 +47,14 @@ static const struct fs_parameter_spec proc_fs_parameters[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
+static inline int valid_hidepid(unsigned int value)
+{
+	return (value == HIDEPID_OFF ||
+		value == HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS ||
+		value == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE ||
+		value == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE);
+}
+
 static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
 {
 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
@@ -63,10 +71,9 @@ static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
 		break;
 
 	case Opt_hidepid:
+		if (!valid_hidepid(result.uint_32))
+			return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid.\n");
 		ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32;
-		if (ctx->hidepid < HIDEPID_OFF ||
-		    ctx->hidepid > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)
-			return invalfc(fc, "hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
 		break;
 
 	default:
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
index 7d852dbca253..21d19353fdc7 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ enum {
 	HIDEPID_OFF	  = 0,
 	HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
 	HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
+	HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE = 4, /* Limit pids to only ptraceable pids */
 };
 
 struct proc_fs_info {
-- 
2.25.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-03-27 17:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-27 17:23 [PATCH v10 0/9] proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 1/9] proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 2/9] proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace Alexey Gladkov
2020-04-02 15:31   ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-02 15:31     ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-02 16:32     ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 3/9] proc: move hide_pid, pid_gid from pid_namespace to proc_fs_info Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` Alexey Gladkov [this message]
2020-03-28 20:40   ` [PATCH v10 4/9] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option Kees Cook
2020-03-28 21:23     ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 5/9] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 6/9] docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 7/9] proc: move hidepid values to uapi as they are user interface to mount Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-28 20:41   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 21:25     ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-28 21:53       ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 23:00         ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-29  3:17           ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02 16:58   ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-02 16:58     ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-03 23:59     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 8/9] proc: use human-readable values for hidehid Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-28 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 21:14     ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-28 21:52       ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 22:54         ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-30 11:12   ` [PATCH v11 " Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-30 18:33     ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02 16:11     ` Jann Horn
2020-04-02 16:11       ` Jann Horn
2020-04-02 16:05   ` [PATCH v10 " Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-02 16:05     ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-02 16:51     ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-04-02 17:04       ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-02 17:04         ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-09 14:32     ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 9/9] proc: use named enums for better readability Alexey Gladkov
2020-04-02 17:00 ` [PATCH v10 0/9] proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-02 17:00   ` Eric W. Biederman

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