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From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, mst@redhat.com,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
	cohuck@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
	Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, david@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 12:06:02 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200619020602.118306-10-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200619020602.118306-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
to directly access guest memory.  That doesn't work if the guest's memory
is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.

So, if a host trust limitation mechanism is enabled, then apply the
iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
---
 hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
index a71792bc16..8dfc1bb3f8 100644
--- a/hw/core/machine.c
+++ b/hw/core/machine.c
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
 #include "migration/vmstate.h"
 #include "exec/host-trust-limitation.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
 
 GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {
     { "virtio-balloon-device", "page-poison", "false" },
@@ -1165,6 +1167,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
          * areas.
          */
         machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
+
+        /*
+         * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
+         * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
+         * mechanisms.  That requires disabling legacy virtio support
+         * for virtio pci devices
+         */
+        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
+        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
     }
 
     machine_class->init(machine);
-- 
2.26.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, cohuck@redhat.com,
	david@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
	David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 12:06:02 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200619020602.118306-10-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200619020602.118306-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
to directly access guest memory.  That doesn't work if the guest's memory
is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.

So, if a host trust limitation mechanism is enabled, then apply the
iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
---
 hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
index a71792bc16..8dfc1bb3f8 100644
--- a/hw/core/machine.c
+++ b/hw/core/machine.c
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
 #include "migration/vmstate.h"
 #include "exec/host-trust-limitation.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
 
 GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {
     { "virtio-balloon-device", "page-poison", "false" },
@@ -1165,6 +1167,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
          * areas.
          */
         machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
+
+        /*
+         * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
+         * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
+         * mechanisms.  That requires disabling legacy virtio support
+         * for virtio pci devices
+         */
+        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
+        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
     }
 
     machine_class->init(machine);
-- 
2.26.2



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-19  2:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 112+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-19  2:05 [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05   ` David Gibson
2020-06-26 11:01   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-26 11:01     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-14 19:26   ` Richard Henderson
2020-07-14 19:26     ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05   ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05   ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05   ` David Gibson
2020-07-14 19:36   ` Richard Henderson
2020-07-14 19:36     ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05   ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05   ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06   ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] spapr: PEF: block migration David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06   ` David Gibson
2020-06-26 10:33   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-26 10:33     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-05  7:38     ` David Gibson
2020-07-05  7:38       ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06 ` David Gibson [this message]
2020-06-19  2:06   ` [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-06-19 10:12   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 10:12     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 11:46     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 11:46       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 11:47       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 11:47         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 12:16         ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 12:16           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 20:04           ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-19 20:04             ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-24  7:55           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-24  7:55             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-25  4:57             ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  4:57               ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:02       ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:02         ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 14:45     ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 14:45       ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 15:05       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 15:05         ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-20  8:24         ` David Gibson
2020-06-20  8:24           ` David Gibson
2020-06-22  9:09           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-22  9:09             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-25  5:06             ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:06               ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:42 ` [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models no-reply
2020-06-19  2:42   ` no-reply
2020-06-19  8:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19  8:28   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19  9:45   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19  9:45     ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19  9:56     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19  9:56       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19 10:05       ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19 10:05         ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19 10:10         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19 10:10           ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-22 12:02           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-22 12:02             ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-25  5:25             ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:25               ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  7:06               ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25  7:06                 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-26  4:42                 ` David Gibson
2020-06-26  4:42                   ` David Gibson
2020-06-26  6:53                   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-26  6:53                     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-26  9:01                     ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26  9:01                       ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26  9:32                       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26  9:32                         ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26  9:49                         ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26  9:49                           ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26 10:29                           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-26 10:29                             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-26 10:58                             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26 10:58                               ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26 12:49                               ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26 12:49                                 ` Janosch Frank
2020-07-01 11:59                                 ` Halil Pasic
2020-07-01 11:59                                   ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-19  9:48   ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  9:48     ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 10:04     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19 10:04       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25  5:42       ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:42         ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  6:59         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25  6:59           ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25  9:49           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-25  9:49             ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-22 14:27 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-06-22 14:27   ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-06-24  7:06   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-24  7:06     ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-25  5:47     ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:47       ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:48       ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:48         ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:44   ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:44     ` David Gibson

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