From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com Cc: qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Subject: [RFC v2 05/18] target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 13:42:51 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200521034304.340040-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200521034304.340040-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> The SEV code uses a pretty ugly global to access its internal state. Now that SEVState is embedded in SevGuestState, we can avoid accessing it via the global in some cases. In the remaining cases use a new global referencing the containing SevGuestState which will simplify some future transformations. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> --- target/i386/sev.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index b4ab9720d6..9e8ab7b056 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct SevGuestState { #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */ #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev" -static SEVState *sev_state; +static SevGuestState *sev_guest; static Error *sev_mig_blocker; static const char *const sev_fw_errlist[] = { @@ -159,21 +159,21 @@ fw_error_to_str(int code) } static bool -sev_check_state(SevState state) +sev_check_state(const SevGuestState *sev, SevState state) { - assert(sev_state); - return sev_state->state == state ? true : false; + assert(sev); + return sev->state.state == state ? true : false; } static void -sev_set_guest_state(SevState new_state) +sev_set_guest_state(SevGuestState *sev, SevState new_state) { assert(new_state < SEV_STATE__MAX); - assert(sev_state); + assert(sev); - trace_kvm_sev_change_state(SevState_str(sev_state->state), + trace_kvm_sev_change_state(SevState_str(sev->state.state), SevState_str(new_state)); - sev_state->state = new_state; + sev->state.state = new_state; } static void @@ -366,25 +366,25 @@ lookup_sev_guest_info(const char *id) bool sev_enabled(void) { - return sev_state ? true : false; + return !!sev_guest; } uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void) { - return sev_state ? sev_state->me_mask : ~0; + return sev_guest ? sev_guest->state.me_mask : ~0; } uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void) { - return sev_state ? sev_state->cbitpos : 0; + return sev_guest ? sev_guest->state.cbitpos : 0; } uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void) { - return sev_state ? sev_state->reduced_phys_bits : 0; + return sev_guest ? sev_guest->state.reduced_phys_bits : 0; } SevInfo * @@ -393,15 +393,15 @@ sev_get_info(void) SevInfo *info; info = g_new0(SevInfo, 1); - info->enabled = sev_state ? true : false; + info->enabled = sev_enabled(); if (info->enabled) { - info->api_major = sev_state->api_major; - info->api_minor = sev_state->api_minor; - info->build_id = sev_state->build_id; - info->policy = sev_state->policy; - info->state = sev_state->state; - info->handle = sev_state->handle; + info->api_major = sev_guest->state.api_major; + info->api_minor = sev_guest->state.api_minor; + info->build_id = sev_guest->state.build_id; + info->policy = sev_guest->state.policy; + info->state = sev_guest->state.state; + info->handle = sev_guest->state.handle; } return info; @@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ sev_launch_start(SevGuestState *sev) object_property_set_int(OBJECT(sev), start->handle, "handle", &error_abort); - sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE); + sev_set_guest_state(sev, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE); s->handle = start->handle; s->policy = start->policy; ret = 0; @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ out: } static int -sev_launch_update_data(uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) +sev_launch_update_data(SevGuestState *sev, uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) { int ret, fw_error; struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data update; @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ sev_launch_update_data(uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) update.uaddr = (__u64)(unsigned long)addr; update.len = len; trace_kvm_sev_launch_update_data(addr, len); - ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->state.sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &update, &fw_error); if (ret) { error_report("%s: LAUNCH_UPDATE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", @@ -588,19 +588,20 @@ sev_launch_update_data(uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) static void sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused) { + SevGuestState *sev = sev_guest; int ret, error; guchar *data; - SEVState *s = sev_state; + SEVState *s = &sev->state; struct kvm_sev_launch_measure *measurement; - if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) { + if (!sev_check_state(sev, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) { return; } measurement = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure, 1); /* query the measurement blob length */ - ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->state.sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, measurement, &error); if (!measurement->len) { error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", @@ -612,7 +613,7 @@ sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused) measurement->uaddr = (unsigned long)data; /* get the measurement blob */ - ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->state.sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, measurement, &error); if (ret) { error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", @@ -620,7 +621,7 @@ sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused) goto free_data; } - sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET); + sev_set_guest_state(sev, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET); /* encode the measurement value and emit the event */ s->measurement = g_base64_encode(data, measurement->len); @@ -635,9 +636,9 @@ free_measurement: char * sev_get_launch_measurement(void) { - if (sev_state && - sev_state->state >= SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET) { - return g_strdup(sev_state->measurement); + if (sev_guest && + sev_guest->state.state >= SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET) { + return g_strdup(sev_guest->state.measurement); } return NULL; @@ -648,20 +649,21 @@ static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { }; static void -sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s) +sev_launch_finish(SevGuestState *sev) { + SEVState *s = &sev->state; int ret, error; Error *local_err = NULL; trace_kvm_sev_launch_finish(); - ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, 0, &error); + ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, 0, &error); if (ret) { error_report("%s: LAUNCH_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error)); exit(1); } - sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING); + sev_set_guest_state(sev, SEV_STATE_RUNNING); /* add migration blocker */ error_setg(&sev_mig_blocker, @@ -677,11 +679,11 @@ sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s) static void sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) { - SEVState *s = opaque; + SevGuestState *sev = opaque; if (running) { - if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { - sev_launch_finish(s); + if (!sev_check_state(sev, SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { + sev_launch_finish(sev); } } } @@ -704,7 +706,8 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) goto err; } - sev_state = s = &sev->state; + sev_guest = sev; + s = &sev->state; s->state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT; host_cpuid(0x8000001F, 0, NULL, &ebx, NULL, NULL); @@ -766,23 +769,24 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier); qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify); - qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, s); + qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, sev); - return s; + return sev; err: - g_free(sev_state); - sev_state = NULL; + sev_guest = NULL; return NULL; } int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len) { - assert(handle); + SevGuestState *sev = handle; + + assert(sev); /* if SEV is in update state then encrypt the data else do nothing */ - if (sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) { - return sev_launch_update_data(ptr, len); + if (sev_check_state(sev, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) { + return sev_launch_update_data(sev, ptr, len); } return 0; -- 2.26.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, cohuck@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Subject: [RFC v2 05/18] target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 13:42:51 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200521034304.340040-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200521034304.340040-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> The SEV code uses a pretty ugly global to access its internal state. Now that SEVState is embedded in SevGuestState, we can avoid accessing it via the global in some cases. In the remaining cases use a new global referencing the containing SevGuestState which will simplify some future transformations. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> --- target/i386/sev.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index b4ab9720d6..9e8ab7b056 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct SevGuestState { #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */ #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev" -static SEVState *sev_state; +static SevGuestState *sev_guest; static Error *sev_mig_blocker; static const char *const sev_fw_errlist[] = { @@ -159,21 +159,21 @@ fw_error_to_str(int code) } static bool -sev_check_state(SevState state) +sev_check_state(const SevGuestState *sev, SevState state) { - assert(sev_state); - return sev_state->state == state ? true : false; + assert(sev); + return sev->state.state == state ? true : false; } static void -sev_set_guest_state(SevState new_state) +sev_set_guest_state(SevGuestState *sev, SevState new_state) { assert(new_state < SEV_STATE__MAX); - assert(sev_state); + assert(sev); - trace_kvm_sev_change_state(SevState_str(sev_state->state), + trace_kvm_sev_change_state(SevState_str(sev->state.state), SevState_str(new_state)); - sev_state->state = new_state; + sev->state.state = new_state; } static void @@ -366,25 +366,25 @@ lookup_sev_guest_info(const char *id) bool sev_enabled(void) { - return sev_state ? true : false; + return !!sev_guest; } uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void) { - return sev_state ? sev_state->me_mask : ~0; + return sev_guest ? sev_guest->state.me_mask : ~0; } uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void) { - return sev_state ? sev_state->cbitpos : 0; + return sev_guest ? sev_guest->state.cbitpos : 0; } uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void) { - return sev_state ? sev_state->reduced_phys_bits : 0; + return sev_guest ? sev_guest->state.reduced_phys_bits : 0; } SevInfo * @@ -393,15 +393,15 @@ sev_get_info(void) SevInfo *info; info = g_new0(SevInfo, 1); - info->enabled = sev_state ? true : false; + info->enabled = sev_enabled(); if (info->enabled) { - info->api_major = sev_state->api_major; - info->api_minor = sev_state->api_minor; - info->build_id = sev_state->build_id; - info->policy = sev_state->policy; - info->state = sev_state->state; - info->handle = sev_state->handle; + info->api_major = sev_guest->state.api_major; + info->api_minor = sev_guest->state.api_minor; + info->build_id = sev_guest->state.build_id; + info->policy = sev_guest->state.policy; + info->state = sev_guest->state.state; + info->handle = sev_guest->state.handle; } return info; @@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ sev_launch_start(SevGuestState *sev) object_property_set_int(OBJECT(sev), start->handle, "handle", &error_abort); - sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE); + sev_set_guest_state(sev, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE); s->handle = start->handle; s->policy = start->policy; ret = 0; @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ out: } static int -sev_launch_update_data(uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) +sev_launch_update_data(SevGuestState *sev, uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) { int ret, fw_error; struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data update; @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ sev_launch_update_data(uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) update.uaddr = (__u64)(unsigned long)addr; update.len = len; trace_kvm_sev_launch_update_data(addr, len); - ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->state.sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &update, &fw_error); if (ret) { error_report("%s: LAUNCH_UPDATE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", @@ -588,19 +588,20 @@ sev_launch_update_data(uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) static void sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused) { + SevGuestState *sev = sev_guest; int ret, error; guchar *data; - SEVState *s = sev_state; + SEVState *s = &sev->state; struct kvm_sev_launch_measure *measurement; - if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) { + if (!sev_check_state(sev, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) { return; } measurement = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure, 1); /* query the measurement blob length */ - ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->state.sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, measurement, &error); if (!measurement->len) { error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", @@ -612,7 +613,7 @@ sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused) measurement->uaddr = (unsigned long)data; /* get the measurement blob */ - ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->state.sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, measurement, &error); if (ret) { error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", @@ -620,7 +621,7 @@ sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused) goto free_data; } - sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET); + sev_set_guest_state(sev, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET); /* encode the measurement value and emit the event */ s->measurement = g_base64_encode(data, measurement->len); @@ -635,9 +636,9 @@ free_measurement: char * sev_get_launch_measurement(void) { - if (sev_state && - sev_state->state >= SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET) { - return g_strdup(sev_state->measurement); + if (sev_guest && + sev_guest->state.state >= SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET) { + return g_strdup(sev_guest->state.measurement); } return NULL; @@ -648,20 +649,21 @@ static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { }; static void -sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s) +sev_launch_finish(SevGuestState *sev) { + SEVState *s = &sev->state; int ret, error; Error *local_err = NULL; trace_kvm_sev_launch_finish(); - ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, 0, &error); + ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, 0, &error); if (ret) { error_report("%s: LAUNCH_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error)); exit(1); } - sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING); + sev_set_guest_state(sev, SEV_STATE_RUNNING); /* add migration blocker */ error_setg(&sev_mig_blocker, @@ -677,11 +679,11 @@ sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s) static void sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) { - SEVState *s = opaque; + SevGuestState *sev = opaque; if (running) { - if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { - sev_launch_finish(s); + if (!sev_check_state(sev, SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { + sev_launch_finish(sev); } } } @@ -704,7 +706,8 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) goto err; } - sev_state = s = &sev->state; + sev_guest = sev; + s = &sev->state; s->state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT; host_cpuid(0x8000001F, 0, NULL, &ebx, NULL, NULL); @@ -766,23 +769,24 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier); qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify); - qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, s); + qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, sev); - return s; + return sev; err: - g_free(sev_state); - sev_state = NULL; + sev_guest = NULL; return NULL; } int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len) { - assert(handle); + SevGuestState *sev = handle; + + assert(sev); /* if SEV is in update state then encrypt the data else do nothing */ - if (sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) { - return sev_launch_update_data(ptr, len); + if (sev_check_state(sev, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) { + return sev_launch_update_data(sev, ptr, len); } return 0; -- 2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-21 3:43 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-05-21 3:42 [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 01/18] target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:01 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:04 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 02/18] target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:03 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:05 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 03/18] target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:05 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:06 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 04/18] target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:07 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson [this message] 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 05/18] target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:08 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 06/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:11 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:09 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 07/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:13 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 08/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:16 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 09/18] target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:13 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:18 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 10/18] guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 1:44 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 11/18] guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:21 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 12/18] guest memory protection: Perform KVM init " David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:39 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-02 3:45 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 13/18] guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:41 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 14/18] guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:54 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth 2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth 2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 15/18] guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 4:13 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson 2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 16/18] guest memory protection: Add Error ** to GuestMemoryProtection::kvm_init David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:16 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 4:15 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 17/18] spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai 2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai 2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic 2020-05-29 22:19 ` [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Sean Christopherson 2020-05-29 22:19 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson 2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson 2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson
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